The effects of market and firm structure on the performance of food processing firms by Arnould, Richard Julius
Retrospective Theses and Dissertations Iowa State University Capstones, Theses andDissertations
1968
The effects of market and firm structure on the
performance of food processing firms
Richard Julius Arnould
Iowa State University
Follow this and additional works at: https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/rtd
Part of the Economics Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Iowa State University Capstones, Theses and Dissertations at Iowa State University
Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Retrospective Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact digirep@iastate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Arnould, Richard Julius, "The effects of market and firm structure on the performance of food processing firms " (1968). Retrospective
Theses and Dissertations. 3275.
https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/rtd/3275
This dissertation has been 
microfikned exactly as received 6 8-14,768 
AKNOULD, Richard Julius, 1941-
THE EFFECTS OF MARKET AND FIRM STRUCTURE 
ON THE PERFORMANCE OF FOOD PROCESSING 
FIRMS. 
Iowa State University, Ph.D„ 1968 
Economics, general 
University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan 
THE EFFECTS OF MARKET AND FIRM STRUCTURE ON THE 
PERFORMANCE OF FOOD PROCESSING FIRMS 
by 
A Dissertation Submitted to the 
Graduate Faculty in Partial Fulfillment of 
The Requirements for the Degree of 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
Major Subject; Economics 
Richard Julius Arnould 
In Charge of Major Work 
Iowa State University 
Of Science and Technology 
Ames, Iowa 
1968 
Signature was redacted for privacy.
Signature was redacted for privacy.
Signature was redacted for privacy.
li 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 1 
CHAPTER II. REVIEW OF THEORY AND HYPOTHESES TO BE TESTED 4 
CHAPTER III. METHODOLOGY AND DATA USED TO TEST HYPOTHESES 57 
CHAPTER IV. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FOOD PROCESSING 
INDUSTRIES 77 
CHAPTER V. RESULTS OF THE REGRESSION ANALYSIS 91 
CHAPTER VI. MARKET STRUCTURE AND ANTITRUST POLICY 153 
CHAPTER VII. CONCLUSIONS 193 
LITERATURE CITED 199 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 208 
APPENDIX A. THE NATURE OF COST CURVES FOR FOOD IlffiUSTRIES 209 
APPENDIX B. DATA USED IN THE SURVIVAL TECHNIQUE 214 
APPENDIX C. DISTRIBUTIONS OF PROFIT RATES, DIVERSIFICATION, 
AND CONCENTRATION BY SIZE OF FIRM 226 
1 
CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1963 over 1.5 million people were employed in the food manu­
facturing industries.^ The value added in food manufacturing exceeded 
$18 billion in 1963. This is more than 2.5 times larger than the same 
industries were in 1947 (80). Almost 20 percent of personal consumption 
expenditures were made for processed food in 1965. 
There were more than 31 thousand companies primarily engaged in 
food processing in 1963 compared to 8.8 thousand in chemicals and allied 
products and 6.2 thousand companies in primary metals. Food manufacturing 
corporations accounted for 21 percent of the total advertising of all 
manufacturing corporations in 1962 (87, p. 66). Dollar sales of corpora­
tions in this sector of our economy increased by more than 76 percent 
from 1947 to 1962 while the dollar sales of unincorporated firms in the 
same sector grew by 4.9 percent (57, p. 8). In 1954 the 100 largest food 
manufacturers held four or more of the eight leading positions in 50 
percent of the food product classes. This percentage control increased 
to over 70 percent in 1964 (57, p. 8). 
These facts indicate the magnitude of the food processing sector 
of the economy. They point to the growth and structural change occurring 
^The Standard Industrial Classification will be used throughout 
the thesis. An industry refers to a four-digit classification containing 
a number of five-digit product groups. Three-digit classifications 
refer to groups of related industries. The following specific breakdown 
of industry groups will be used to study the food processing industry: 
meat products, 201; dairy products, 202; canned and frozen fruits and 
vegetables, 203; grain mill products, 204; bakery products, 205; other 
food companies; and companies producing food products but primarily 
engaged in nonfood activities. 
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in that sector. The food processing industries have developed from small 
local firms into networks of large conglomerately diversified manufac­
turers. Therefore, it is important to investigate the effects of these 
developments on the economic performance of these industries. 
This thesis is a test of the contribution of selected structure 
and conduct characteristics of the firm and its primary industry to 
the performance differentials that exist among food processing firms. 
The measures of performance to be used are profitability and cost 
efficiency. Structural characteristics selected for measurement are 
industry concentration, size of the firm, diversified market power, and 
barriers to entry caused by plant and/or company economies of scale. 
Measures of conduct are represented by the amount of product differentia­
tion and the amount of product diversification. 
An industrial organization study should facilitate the understanding 
of the interaction and interdependancies of the structural environment 
with conduct and performance. This enhanced understanding should, further­
more, increase our perception of the working of a realistic market 
economy. The results of such a study should yield implications concerning 
the monopolistic performance of firms resulting from various market 
structures, company structures and forms of conduct and determine the 
value and appropriateness of structural dimensions as guideposts for 
antitrust policy. 
The theoretical relationships involved in evaluating market 
performance are discussed in Chapter II. The data and methodology used 
to test these theoretical relationships and determine their strength 
are given in Chapter III. A look at the general characteristics of 
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competition in the food processing industry is presented in Chapter IV. 
The results of the statistical analysis are presented in Chapter V along 
with a critique of findings in other studies. Chapter VI summarizes the 
legal history of antitrust action relevant to the measures studied in 
the preceding chapters and builds a case for revised policy based on 
the results of the tested hypotheses. 
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CHAPTER II. REVIEW OF THEORY AND HYPOTHESES TO BE TESTED 
The intent of this industrial organization study is to evaluate 
the competitive performance of the large firms making up a substantial 
segment of the food processing sector of the economy. The norms used to 
evaluate performance must first be evaluated in theoretical market 
situations. The actual measurement of market characteristics requires 
the use of indirect or proxy measures and thus, must be evaluated in 
accordance with the weaknesses of such measures. 
Economic theory should, as Bain points out, (6, p. 22) (1) provide 
an analysis of the way the enterprise economy functions under a given 
set of structural and behavioral conditions, (2) explain why it functions 
in this manner, (3) predict how it will function under a changed set of 
conditions, and (4) evaluate the performance of the economy under 
different sets of assumptions on the basis of the contribution made by 
the economy in each case to the previously defined social welfare goals 
of the individuals in the economy. 
In meeting these criteria society must provide the desired per­
formance norms. Economic research should be used to evaluate the extent 
to which markets achieve these norms._ In various oligopolistic market 
situations the underlying assumptions needed to evaluate this system 
are very stringent resulting in significant losses of generality in the 
results (8). 
Thus in realistic industry situationsisuch as those confronted in 
the various food processing industries where numerous assumptions of 
existing theory are violated,the procedure must be one of hypothesizing 
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performance characteristics of firms under certain market situations in 
relation to firms in other market situations. The measured (cardinal 
or ordinal) deviation of the conditions existing among firms in one 
industry from similarly measured conditions for firms in another 
industry when other differences in the industries are accounted for can 
provide measures of the existence and type of relationships between 
industry structure and performance. 
Market Performance of Firms 
This study involves testing certain hypotheses that describe the 
expected relationship and influence of certain structural and behavioral 
conditions on the performance measures of firms that have been emphasized 
in modern theory and research. The firm is used as a basis for description 
because it is more legitimate to expect monopoly influences to show in 
the performance of firms, not in industry averages that encompass both 
monopolistic firms and those firms against which the monopoly power is 
being exerted. 
Bain states that "...The essential limits of the performance of 
enterprises within a capitalistic economy are those of adjusting to 
whatever demands are present for their outputs, with the restriction 
that in so adjusting they must as a group at least break 'even'..." 
(6, p. 11). Price theory and general equilibrium theory, which consider 
this adjustment process, evaluate the performance of the adjustment on 
the basis of the level of production efficiency attained, the cost-price 
relationship, and the resultant income distribution. This approach 
does not take into account the ability of the economy to adjust to at 
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least three economic performance goals set by the political institutions, 
these being full employment, steady economic growth, and stable economic 
conditions. The triad of structure, conduct, and performance must then 
be evaluated at three levels, at the firm level, at the industry level, 
and at the aggregative economic level. If the performance goals at 
different levels are in conflict, society, taking into account legal 
feasibility, social and cultural preferences, must through such measures 
as antitrust laws adjust the conflicting goals. This thesis considers 
primarily the extent to which the performance of a firm is influenced 
by the structure of the market (industry) in"which it participates. 
It is not mechanically feasible to investigate all possible measures 
of performance in a study of this size and retain any ability to 
generalize over a sector so large as the food processing sector. Profit^ 
ability, production efficiency and the adequacy of the scale of operations 
are considered here. These are measured at the firm and industry level. 
The stability and level of profits over time of diversified firms compared 
to nondiversified firms are the only measures of aggregative economic 
performance to be considered. The adequacy of each of these as a 
performance norm will be discussed in turn. 
Profitability 
Profitability achieves its importance as a measure of performance 
because it is the most readily available measure of the impact of market 
power on resource allocation. Productive efficiency as defined by the 
Pareto optimality conditions is achieved when any further reallocation 
of inputs would result in a reduction of output by at least one producing 
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unit. Utility is maximized when any further reallocation of commodities 
(including all items in the individual's utility function) would reduce 
the level of utility of at least one person. The joint efficiency or 
general optimality is achieved when rates of commodity substitution for 
all consumers are equal to one another and to the rate cf product trans­
formation for all producers. Perfect competition guarantees the existence 
of this condition of optimality (44, pp. 79-120). 
If monopoly elements are present among the producers or sellers 
a price may be charged that would exceed marginal costs because the 
demand faced by each firm is no longer infinitely elastic but is downward 
sloping. Price, being a function of quantity sold under monopoly conditions, 
is now subject to the influence of the firm. It can be manipulated by 
actions of the firm, e.g., restricting output at a quantity below that 
of minimum average costs. Thus the ratios of the marginal products will 
no longer be equal to the ratios of the prices for the producers and the 
ratios of marginal costs will no longer equal the ratios of commodity 
prices for the consumer but will exceed them. A reallocation of inputs 
(or output) can be found that will increase the level of output (consumption) 
of at least one producer (consumer) without diminishing the level of 
output (consumption) of another (42, pp. 201-211). The degree of the 
misallocation of resources or welfare loss is determined by the divergence 
of price from marginal costs in the input and output markets, which is in 
turn determined by the elasticity of demand and the shape of the cost 
functions. One serious weakness in the Pareto system for determining a 
social optimum is that the resultant optimum is not independent of the 
initial distribution of income (45, pp. 215-281). In the current society 
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of the United States income distribution has become a matter of policy 
concern to the extent that legislation has been inacted to redistribute 
income in a more equal manner. Therefore, policy norms that are to be 
derived from welfare theory must go beyond the criteria of the Pareto 
optimum and pure competition to take into account this factor. 
In an historical sense, differently defined concepts of workable 
competition have entered to fill this gap and to alleviate problems 
involved in the theory of second best alternatives. The theory of 
second best states that "...if an irremovable constraint is introduced 
into a general equilibrium model so as to prevent the attainment of one 
or more of the optimum conditions, the remaining conditions, although 
still attainable, are not necessarily desirable." (34, p. 15; 50, 
pp. 11-32). J. M. Clark stated that it is not true that satisfying more, 
but not all, of the presumed conditions will necessarily lead to a 
desired position (15, p. 241). As a substitute for the pure competition 
norm Clark introduced the concept of workable competition. To summarize, 
Clark maintains the existence of workable competition under the following 
circumstances: (1) If there exists small numbers of firms in a given 
industry there must be sufficient product heterogeneity accompanied with 
sufficient potential for commodity substitution to cause competitive 
response uncertainties; (2) there should exist a demand curve with 
sufficient elasticity to allow the firm to cover long-run average costs; 
and (3) there should be an active threat of potential competition from 
existing firms and new entrants (15, p. 241). 
Stigler states that an industry is workably competitive when 
''...(1) there are a considerable number of firms selling closely related 
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products in each important market area; (2) these firms are not in 
collusion; and (3) the long-run average cost curve for a new firm is not 
materially higher than for an established firm." (76, pp. 2-3) Edwards 
and Sosnick give definitions of workable competition that represent more 
explicit breakdowns of Stigler's points (26, pp. 9-10; 72, pp. 380-423). 
These concepts of workable competition do not attempt to drive all factors 
to the assumed level of perfect competition but to a workable level of 
competition where there are sufficient numbers of producers and sellers 
to allow competitive pricing to function, excess profits or losses 
are not present to the extent that the consumer is jeopardized at the 
expense of the monopolistic producer, but profits are high enough to 
reward innovation, creativity, and risk. Therefore, long-run profit 
differentials that exist between firms should not entirely be the result 
of that firm's market share, structure, or any artificial barriers to 
entry that it may develop. Temporary differentials between the perfor­
mance of various firms (and industries) should be expected for a number 
of reasons. First, the firms have varying abilities to cope with risk 
and uncertainty. Second, the firms in different industries have varying 
degrees of factor mobility and thus have varying rates of adjustment 
to dynamic factors. Third, the firms may have different levels of 
internal efficiency caused by the possession (or lack of possession) of 
scarce resources such as management. This could lengthen any temporary 
difference between one firm and another. Fourth, the competitive 
adjustment from one equalibrium to another causes differentials to exist. 
These are only a few of the factors that could cause temporary differentials. 
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Zimmerman has stated that market structure is a response to funda­
mental conditions of tastes and technology, while profits are merely 
the result of this response (95). He therefore concluded that antitrust 
action should not try to dispel monopolistic structure because the 
monopolistic structure grants stability (95, p. 5). However, Bain and 
others have shown empirically that production technology does not warrant 
the existence of a small number of large firms in each industry (5, p. 84; 
68; 75; 93). If Zimmerman is accurate, it must be "tastes" that lead 
to monopolistic industry structure. But are the tastes of the entre­
preneur in accord with the tastes of the consumer? If the entrepreneur 
is assumed to be a profit maximizer the answer must be only conditionally 
affirmative. The monopolistic producer may be able to increase profits 
at the expense of efficient resource allocation and consumer welfare. 
Therefore profit differences between firms should not be justified 
solely on the basis of the market share of that firm or the structure 
of the industry to which it belongs. 
To summarize, as Bain points out, for a workably competitive system, 
short-term excess profits are justified and "therapeutic" for the economy 
to offset short-term losses encountered in depressing periods, to en­
courage expansion, efficient production, research and innovation, and to 
reward risk and uncertainty (6, p. 371). Chronic excess profits cause 
an inequality of income distribution by favoring enterprise owners at 
the expense of other recipients and by the undesirable impact on resource 
allocation among industries. 
Excess profits will not be measured in absolute terms in this paper 
because of the problems of setting a competitive and appropriate profit 
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norm. A measure can be made of the effects of monopolistic structure on 
profit rates using various measures of market power and concentration 
to be discussed below. Various empirical studies have shown that certain 
relationships exist between average industry profits and industry-
structure particularly when accompanied with barriers to entry (7, 36, 
57, 69, 92), These studies have not taken into account the effects of 
market power in diverse industries by the same firm. These studies 
have not measured the influence of market structure on individual firms. 
It will be hypothesized below that firms with diverse market power can 
use such power to stabilize profits. 
The studies mentioned above have investigated the profit rates of 
one industry compared to another again with some measure of industry 
concentration as a dependent variable. A deviation from this standard, 
in which the performance of individual firms within concentrated industries 
is compared to the performance of individual firms in unconcentrated 
industries rather than the representative firm of a given size category, 
will allow a more direct test of modern theory. This approach is fostered 
by both economic and statistical logic. First, from the economic point 
of view the firm encompasses the decision unit, not the industry. Thus 
any profits that accrue to oligopolisticly structured industries should 
accrue in a somewhat like degree to those firms that are a part of the 
oligopoly. The individual firm would not desire to become a part of 
the oligopolistic structure if it did not achieve the levels of 
performance of the other oligopolists. Differences that may exist 
among the performance of various members of any market oligopoly (as 
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would be expected with an imperfect capital market, different management, 
etc.) are eliminated when industry averages are used. The effects of 
market and firm structure should be evaluated with respect to their 
impact on individual firms. 
The statistical problem is again the problem of averaging. Using 
average industry profits as a measure of performance eliminates all 
within industry variation which may or may not overwhelm any between 
industry variation. This reduction in total variance increases the 
level of explained variance. The increase could be significant enough 
to give spurious levels of significance to relationships between 
2 
variables. 
In an unconcentrated industry profits of firms of varying sizes 
should tend to be equalized if (1) there are close product substitutes 
and (2) low barriers to entry. In a monopolistic industry the profit 
rates of firms should be highly correlated with a measure of the firms' 
market power. 
If monopoly profits are made by certain firms in an industry other 
firms may remain in the same industry making lesser profits because of 
the cost umbrella held over these firms by the price cost margins of 
the monopolistic firms. There may be no convergence of profits to any 
one level because of varying degrees of efficiency present among the 
firms. 
This argument will be developed in more detail in a later section 
of the paper. 
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However, in the industries studied product differentiation exists 
which allows the firms to sell substitutable products in the same or 
different markets at different prices thus achieving different levels 
of profitability. Thus the extent of monopoly pricing by firms in these 
industries cannot be determined solely by the cross-sectional variation 
in the profits of firms within "aHy'industry. 
If in a competitive industry, determined to be so by the existence 
of a large number of firms, the profit variation among the different 
firms at a given time is very small, there must be no unique optimum 
size of firm, i.e., no recognizable economies or diseconomies of scale 
for the firm. If in an industry determined to be monopolistic in structure 
by the existence of a few firms with significant market power, there is 
no significant variation in the profit rates between possessing market 
power and firms without signs of market power, the firms with the market 
power must not be using the market power to increase profits, i.e., they 
must be functioning competitively, or there must be little difference in 
the level of efficiency achieved among the various firms. Therefore 
profit rates should not be viewed in a vacuum but must be considered 
in conjunction with the performance of other firms (and industries) and 
the shape of the various firms' cost curves. Before discussing measures 
of costs, i.e., the efficiency of plants, an appropriate measure of 
profits must be selected. 
None of the numerous measures of profit directly conform to the 
tastes of economists. The particular ratio used should fit the hypotheses 
being tested. The question being asked here is what effect do structural 
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characteristics that describe firms in monopolistically structured 
industries have on profitability? As was described above, excess profits 
indicate the existence of monopoly forces. Since excess profits cannot 
be practically distinguished from normal profits, the relationship of 
measured profit levels to other monopolistic attributes must be 
investigated. The profit measure should reflect the firm's ability 
to earn monopoly profits. But since monopoly profits are not being 
measured directly it is the differential levels of profit rates and 
their relationship to differential market structures that are important. 
A ratio of net profit after taxes to net worth will be used in 
this study. Net profit after taxes is the lower limit of real profits. 
Real profits should be higher than accounting profits for the following 
reasons: (1) Part of the monopoly earnings may be paid in the form of 
excess officers compensation. This will keep reported profits below a 
level that would induce entry of new firms. (2) Depreciation, as a 
cost item, may not be a true reflection of the cost of capital equipment 
especially in periods where rapid write-offs are allowed. (3) Advertising 
has cumulative effects even though it is accounted for on a current cost 
basis. Possibly, advertising costs should be carried into future 
periods rather than written off in the year the investments were made. 
Net profit after taxes gives a measure of the firm's ability to earn 
money that can be retained for future expansion or passed on as dividends. 
Net worth is a measure of the cumulative amount of funds that have 
been invested in the firm. This account provides a measure of the 
amount of funds that could have been invested elsewhere or, at least in 
part, distributed to stockholders. Therefore, it provides a base for 
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the opportunity cost doctrine. In the ratio form of net profit to net 
worth a measure of the net returns derived from the activities of this 
firm can be compared to net returns of other firms and other areas of 
production. 
This ratio contains certain weaknesses as an accurate measure of 
profitability. First, net worth is an accumulation of past funds placed 
into the company thus being subject to unwarranted influence in periods 
of inflation and recession. Net profits are in current dollars therefore, 
not being affected in the same manner^ The inflated base may not truly 
reflect the value of the firm. An asset base would contain certain 
degrees of the same weakness. Second, it was mentioned above that 
excess profits may be passed on in the form of excess executive compensa­
tion, wages, or advertising. These items appear as cost items in the 
accounts thus reducing the true level of profits. Third, accounting 
depreciation may not reflect actual capital costs since it is neither 
an accurate measure of capital used nor the obsolescence of capital 
caused by changing technology. Fourth, the relative ability of firms 
to earn profits may be affected by the effect of the tax structure on 
firms of different sizes. The after tax ranking of net profit to net 
worth based on size of assets is very similar to the pretax ranking 
based on size of operation and the differences between size classes are 
only slightly affected. 
The ratio of net profit after taxes to net worth is an acceptable 
measure for the purposes of this study for another reason. Profit 
data for the food industries are presented in numerous forms by 
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Stekler (74), When ranked by assets size, profit rates reach a maximum 
in the $50 to $100.million asset category for all measures used by 
Stekler. Although absolute rates of profit vary under different forms 
of measurementj the relative differences between the profit rates of 
different size categories of firms do not change significantly. There­
fore, the consistency of one measure becomes the important element in 
a study of the relative differences in the levels of profit rates and 
a ratio of net profit after taxes to net worth is at least as consistent 
as alternatives. 
Efficiency of scale of operations 
The second measure of performance to be used is the efficiency of 
the scale of operation or the cost efficiencies of various firms. Firms 
operating in a competitive industry should be forced to produce within 
a close range of the lowest cost level of output on the long-run average 
cost curve. If the cost curve is horizontal over a major portion of 
the levels of output, the industry could accommodate firms of varying 
sizes but the profit rate of such firms should be equal. The minimally 
efficient scale of plant defines the necessary level of concentration for 
the efficient functioning of an industry. 
The distribution of profit ratios by size of firm has often been 
used as a measure of efficiency. The reasoning here being that a 
firm in a given industry that has a higher profit rate than other firms 
in the same industry must have cost efficiencies (1; 9; 61; 75; 86). 
The common fallacy in the use of profit rates as a measure of 
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efficiency is that the relation between profits and efficiency varies 
with the degree of competition. In a highly competitive market the 
relationship is a direct one. In oligopolistic or monopolistic markets 
higher profit rates may be the result of monopoly pricing, not efficiency 
in production. 
Collins and Preston have used the price-cost margin in their studies 
of competition and monopoly in food processing industries (82, pp. 711-728). 
The price-cost margin is a measure of monopoly power and was found to 
have a high positive correlation with industry concentration (82, pp. 
718-719). But this is neither a measure of efficiency nor of scale 
effects. The differential between price and cost does not give an 
indication of the absolute level of costs if monopoly elements are present. 
Therefore a direct measure of the relation between costs and size 
of firm provides the most adequate measure of efficiency and scale of 
operation. Four categories of costs are used to distinguish the 
relationship of the costs of company operation to size of the operation. 
First, total costs of operation includes cost of goods sold, general 
administrative overhead, depreciation, interest, advertising and sales 
promotion, and taxes. Total costs, although it may contain some elements 
of monopoly profits, does not in this case include the normal profit 
concept of economic theory. This level of aggregation avoids many of 
the problems arising from different accounting systems and changes in 
accounting systems. Differences in the product mix of companies haye 
a primary effect on the cost of goods sold, since this category 
contains most of the inplant production costs such as production labor. 
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inventories, and repairs and maintenance. The effect of product mix on 
efficiency is determined by examining the separate cost items, e.g., 
cost of goods sold, advertising, and general administrative overhead, 
to determine their respective minimum average levels with respect to 
extent of product mix and size of company. 
The existence of economies of multiplant operation above those of 
inplant production economies would cause the average total cost curve 
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to be downward sloping. Output of a multiproduct firm must be measured 
in dollar terms. Therefore average total cost becomes the ratio of total 
costs to total revenue. With this unit of measure product prices are 
used as weights of product output; thus total revenue becomes the index 
of output and average total cost is expressed as cost per dollar of 
sales. A precedent for this procedure is found in determining total 
costs by weighting optimum input combinations by factor prices (13, p. 
266). A similar technique was used by Douglas in deriving the elasticity 
coefficients used to determine the relationship between size of firm 
and the structure of costs in retailing (24). Using the 1RS grouped 
data and using the average data within each asset size group, Douglas 
found an eratic movement in total costs. This was explained by the 
movement of the elements within the total cost curve, i.e., operating 
expenses did not reach a minimum at the same level of output as did 
cost of goods sold. 
The nature of the total cost curve of a multiproduct firm will 
be discussed fully in the section on methodology. 
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A similar comparison of the cost components of food processing is 
presented here and related to size and structural parameters. The 
results of such tests should provide insights into the existence of scale 
effects in the industries studied. A discussion of plant economies is 
taken up in a later section dealing directly with barriers to entry. 
This study does not represent an attempt to exhaust the dimensions 
of performance. It attempts to determine the relationship of profit 
rates and cost structures to certain characteristics of structure and 
conduct. Many of the measures of performance promoted by Sosnick 
(26, pp. 9-10; 34; 73; 76; 85) and others are considered in their 
general aspects and compared to other sectors of the economy but are 
not made part of the regression analysis. 
The influence of risk and uncertainty is not being treated as a 
factor affecting the above mentioned performance variables. This could 
be a serious factor since all food products may not be affected equally 
by risk and uncertainty. First, it is assumed that they have all insured 
themselves against risk. Second, data limitation do not allow any 
further consideration of uncertainty in the cross-section analysis 
undertaken here. 
Structural Measures and Their Effects on Performance 
The most common indicators of the existence of monopoly elements 
have been the structural measures. The most frequently used structural 
measures are size of firm, delineation and size of the market and 
concentration. Bain has given the background for the relationships 
between structural elements and industrial performance that can be derived 
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from price theory. These relationships will be discussed in turn with 
each of the structural measures to be used in this study. It will 
be argued here that certain structural conditions are necessary but 
not sufficient conditions for monopolistic performance. The presence 
of certain structural conditions is indicatory of the existence of 
monopolistic elements. But the relationship between the structural 
conditions and levels of performance must be determined if monopoly or 
oligopolistic pronouncements are to be made. 
industry concentration 
Measures of industry concentration are conceived as indicia of 
oligopoly power or market bargaining power. Oligop-ly and monopoly 
power derives from a relationship between buyers and sellers with the 
strength of such power depending on the number, size distribution, 
and conduct of the buyers and sellers. The concentration ratios 
commonly used are one-parameter indices of firm numbers and their size 
distributions in various markets which some economists say may be 
regarded as direct measures of the ordinal degree of oligopoly (70, 
p. 109). 
The hypotheses of this research tend to support the concept that 
concentration ratios "...do provide an a priori basis, supported both 
by theory and experience for identifying markets containing signifi­
cant elements of monopoly, although the extent and significance of 
non-competitive elements so located must be evaluated in each case by 
further study (35, p. 1263)." That is, high concentration ratios 
20b 
signal attention to a particular industry but the relationships between 
high concentration and measures of performance must be tested to 
determine whether or not the market has functioned as a monopolistic 
market. 
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Scitovsky has outlined five effects, supported by theory, that would 
be expected in a monopolistic or oligopolistic market (70, pp. 102-110). 
First, monopoly power as represented by high concentration may have 
varying effects on income distribution. Some consider it inequitable 
for resources to receive more payment than is necessary to draw desirable 
quantities. Scitovsky considers income distribution to be one of the 
determinants of the flow of resources. Thus an income distribution that 
brings forth an efficient allocation of resources should be achieved 
(70, p. 102). Since concentration may allow monopoly prices and 
profits to be derived from the purchase of inputs and sale of output, 
incomes of certain groups of both consumers and producers are affected. 
It becomes more expensive and difficult to enter an industry and 
output may be restricted and sold at higher prices. 
Scitovsky maintains that "The aim of all concentration,..., is 
monopoly profit; and therefore the best way of measuring concentration 
is to measure the extent to which it achieves this aim (70, p. 103)." 
Therefore, the hypothesis is being tested that states that there is a 
high correlation between profit rates and the company's primary industry 
concentration, i.e., concentration in the primary industry accounts 
for a significant amount of the differences in profit levels between 
firms in different industries. 
Second, high concentration has an effect on the distribution of 
social and political power. The arguments here are similar to 
Galbraith's concept of countervailing power (37). The labor unions 
gain power to bargain with management, management bargains with the 
owners of capital. The balance of power in these bargaining situations 
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has an important influence on the balance of social and political power. 
The individual needs power to bargain against government, and this 
power might be derived from the socio-economic groups to which the 
Individual belongs. Monopoly power achieved from the concentration of 
industries can manifest itself in political action. Therefore, this 
may be a socially undesirable aspect of industrial concentration. 
However, this type social and political aspect of monopoly is not tested 
in this thesis. 
Third, the influence of concentration on monopoly power may have 
serious effects on the allocation of resources. In a competitive market 
resources are combined in the most efficient methods because of the 
price system which reflects relative scarcities and demands. In an 
oligopolistic market prices charged for outputs may be above marginal 
costs and prices paid for inputs may be below marginal value. Price is 
no longer a valid indicator of relative scarcities. Too little will be 
produced and too few resources will be utilized in these industries 
giving high profit margins. The existence of this condition is indicated 
by the hypothesized relationship that there is a high correlation between 
profit rates and concentration. 
High concentration will affect the allocation of resources in a 
second manner. Since there is high margin between price and marginal 
costs, firms in an oligopolistic industry are not forced to use the 
most efficient methods of production. Once again, price does not 
represent the relative scarcities of inputs and the "socially most 
desirable" combination is not used. The results of the hypothesis 
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relating concentration to profit margins will not indicate the extent 
of the misallocation but only the existence of a system that does not 
enforce the most efficient allocation of resources. 
Fourth, Seitovsky points out that "...profit maximization calls for 
efficiency in the internal administration and engineering setup of the 
firm, whatever the nature and structure of the markets in which the 
firm operates (70, p. 107)." To maintain a monopolistic position firms 
may charge an entry limiting price. This price, since it is below the 
monopoly price, will reduce the rewards for entry into the industry and 
thus establish barriers to entry (6, pp. 414-416). However, this could 
involve simple inefficiencies in the internal operation of the firm if 
by using the limit price firms do not adhere to the principle of profit 
maximization. 
Fifth, oligopolistic market structures may not promote a rapid 
rate of technological progress. The inducement pertains to the dynamic 
mechanism while the prior factors referred to efficiency in static 
systems. There is some controversy concerning the actual direction of 
the effects of structure on technological change. First, only the well 
endowed firms, namely those receiving high profits, can afford costly 
R&D programs. In the more atomistic industries such as agriculture, 
technological progress has been developed by input suppliers, i.e., the 
fertilizer producers, insecticide producers, and universities. Second, 
innovation is a risky venture that only the profitable can afford. Thus, 
even if the firm is profitable enough to be inventive it is not assured 
of being profitable enough to be an innovator. 
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On the other side, Fellner states that "...A well-known proposition 
maintains that in a competitive industry newcomers enter with a new 
model (and force old firms to price below old total costs, according to 
the new method) as soon as new total cost falls short of old total costs, 
while a monopolist will adopt a new method only if new total cost is 
lower than old variable costs (32, p. 114)." Thus, progress should be 
slower under monopoly. This implies that new firms have some information 
and foresight not available to existing firms. This assumption does 
not seem to be valid nor does this reasoning account for the source of 
the funds to support the inventor. Therefore, there seems to be no 
^ priori reason to expect one industry structure to exhibit a more rapid 
rate of technological progress than another (33, p. 556-577). 
Tests were not made in this study to determine the various rates 
and divergencies in rates of technological progress in the food processing 
industries. There seems to be an indication that in meat slaughtering 
the innovated techniques have been adopted by the independents building 
new plants at the decentralized locations. However, the industry is 
not characterized by high concentration but decreasing concentration. 
Innovation by meat processors seems to be introduced by the medium sized 
processors. In baking, also a relatively unconcentrated industry, 
the large national concerns have been the innovators. In soybean and 
corn milling, both highly concentrated industries, the same holds true. 
In canning the large processors have innovated field operations partly 
in response to restrictions on hiring nationalist labor and partly in 
response to anticipation of an organized labor movement in the industry. 
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In flour milling no general statement can be made concerning the relation-
4 
ship between innovation and company size. Therefore, there seems to be 
no general rule concerning the relationship between monopoly power and 
the rate of innovation in food processing. However, this point should 
not be considered closed to other researchers based on these non-empirical 
observations. 
A number of hypotheses including those already mentioned can be 
drawn from the above discussion: First it is expected that there is a 
high positive correlation between industry concentration and average 
Industry profit rates. Bain found that in a sample of 43 industries 
the average profitability on equity was high for the extremely highly 
concentrated and the very lowly concentrated industries (7, p. 313). 
Weiss found higher correlations between certain adjusted concentration 
ratios and average industry profits (92). The related hypothesis being 
tested in this research differs only in the sense that the relation is 
being tested between the profitability of firms and the concentration 
of the firms' primary industry. A positive relation is expected on the 
basis of the above discussion. The techniques used to test this hypothe­
sis and other factors relating to methodology will be given in Chapter 
III. 
Firms within a concentrated industry should experience higher 
profits than firms within unconcentrated industries regardless of the 
firm's relative size. The large dominant firms in a monopolistic 
This information was obtained from discussions with industry 
experts at the U.S.D.A. 
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industry shield the smaller firms by holding a cost umbrella over them. 
In this way the smaller inefficient firms can survive in a monopolistic 
industry whereas they would not have this margin protected by the cost 
umbrella in a more competitive industry. This is directly related to 
the above hypothesis but the use of individual company statistics could 
indicate things left uncovered in industry averages. To uncover the 
possibility that large firms earn relatively equal profits regardless 
of their primary industry, a firm size variable was introduced into the 
study. This will be discussed below. 
A second hypothesis flows from the concept of the cost umbrella. 
That is, if monopolistic power does exist and the cost umbrella is used 
to protect small competitors the variance of intra-industry profit 
rates should be lower in a competitive industry than in less competitive 
industry. In a competitive industry firms will be forced to price at 
or near marginal costs in the long run. Since there is little or no 
margin between marginal cost and price, exit of low profit or unprofitable 
firms will be rapid. But in a monopolistic industry the margin exists, 
therefore allowing firms of varying degrees of efficiency to remain 
in operation. 
If there are no economies or diseconomies of scale in the company 
operation and all firms are equally efficient this variance test will 
not be a good indicator of monopolistic elements in an industry. 
However, there is evidence of some economies of scale in food processing 
at the plant and company level (68, p. 598; 93, pp. 258-259) and some 
evidence of diseconomies at the company level for some food processing 
industries (75, pp. 64-71). Secondly, it seems unrealistic to assume 
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that all firms in an industry have homogeneous management and personnel 
that allow for equal rates of efficiency, especially in light of the 
fact that profitable companies reward their managers in a manner that 
clearly indicates the scarcity of their particular resource. Therefore, 
the variance test should yield some indication of the existence of 
monopolistic markets in food processing. 
Size of the firm 
The absolute size of the firm presents a structural feature related 
to industry concentration but presenting a different set of expected 
relationships to performance. First, the absolute size of firm will have 
an influence on operating efficiency if either real or pecuniary economies 
of scale exist for the firm. These economies differ from in-plant 
economies in their relation to the overall functions of the firm. The 
larger firm may be able to draw capital at a lower rate. They may be 
able to more fully utilize R&D staffs. Small, and particularly, 
single product operations are limited in their ability to hire scientists 
and fully utilize the exploratory nature of scientific research. Multi-
product operations, almost universally of a larger nature than single-
product firms, can allow scientists to delve into a variety of research 
areas and utilize their skills. 
Large companies are typically the largest advertisers. Thus, they 
can advertise on national media which increases the exposure of the 
advertisement per dollar spent and also qualifies the advertisers for 
the volume discounts common to advertising. 
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Large firms may also be able to purchase volumes of inputs that 
qualify them for volume discounts. Their size may give them enough 
bargaining power to permit them to make better deals on input purchases. 
These latter examples may all involve pecuniary effects but the effects 
could, in any case, explain some of the differences in profit rates. 
There may be offsetting factors that need to be accounted for. 
First, classical theory has essentially assumed that after a firm 
reaches a certain size, management becomes so removed from the line 
operations that coordination and efficiency are lost. Secondly, large 
firms typically train their own personnel for specific functions within 
the company. Smaller companies that cannot afford such a training program 
must either accept lesser trained management or pay enough to attract 
those trained by the large companies. This charge should never 
rationally exceed what it would cost the company to provide such training 
on its own. This results in an inflationary effect on the wages paid 
by the large corporations. 
These economies of scale for the total company operation should be 
reflected in the profit rates of the companies in the absence of monopoly 
C75, p. 55). Factors not directly related to the primary product of the 
company but related to its overall operation, e.g., the attraction of 
investment, should yield a positive relationship between size of firm 
and the firm's profit rate regardless of primary industry classification 
if such economies exist. Similarly, if economies exist that are peculiar 
to a particular primary industry the same positive relationship should 
exist between profit rates and size of firms within an industry. 
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This positive relationship between profit rate and size of firm 
could be caused by monopoly pricing and not economies of scale or 
efficiency. A comparison of average cost of operation to average 
revenue is needed to detect such pricing. If increases in the profit 
rate are not accompanied by declines in average cost, monopoly pricing 
must be present. This pricing element causes an increase in the margin 
of the company. In a competitive situation the company would be forced 
to lower price if efficiencies or economies are involved to capture an 
additional share of the market. In a monopolistic situation» it may be 
to the firm's advantage, even if efficiencies are involved, to maintain 
price, thus protecting smaller competitors, and permitting the large 
firm to gain monopoly profits. Thus a comparison of the shape of the 
average cost curve with the profit curve should give an indication of 
the pricing pattern of firms of varying sizes in various industry structures. 
Barriers to entry 
Barriers to entry reflect a characteristic of industrial organiza­
tion within which elements of structure and conduct become intertwined. 
For instance, barriers such as large investment needs and scale of 
operations are a product of the state of technology. Those achieved 
via patents and copyrights are institutional in nature. Product differen­
tiation, advertising and promotion, and pricing policy represent barriers 
to entry directly related to the conduct of firms. 
Basically, a barrier to entry is present any time sellers in an 
industry possess an advantage over firms who wish to enter. The extent 
of the barriers determines the extent to which established firms are 
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protected from potential competition (6, pp. 237-238). Bain indicates 
that the barriers to entry may be measured by the percent to which price 
can be raised above the competitive level of average costs of production 
and distribution without inducing new entry (6, p. 337). This definition 
fails to incorporate Bain's later discussion of the effect of industry 
concentration. If industry concentration is not high there might be 
enough intra-industry competition to maintain near competitive price 
levels. If this is the case, barriers could eliminate the threat of 
new entry, but not seriously affect price margins. Therefore, barriers 
to entry are more aptly measured by capital requirements and control 
over resources (5, 41, 62, 75). 
The major sources of barriers to entry that allow established firms 
to elevate price above the competitive level without inducing entry 
will be discussed in turn. First, the established firms may possess 
"absolute" superiority over new entrants derived from: (1) control over 
certain production techniques; (2) the build-up of market information 
not available to the "outside;" (3) the ownership of valuable resources, 
including management, labor, and equipment as well as natural resources; 
and (4) the availability of funds from sources unwilling to promote 
investment in a company moving into a new area. 
Second, barriers to entry may result from economies of scale in 
production, distribution, management, and marketing and distribution. 
These economies may be real or pecuniary, but either case will present 
a barrier by requiring the new firm to capture immediately a significant 
share of the market if it is to receive the same rate of return as 
existing companies. 
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It is necessary to look at the scale effects at the plant and 
company level to determine their importance as capital requirements 
barriers to entry. It is believed that economies of scale in food 
processing at the plant level are limited in the sense that the minimum 
efficient size comes with a small percentage of industry output. The 
survival technique and engineering methods have been used in testing 
for production economies of scale in most of the food processing 
industries (.68, pp. 91-100; 75, p. 54; 93, p. 246). The results of these 
tests will be presented later. 
Economies of scale may accrue at the company level as well as the 
plant level. These scale effects could be the result of coordinated 
purchasing and distribution, full utilization of managerial talent, 
increased specialization of research and development staffs, and 
coordinated advertising and promotion. The data to be used in this study 
do not permit the separation of real and pecuniary economies. Pecuniary 
economies have the same effect as a barrier to entry as real economies 
so should not be eliminated from consideration. 
The existence of any of these scale effects would cause the relevant 
cost curve to be downward sloping. Examination of the relevant cost per 
dollar sales will be made to determine the nature of the cost curves for 
the food processing firms. 
Quantity discounts in mass media advertising are a significant 
factor in reducing the cost of advertising for a given exposure rate. 
Maximum volume discounts of 25-30 percent off regular rates are received 
by large volume network television advertisers. Smaller amounts are 
available in other advertising media (29, pp. 44-45). The large company 
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can also afford prime time advertising which provides a higher exposure 
rate. 
Advertising presents a barrier to entry in three respects. First, 
advertising is a form of capital in the distribution process. This 
form of capital is more prone to uncertainty than buildings or equipment 
because its effects are unknown. Therefore, the company must be willing 
to place large volumes of finances in uncertain ventures. 
Second, advertising has a cumulative effect on the market. Palda 
found that it took almost seven years for an advertising dollar to 
exhaust 95 percent of its sales generating potential (63, pp. 162-179). 
The cumulative effect of brand and special label promotion must be over­
come by the entrant if he is to capture a significant share of the market. 
Third, advertising is a means of product differentiation that creates 
brand preferences or company allegiances in the minds of consumers. This 
facit of advertising is more directly a measure of conduct than of market 
structure. Therefore it will be discussed in the next section. 
In summary, it is hypothesized that the capital requirements of 
the plants of a company in its primary industry plus the capital 
requirements from the absolute level of advertising represent barriers 
to entry that allow the firms to receive a high profit rate. The cost 
structures developed in the research will be used to enforce this test. 
Market Conduct and its Effects on Performance 
Market conduct refers to those factors or influences that are 
specifically related to the internal policy of the firm, the manner in 
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which the firm relates to other firms, and the influence of these two 
items on the determination of pricing policies, output decisions, and 
the method of competition to be used. These factors are endogenous to 
the firm's operating model and thus under the control of the decision­
making unit. 
Two aspects of market conduct are presented in this paper; product 
differentiation and product diversification. Specific forms of pricing 
conduct are not considered although the results of such conduct are 
represented in the profit rates of the firms. 
Product differentiation 
Product differentiation is the process through which products of 
similar or identical uses are made different (1) in either quality, 
substance, or design or (2) strictly differentiated in the minds of the 
consumers by brand loyalty. 
Emphasis is placed here on one of the many dimensions of product 
differentiation, namely that created by advertising. Advertising has 
long been considered an instrument used to subserve the competitive 
functioning of the market. In recent years advertising has drawn 
increased attention by economists and policy makers as a noncompetitive 
tool. The latter aspects are of Importance here. Of particular concern 
are the effects advertising could have on the maximization of consumers' 
satisfaction which "...has traditionally been regarded as the primary 
criterion for evaluating the economic system (35, p. 1257)." 
Advertising may be undertaken by a firm for any one or a combina­
tion of the following reasons: (1) to expand the market for the product; 
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(2) to expand the firm's market share; and (3) to change the shape of 
the demand curve. Thus advertising may take one of three forms: (1) 
a purveyor of price, quality, and physical appearance information; (2) 
a means of persuading consumers of product differentiation merely on 
the basis of its being produced by a certain enterprise; and (3) a barrier 
to entry. 
Money spent on informative advertising raises no issue regarding 
anti-competitive effects. The exposure to more price and quality 
information can only enhance the maximization of consumer preferences 
and the functioning of a competitive system. 
The barrier to entry aspects of advertising, discussed above, are 
felt mainly through the increased capital required to overcome the 
cumulative effects of firms using high absolute levels of advertising. 
Persuasive advertising and promotion create barriers to entry and 
"...violate(s) the principle of consumer sovereignity by the deliberate(ly) 
use(ing) (of) resources to change consumers' tastes...and by limiting 
consumer choice through the progressive substitution of nonprice for 
price competition (35, p. 1259)." Bain states that; 
"Persuasive promotion...and its costs are basically 
wasteful, and more so as they become larger. (A) large 
proportion of observed promotion activities and costs 
have, to all appearances, a dominately persuasive 
orientation, and this relative emphasis is generally 
greater as selling costs are larger in proportion to 
sales. It is common to industries with costs equal 
to five percent or more of sales revenue...that nearly 
all advertising effort...has a persuasive...orientation. 
All or most of the industries with relatively high 
advertising costs are seriously suspect of...(un-
workability) in the sense that wasteful promotion 
costs have exceeded the 'limit of tolerance' or 'margin 
for error' which should probably be allowed in making 
normative evaluations... (73, p. 117)." 
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Although it may be difficult to draw a sharp demarcation between 
informative and persuasive advertising, it is clear that a large portion 
of television and magazine advertising reveals no price information 
and little beneficial quality information. Clearly when a new product 
is introduced in the market it needs more promotion than established 
products. It needs to be familiarized in the consumers' minds. But 
after this has been accomplished, promotion can be reduced to concentrate 
on price-quality information. 
Since 1950, advertising expenditures have risen more rapidly than 
GNP, Total expenditures in 1965 were 165 percent higher than in 1950. 
Television advertising has increased by 15 times the 1950 level (46, p. 28). 
Among the products most heavily advertised are packaged soaps and 
detergents with a four-firm concentration ratio of 79 percent; razor 
blades, 97 percent; dentifrices, 83 percent; tires, 75 percent; and 
chewing gum, 79 percent (46, p. 28). Professors Wilson and Comanor of 
Harvard University found in a recent study (as yet unpublished) that 
industries with "...high advertising outlays exceeded by nearly 50 
percent the average profit rate of the 41 consumer industries studied 
(46, p. 28)." John Blair, chief economist of the Senate Antitrust 
- Subcommittee found that of the 36 consumer industries and product classes 
which spent $250,000 or more on advertising in 1965, 25 have had an 
increase in concentration. In addition to these factors there is no 
indication of the amount of persuasive advertising that is cancelled by 
similar efforts of rivals and hence wasteful of resources. 
Telser found, in his study of the relationship between advertising 
and competition, that "there is little—empirical support for an inverse 
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association...between the two factors (79, p. 558)." This conclusion 
is based on the weak correlation between the four-firm concentration 
ratios and the ratios of advertising to sales. It has been pointed out 
that concentration, although an accepted measure of monopoly is only 
one aspect of structure rather than being a complete measure of market 
power (17, pp. 6-8). Therefore, the conclusion of Telser should not 
be made until the effects of advertising on performance are known. 
Secondly, Telser examines the relationship of advertising to the 
stability of market shares but uses brands rather than firms in his 
tests. Finding that high advertising is associated with relatively 
unstable market shares of brands, he suggests that the hypothesis that 
advertising protects market shares from competition be rejected (79, p. 547). 
He never considers the relationship between "...high advertising expendi­
tures and rapid new product or brand introduction and the stability of 
market shares of firms (17, p. 8)." Thus the instability of brands 
within a firm may not necessarily reflect instability of the firm's market 
share. 
It is hypothesized that a high absolute level of advertising over a 
period of years and a high advertising to sales ratio create barriers 
to entry that are reflected in high profit rates in addition to those 
presented by production economies. 
Tests of the influence of advertising are particularly significant 
in the food processing sector of the economy since the firms in this 
sector (excluding alcoholic beverages) accounted for about 12 percent 
of all corporation advertising and about 21 percent of all advertising by 
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manufacturing corporations. Between 1950 and 1964 advertising expendi­
tures by food manufacturers increased over 300 percent from $435 million 
to $1.4 billion. The rate of increase was one-third greater than the 
average for all U.S. corporations (58,p. 65). Total advertising of the 
firms in food and kindred products (except alcoholic beverages) greatly 
exceeded that of tobacco manufacturers, petroleum products, and motor 
vehicles and parts manufacturers (58,p. 63).^ 
This high absolute level of advertising is concentrated in a few 
firms. Roughly 44 percent of the total spent on advertising food 
products was spent by the 20 largest companies in 1964. The 50 largest 
accounted for in excess of 80 percent (58,p. 65). In the same year the 
20 largest food companies accounted for over one-half of all television 
advertising of food products, 71 percent of network television, and 60 
percent of magazine advertising of food products (58,pp. 66-67). These 
percentages have greatly increased since 1954. It is also of interest 
to note that these 20 companies accounted for 28 percent of food product 
sales, which is significantly lower than their percentage of food 
advertising (58,p. 66). This disparity between concentration of sales 
and concentration of advertising is further exemplified by the following 
table. 
Although it is not conclusive evidence, the discrepancy between the 
two measures of concentration (sales and advertising) indicates the need 
for treatment of these measures as separate dimensions of market power. 
However, it should be recognized that food and kindred products is a 
2 digit classification, tobacco a 2 digit, petroleum products 3 digit, 
and motor vehicles and parts a 4 digit classification (58, p. 63). 
Table 1. Share of value of shipments and advertising in measured media accounted for by the 4 
largest companies of selected food manufacturing industries, 1963^ 
(Percent) 
Share of Media advertising expenditures of the 4 largest 
national companies 
industry 
Census industry shipments 
made by 
the 4 Magazines News­ Network Spot TV Total 
largest papers TV measured 
companies media 
Food products, average 46 72.9 48.7 85.2 74.7 77.1 
Meat products : 
Prepared meats 14^ 61.0 48.7 100.0 28.0 45.4 
Poultry dressing 14^ 
Dairy products : 
Natural and processed cheese 44® 89.5 86.0 100.0 96.4 94.6 
Condensed and evaporated milk 40^  98.6 82.9 100.0 100.0 98.9 
Ice cream and frozen dessert 37 55.8 84.8 100.0 86.6 84.4 
Fluid milk 23® 53.2 48.6 77.1 49.4 54.5 
Canned, preserved, and frozen food: 
Canned and cured seafood 48, 43.2 55.9 100,0 92.6 85.9 
Canned specialities NÂ 92.9 97.2 91.3 99.2 95.0 
Canned fruits and vegetables 24* 46.7 73.5 50.7 25.0 49.5 
^1963 concentration ratios; remaining figures are for 1958, as 1963 figures were not available. 
^NA Not ascertained. 
^Source: (58, p. 75) 




















Dehydrated fruits and vegetables 37^ 47.2 40.2 59.0 75.6 58.2 
Pickles and sauces 35 26.0 18.6 63.0 53.3 42.3 
Fresh and frozen packaged fish 18 
_, a 46.1 63,4 78.3 
00 00 St 
58.7 
Frozen fruits and vegetables 24 
Grain mill products : 
Flour and meal 38 100.0 95.8 100.0 90.1 95.1 
Breakfast cereal 83 80.0 81.1 75.1 90.4 82.8 
Rice milling 43 75.7 97.6 100.0 87.7 91.2 
Blended and prepared flour 67 94.7 96.0 97.9 95.3 96.2 
Bakery products : 
64.2 Bread and related products 23^ 51.1 53.8 22.1 73,0 
Biscuits and crackers 59^ 93.2 78.1 100.0 61.5 89.3 
Sugar ; 
Cane sugar refining 69 76.1 83.9 None 87.1 85.0 
Beet sugar 64 
Candy; 
Confectionery products 18 82.8 70.2 46.8 65.2 67.4 
Chocolate and cocoa products 71 
Chewing gum 88 100.0 78.5 100.0 100.0 99.9 









Soft drinks : 
Bottled and canned soft drinks 
Flavorings 
75d 
55 85.0 72.2 88.1 84.2 83.3 
Oil mills : 
Shortening and cooking oils 42® 94.1 90.7 97.6 89.9 92.1 
Margarine 46 81.3 84. "i 100.0 81.6 85.2 
Miscellaneous foods : 
Potato chips 35 100.0 66.3 100.0 80.4 81.6 
Roasted coffee 46 40.4 61.5 90.2 56.3 60.0 
Macaroni and spaghetti 25 80.6 69.7 93.2 45.0 64.3 
Media advertising expenditures of the 4 largest 
companies 
Total 
Magazines News- Network Spot TV measured 
papers TV media 
<^Sales concentration ratio including sales of franchised bottlers. See Chapter II. 
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Absolute size of advertising expenditures is then a measure of advertising 
as a barrier to entry. Size of firm measured by sales volume is a 
separate dimension of market power. 
The hypothesis is tested in this study that there is a high positive 
correlation between both absolute levels of advertising and the percent 
of sales revenue devoted to advertising and the profitability of firms. 
Other differentiation activities—promotion, packaging, etc., will not 
be considered. 
Product diversification 
There must be some debate whether diversification is truly a measure 
of conduct or should be considered a structural change. Diversification 
is considered a measure of conduct in this research for two reasons. 
First, diversification has no immediate impact on the structure of any 
one market. The structural change brought about by diversification is 
at an aggregative level; it spreads across market lines. Therefore, 
this form of structural change is inconsistent with the other structural 
variables considered in the paper. Second, diversification is completely 
under the control of the firm. The decision is made by the firm whether 
or not to enter a new product line or a new geographic market and in 
turn whether this be accomplished by merger or internal growth. Diversi­
fication of product line or geographic market is as much a matter of 
firm conduct as differentiation of a product. 
Definitions 
In the realm of industrial development the firm has essentially 
three avenues of growth; horizontal; vertical; and conglomerate. 
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Each of these may be pursued by either internal means of expansion or 
by merger (where merger indicates any type of purchase of any part or 
the whole of the assets or stock of another enterprise giving the 
purchasing firm control over the purchased enterprise), 
Horizontal growth is the expansion of an enterprise's capacity in 
its primary product line. The increased output of the firm is viewed 
as identical or highly substitutable for its primary product. The motives 
of such expansion, whether by internal growth or merger, may be to 
achieve a larger market share to gain increased market power, to achieve 
economies of scale in production or distribution of the product, or 
merely to meet growing demand for the product being produce. 
Vertical growth is the expansion either forward into the activity 
usually performed by the buyer of the enterprise's product, or backward 
into the inputs used by the enterprise in its primary production. This 
type of growth may be undertaken to insure a continual supply of inputs 
or intermediate products, to gain control of vital inputs or market 
outlets, or to achieve economies that make the vertical operation cheaper 
for the firm than if it were to purchase these inputs or services in the 
market. 
Conglomerate growth, or growth by diversification, bears no clear 
cut definition. Pure diversification is the movement into completely 
unrelated areas. But there are few cases of this form of diversification 
since at some level of company operation—the procurement of inputs, 
production, or distribution, or in the more aggregative sense, the 
competition for labor or capital—the diverse product line bears a 
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significant relation to other products of the firm. Antitrust enforcement 
has relied on the use of a strict definition for horizontal and vertical 
mergers and left the residue of cases fall into the category of con­
glomerate mergers (67). 
The following definition of diversification will be used in the 
context of this paper; diversification results in the production of a 
product by a firm that is not a close substitute of the firm's primary 
product in a vertical or horizontal nature. The 4-digit Standard 
Industrial Classification is used for analytical measurement of diversi­
fication after taking account of vertical integration. 
There are at least three weaknesses in this measure. First, the 
degree of "node commonality"^ cannot be measured directly by such a 
classification scheme. Some of the influence of varying degrees of 
product relatedness is accounted for by considering various alterations 
of the 4-digit SIC. 
Second, there are differences in the volume produced and relatedness 
of products within 4-digit industry groupings. Thus each 4-digit industry 
is not a clean homogenous group of products. Some industries contain a 
wider group of products than others. As would be expected from this 
some industries account for a much larger volume of output than others. 
^If each firm is viewed as a collection of elements "each of which 
has some output or capacity" and "if we designate each location of an 
element" along a spectrum, ranked by relatedness, as a node, then "the 
degree of product relationship is the degree of node commonality that 
exists" between the various activities of a firm (56, pp. 3-7). 
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Third, there are instances where the product grouping within a 
4-digit industry may be questioned. A few industries contain products 
sold in different markets than the majority of the products in the 
industry. 
In view of these weaknesses, the 4-digit industry classification 
is used because (1) it most clearly represents the node commonality 
desired for this study and (2) data identifying primary products of firms 
and industry concentration are most readily available at this level of 
classification. 
Diversification may also take the form of market extension. This 
is defined as the movement, by a firm, into a new geographic market 
with a product previously produced by the enterprise. Diversification 
via market extension is not considered separately here. All markets 
are considered to be national markets for purposes of concentration 
measures. In the realm of food processing this assumption is most 
seriously violated by the dairy and bakery industries. Studies have 
indicated the existence of negative relationship between regional industry 
influences and profit rates which indicates a downward bias of national 
concentration ratios (17, pp. 31-32; 82, pp. 720-721). Since data are not 
available that would permit a meaningful measurement of geographic market 
extension, the influence of this facet of firm conduct or performance 
is left in the unexplained error. 
Diversification must be considered from two points of view. First, 
what are the reasons for product diversification within an enterprise 
and are these reasons fulfilled? Second, what are the effects of product 
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diversification on market performance? Each aspect will be considered 
in turn. 
The reasons for the pursuance of any activity (or form of conduct) 
endogenous to the firm must be tied to the objectives of the firm. 
Therefore it is necessary to choose a central objective common to the 
firms under study. The firms are assumed to be pursuing the goal of 
long-run profit maximization. Although firms may have numerous short-
run goals and even varied long-run goals, profit maximization seems to 
play a critical role in the long-run decision model of the firm (51, 8). 
Specifically, diversification will be considered a means to increase 
the level of profits, increase profit stability or reduce risk, a general 
outlet for investments, and a means to achieve market leverage. 
Diversification can influence the level of profitability in two ways : 
first, by the channeling of capital into more profitable areas; and second, 
by permitting the firm to more fully utilize resources. 
The firm may find that demand conditions for its primary products 
have shifted or the cost structure has changed to reduce the level of 
profitability of producing such a product. There may have been no change 
in the marketing conditions of the firm's primary product but new products 
may have entered the market that yield a higher return on capital or a 
rapid growth rate. These are only two reasons to encourage a firm to 
diversify into new product lines. Diversification may be the dynamic 
mechansim by which competition funnels capital of an existing firm 
into more productive and higher profit areas of use. 
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Physical rigidities and the immobility of capital do not allow large 
firms and particularly firms that contribute a significant share of the 
output of an industry to move in and out of the production of certain 
goods at will. Once capital has been committed to the production of a 
particular product it cannot be reversed and moved into other areas in 
the short run. Therefore, rather than move entirely into the new area 
the primary product of the firm is maintained as a base. 
The base of operation provided by the primary product is used by 
the firm to provide liquidity for moves into new areas. The firm must 
have liquidity if it is to obtain capital or make investments in new 
.areas whether this move be accomplished by Internal expansion or merger. 
A firm may, and very often does, have ample liquidity even in view of 
declining profits. The firm will hold liquid assets during a period of 
declining profits in anticipation of an opportunity to Invest in higher 
profit areas (82, pp. 196-197). 
Diversification that permits fuller utilization of resources or the 
realization of economies of scale is related to the achievement of 
higher profits through cost reduction and the perseverance of the primary 
product line of a firm. 
The latter factor will be taken up first because of its obviousness. 
If the firm has diversified to achieve cost reductions of some nature 
through the joint procurement of Inputs or through the production and 
marketing of joint products it would be reductio ad absurdum to discon­
tinue the production of the primary product. 
Economies of scale or cost reduction via more efficient utilization 
of resources are not so readily conceived when their achievement is derived 
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not from the increased scale of a particular product but through the 
production of differing products. Such gains might come from the adapta­
bility of capital during slack periods for a certain product to production 
of related products. But it is more conceivable that the gains be in 
management and nonproduction personnel, procurement, marketing, and 
research and development. 
Expansion by merger is often considered a method of purchasing 
management (82, p. 188). However, the ability of existing management may 
be spread into new enterprises or operations without detracting from the 
primary function of the company. The same may be true for sales personnel. 
If the products are marketed through similar channels the existing firm 
may have a great advantage over a new entrant or a single product firm 
in its ability to use its existing sales force to promote a number of 
products with the same resources. 
If the products are produced from similar inputs, the extension 
into a new product may allow volume purchases that permit the company 
savings on a per unit basis for both product lines. 
Many facilities may be utilized by both products on the marketing 
end of the spectrum. If the products are sol^ through similar or identical 
outlets the same transportation facilities may be utilized. More signifi­
cantly, the products may be promoted and advertised jointly. The unit 
cost reduction from large scale advertising was discussed above. Similar 
savings are derived from promotional schemes such as the joint mailing 
of coupon offers. 
Research and development personnel are able to delve into and 
follow lines of research that might have no future if the company produced 
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a single-product line. The findings of research are by necessity unpre­
dictable. Only if the company is willing to diversify can a number of 
the results of R & D efforts be used. 
In addition to the direct attempt to increase profits by diversifica­
tion, the enterprise can, if the diversified activities are properly 
chosen, reduce risk of abnormally low profits. An analogy may be drawn 
here to the diversification of an asset portfolio (53). Risk is typically 
measured by the variability of returns over time. The measure to be used 
here is the variance of the ratio of net profit after taxes to net worth. 
If r^ are the random variables representing the possible outcomes 
for each of i = 1,2, , N diversification moves, s is the sum of these 
returns, and w is their average, risk will be reduced with no accompanying 
reduction in the profit level under the following conditions: 
2. Gov (r^ , rj) = 0 Yr^ 
3. Var (r^) = Var (r^) 
Then the expected value of the total return, s, is 
expt (s) = expt (r^^) + expt (r^) 4 + expt (r^) 
or expt (s) = N E, 
where E = expt (r^) = expt (rg,) = = ex^t (r^). 
The expected value of the average return, w, is then equal to: expt (s) . 
N 
Therefore, under the above assumptions the average return is not 
reduced by diversification. 
The variance of the total operation, s, is 
var (s) = var (r^) + var (r^ H h var (r^.) 
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but since equal variances are assumed, 
var (s) = Nvar (r) 
then the variance of the average of the portfolio is, 
1 2 
var (w) = (—) var (s). 
Substituting we have var (w) = • 
Thus the variance (risk) approaches zero as N increases, i.e., the number 
of uncorrelated activities are added to the operation of the enterprise. 
Again to parallel the argument of Markowitz the assumptions will 
be relaxed to fit the situation of product diversification. 
First, this proof assumes that the returns, the variance of returns, 
and the covariance of returns are predictable or can be assigned 
objective probabilities. Entrepreneurs must base their predictions on 
probability beliefs which are subject to error. There may, in addition, 
be autocorrelated errors increasing in magnitude as the number of diverse 
activities increases. This is similar to diseconomies of scale in 
prediction. With one product line the company need predict only the 
market events relating to that particular line. With two product lines 
the company must predict the market events of both product lines and the 
interaction or covariance between the two. Because of the need to predict 
the covariance of the returns of every product with every other, the 
time and cost of prediction will necessarily increase geometrically. 
Therefore, even though the gross return may not be lowered with decreases 
in risk through diversification the net return may very well be diminishing 
because of the increased entrepreneural time required. 
Second, the returns on each operation or product line are not equal. 
Therefore, the expected value of the average is unequal to the expected 
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value of r, the return on each line. The expected value of the average 
return or the return on the combined operation, w, is now; 
expt (w) = ^  expt (s). 
Thus, the expected return will be altered by diversification, but 
since the variance of the returns is independent of the level of returns, 
diversification still brings increased certainty. 
Third, the variances of return on all operations are not equal in 
manufacturing. With unequal variances it is possible that the profit 
variance of the enterprise may not approach zero if the variance of the 
successive additions exceeds some upper limit. If this upper limit is 
defined by var (L), then, 
var (s) = var (r^) + var (rg) 4 + var (r^). 
By the assumption that none of the variances exceeds var (L), 
var (s) £ N var (L). 
The variance of the average, w, is then 
1 ^  
var (w) = (—)" var (s) 
which must be less than or equal to > 
or, var (w) £ • 
Thus, as N increases, > approaches zero, so var (w) also ap­
proaches zero. This proves that with unequal variances, product diversi­
fication can reduce the total risk, but the upper limits on the permis­
sible variance declines as the number of diversified activities increases. 
Fourth, the assumption that the returns on different product lines are 
uncorrelated must be relaxed. This assumption is particularly involved in 
product diversification where numerous moves are into product lines closely 
related to existing product lines (39, pp. 27-64; 56; Chap. I, II). 
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If the average covariance is defined by the sum of all distinct 
covariances divided by the number of distinct covariances, the average 
variance can be represented in the following form: 
var (») + Ji£il 
w h e r e t h e  c o v a r i a n c e  o f  t h e  i t h  r e t u r n s  w i t h  t h e  j t h .  B u t  a s  N  
increases, with var (r ) < var (L), approaches 0. Therefore, as 
N 
N increases the variance of the average return approaches the average 
covariance. Risk can then be reduced to a certain level, the average 
covariance, by diversification in the presence of non zero covariances. 
The ^  priori expectations relating to product diversification that 
can be derived from the Markowitz model are that by the accurate evaluation 
of uncertainty and the proper selection of product lines an enterprise 
can (1) increase profits and (2) reduce profit variance or risk by product 
diversification. If this is the case, diversified firms will have higher and 
more stable profits than non-diversified firms and the variance of returns 
will decline as the firm adds product lines. 
Gort investigated the hypotheses relating the cyclical fluctuations 
of the different product lines added to the frequency of product line 
additions. Two measures were used to describe cyclical fluctuations. 
First, Gort used the Chi-square to test for any relationship between 
the number of changes in direction of the annual output indexes for 
particular products, the frequency of product additions falling into one 
of his three ranges of turning points. Second, a Chi-square was used 
to test for any relationship between the cyclical amplitude, measured by 
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averaging through to peak and peak to through changes in the annual output 
indexes, to the number of product additions falling into his three ranges 
of cyclical amplitude. In both cases he found the relationship to be one 
of a high number of product additions in cyclically unstable product lines 
(39, pp. 113-117). This is not strong evidence which a conclusion con­
cerning the effects of diversification on profit rates or stability should 
be based. But it does indicate that firms might for some reason choose 
product additions having variance of returns greater than the upper limit 
(var (L)) described by Markowitz. 
Gort found that besides choosing product lines that were not particu­
larly stable, the firms choose (1) areas of relatively high technological 
change and (2) areaj requiring a large average investment (39, pp. 103-134). 
The hypotheses described above will be tested here by relating profit 
variance of diversified firms to that of single product firms over an 
eighteen year period. Second, a comparison will be made between the 
variance before and after diverisfication on a small group of firms where 
the change in product lines can be distinguished. 
Large firms may find it undesirable or non-contributory to their goal 
of profit maximization to invest all funds in their primary industry for 
two reasons. First, demand for the primary product may not be growing 
rapidly enough to accommodate the increased capacity created by new in­
vestment. Second, legal restrictions have placed limitations on certain 
forms of horizontal growth more severely than on diversified growth. 
Diversification provides an outlet for investment funds that bypasses 
either of these two problems. The problems will be taken up in turn. 
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The first problem is a simple capacity problem. The large firms who 
can afford to move into other product areas often do so if their primary 
industry is slow in growth or sensitive to excess capacity problems. 
In some industries a few large firms make more total investment in numerous 
areas than is made by all firms in their particular primary product line. 
Diversification provides an outlet for the funds of these large and often** 
highly liquid firms. 
Second, it has been emphasized by a number of companies that it is 
cheaper to expand by merger than by internal expansion. There are 
restrictions placed on growth by merger, particularly horizontal merger, 
by the antitrust laws. These restrictions will be covered in detail in 
Chapter VI, but at this point it can be said that mergers in industries 
that have had a tendency toward increased concentration and mergers 
involving upwards of 30 percent of a market will be protested by the 
antitrust agencies. The rule of law is less distinct and certainly less 
rigid toward product extension and conglomerate mergers. Therefore, 
firms who might otherwise grow by horizontal mergers are taking the path 
of diversification to avoid antitrust litigation. 
Market leverage, which may be achieved through diversification bears 
different definitions by different writers (25, pp. 331-352; 56, pp. 
105-115; 75, pp. 54-71). It is considered here as the situation in 
which a firm may achieve power in one market because of its activities 
in other markets. This leverage may be achieved and used in a number 
of ways. It may be the temporary shifting of financial resources from 
one product to another when that particular product needs additional 
p r o m o t i o n  o r  n e w  f e a t u r e s  t h a t  m i g h t  b e  d e v e l o p e d  t h r o u g h  R & D .  
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Market leverage may be achieved by full line selling. The buyers 
may find it more attractive to purchase various products from fewer 
salesmen. Or the manufacturers may promote certain product lines by 
selling other products at a discount when purchased in combination. 
The essence of market leverage is that it allows the multiproduct 
firm to compete in a manner not open to the single product enterprise. 
The multiproduct firm can use the factors mentioned above to squelch 
competition. In addition, it can, in the short run, subsidize a product 
line that is temporarily under the impact of intensive competition, by 
the use of profits from other product lines. The firm would not subsidize 
a product over the long run unless the product provided something in 
return to the other products, e.g., complementarity or a quasi tie-in 
arrangement. 
The extent to which market leverage has a positive influence on 
profit rates should show up in a test of the relationship between profits 
and an index of diversified enterprise power. Such an hypothesis is 
tested using enterprise profit rates and an index of market power discussed 
in the following chapter. 
Effects of Product Diversification on Market Performance 
Four of the means through which diversification may have an effect 
on market performance will be considered: the spread of monopoly power; 
the ability to use reciprocal trade agreements; increased enterprise 
efficiency; and increased market leverage. 
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Spread of market power 
The spread of market power is closely related to the attainment of 
market leverage. The firm may be restrained from achieving further 
monopoly power in one industry by the antitrust laws. It then funnels 
its growth potential into other industries. If this firm is large, and 
has vast financial resources, it may shift this power to a different 
product line by merging with a dominant firm in that industry. Examples 
of such cases are the mergers of Procter & Gamble with Clorox, and 
Reynolds Metals with Arrow Brands. In both cases the firms (P & G and 
Reynolds) were large, dominant firms in their primary Industries. The 
firms with which they merged were also dominant in their respective 
industries but lacked the resources made available to them through the 
merger. The merged firms were much larger than any other firms in the 
industries of the purchased firms and thus had the potential to build 
resources and market strength to stifle any competitive effort that might 
be promoted by smaller firms. 
It is hypothesized that because of this diversifed market power, 
there is a positive relationship between the level of profits and the 
extent of diversification. This market power is manifest in monopolistic 
activities that are measured in higher price-cost margins and higher 
profits. 
Reciprocal trade agreements 
The diversification of an enterprise may be patterned in a manner 
that allows the firm to increase sales by the use of reciprocity 
(55, p. 73; 78, pp. 1386-1393). Reciprocity is the process by which 
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companies place high priority on purchasing from companies that have in 
turn purchased from them. This action becomes significant when the 
large diversified firms in oligopolistic industries meet one another in 
different markets. There becomes a practice of considering "purchase 
credits." A company will consider that every purchase it makes from 
another company earns it a purchase credit in return. 
More candidly, firms may diversify in a pattern that forces processors 
in the middle to purchase intermediate products from their company if 
they wish to sell the company end products. 
Consider the case where Industry A sells product A to industry B; 
industry B sells product B to industry C. If a firm in industry C gains 
a significant share of the output of industry A, either by merger or 
internal growth, firms in industry B are effectively "boxed in." The 
firm in industry C may require the firms in industry B to purchase product 
A from its division in industry A if they wish to sell their products 
to this firm in industry C. 
To quote Turner, "...it may be stated flatly that reciprocity, even 
more than the tying arrangements it so closely resembles, has little or 
nothing to be said in its favor (78, p. 1388)." The effectiveness of 
competition depends upon the effectiveness of price competition and the 
buyer's sovereignty in choosing among various grades of quality, service, 
etc. Reciprocity clearly distorts this system. Rationally, firm B would 
not enter into purchase agreements with A and G (assuming that industries 
A and C are not controlled by one firm) unless the purchase credits earned 
by B can be used to its advantage. But if this is a profit advantage it 
represents a private advantage and not necessarily a social gain. 
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This form of reciprocity that distorts the competitive market mechanism 
can be achieved through product diversification. 
In summary, it is hypothesized that firms diversify to increase profits, 
increase efficiency, increase profit stability or reduce risk, and as an 
outlet for investments. The means through which diversification can 
achieve these goals are the spread of monopoly power, the achievement of 
market leverage, and increased use of reciprocal trade agreements. The 
methods used in testing these hypotheses are discussed in Chapter III. 
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CHAPTER III. METHODS AND DATA USED TO TEST HYPOTHESES 
The hypotheses described in Chapter II need to be separated into 
those tested with cross-section analysis and those tested with time 
series analysis. The variables and data used to derive these variables 
will be discussed in this chapter along with the statistical testing 
procedures used. 
Cross-Section Analysis 
The intent of the cross-section analysis is to determine with 
regression analysis to what extent the differences in profit levels 
between firms, as a measure of performance, can be accounted for by 
differences in the structural variables common to most studies comparing 
the performance of various industries using industry averages. The firm 
was used as a basis for comparison because monopoly or non-competitive 
performance should be reflected most clearly in the performance charac­
teristics of firms, not industry averages possibly made up of the 
performance of firms possessing market power and those to which the 
market power is used against. Thus, the general hypothesis being tested 
is that the concentration of a firm's primary industry explains a 
significant portion of the different levels of profits among food 
processing firms. The level of explained variance is increased signifi­
cantly by the introduction of other commonly used measures of firm and 
industry structure and conduct. 
A set of variables uncommon to the studies reviewed in Chapter II 
are introduced to account for differences in the product mixes of 
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companies (diversification) and market power achieved through diversifi­
cation (diversified power index). 
The cross-section analysis gives one view of the long-run cost and 
revenue structure since it represents firms of varying sizes operating 
plants employing different technologies but subject to similar potentiali­
ties in technology and price conditions, and subject to similar exogenous 
forces. Some economists maintain that cross-section analysis presents 
the best representation of the long-run situation (17, p. 36). However, 
it is not entirely accurate to assume that a firm on one point of the cost 
curve could move to another point since these two points represent different 
firms in reality. Time series indicates how the firm has adapted to 
changes in technology, price-cost conditions, and the exogenous forces 
but does not maintain the usual ceteris paribus conditions of long-run 
analysis, e.g., price invariance, all firms subject to the same levels 
of technology, and invariant exogenous conditions. Therefore, cross-
section analysis is used here to depict the long-run market and firm 
situations. 
Data were collected for 182 publicly held corporations that were 
either (1) registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission and 
listed in Moody's Industrial Manual (1966) as food processors or (2) 
listed in the Fortune Plant and Product Directory (1966) of the 1,000 
largest manufacturing corporations as having some operations classified 
in the food industries. Cooperatives and a few other companies, particu­
larly where data were lacking or financial accounts were not comparable, 
were eliminated from the study. The remaining firms are used to represent 
the population of publicly held corporations engaged in food processing. 
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In a specific breakdown, there are 20 corporations remaining that are 
primarily classified in meat packing (201), 19 in dairy products (202), 
30 in canned and frozen fruits and vegetables (203), 27 in grain milling 
(204), 19 in baking (205), 25 in other and miscellaneous food products, 
and 40 primarily in non-food manufacturing. 
This group of firms was chosen for the following reasons: First, 
financial reports are filed annually with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission by these corporations, Moody's then publishes this data making 
known the changes in accounting procedures, ownership, or control of the 
corporations. This provides a ready source of consolidated financial 
data. 
Second, partnership and proprietorships which are subject to different 
tax laws than corporations and have different accounting systems are 
eliminated from the study. 
Third, these firms account for a sizable segment of output of 
manufactured food products. In addition, they are the industry leaders 
and medium sized firms in each industry. Therefore the samples include 
those firms in the industry that could possess market power and those 
to whom the power could be used against. 
Data on the revenue, costs, and assets were taken from Moody's for 
the 1965 fiscal year. Three measures of profit rates were calculated 
to depict performance. These ratios were used as dependent variables 
in the regression model. The average profit rates for a three year 
period were calculated for a subsample of the companies to eliminate 
any erratic annual changes in profitability. The differences between 
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1965 profit rates and the average three year profits did not justify 
using the average for the entire sample. 
Measurement of profitability 
The commonly used net profit to net worth ratio indicates a firm's 
ability to achieve a return on its invested capital above any cost involved 
in getting a product to market. Since the effect of taxes may be 
different on firms in different states and of different sizes a second 
measure was calculated. This measure is the ratio of net profit before 
taxes plus depreciation to net worth. Depreciation is subject to much 
variation which is not accounted for by true capital usage but only 
accounting and institutional differences. Therefore, this ratio is a 
gross measure of the return to capital and investment. It is clean of 
any possible artificial differences caused by varying types of deprecia­
tion write-offs used by companies employing similar capital. 
The third measure of profitability used is the ratio of gross margin 
to total revenue. This ratio is calculated as the difference between cost 
of goods sold and total revenue divided by total revenue. Cost of goods 
sold includes the cost of those items directly associated with the physical 
production of the product, i.e., materials and inputs purchased, 
production labor, and inventory costs. Cost of goods sold most clearly 
approximates the variable cost of production of any measures available 
from the data sources. This ratio eliminates depreciation, administrative 
expenses, advertising and promotion, and interest. These items are 
eliminated for two reasons. Either the accounting procedure is such 
that the accounts bear little relation to the underlying economic 
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concepts or the expenses are particularly susceptible to receiving excess 
returns, e.g., executive compensation and advertising, as was discussed 
in an earlier chapter. The remaining ratio is then not identical to but 
a close approximation for the marginal cost-price comparison suggested 
by Lerner as a measure of monopoly (47, pp. 157-175). 
A comparison of the regression results using these three ratios 
as dependent variables should point to the existence (or nonexistence) 
of monopoly power and the influence of accounting procedures on the 
measurement of monopoly power. The firm could be earning nonexcessive 
profit rates but they might be the result of margins used to pay excess 
compensation to officers, excess rewards to capital through rapid 
depreciation techniques, and excess advertising and promotion that could 
act not only as an area for excess rewards but also as an area to build 
up additional barriers to entry. 
The independent variables are used as measures of (1) market power 
derived from the primary operation of the company and from the diversified 
operations of the company; (2) size of company operation, (3) barriers 
to entry from certain capital requirements; (4) product differentiation 
and (5) product diversification. The bases for the hypothesized relation­
ships were presented in Chapter II and thus only the specific hypotheses 
will be presented here. 
Measurement of industry and firm structure 
The industry concentration ratio is used as a measure of the 
monopoly power the firms derive from maintaining their primary activity in 
a highly concentrated industry C83, Tables 2, 3). 
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The firm concentration ratio makes no account of the monopoly 
influence of diversification.^ Therefore, a second variable was added, 
E a^ c^, where a^ is the share of the firm's employment in the ith 
nonprimary 4-dlgit industry and is the concentration ratio of the 
ith nonprimary activity. This measure forms a weighted concentration 
ratio for the firm's diversified activities based on the share of the 
firm accounted for by each nonprimary activity. The separation into 
two variables allows for the measurement of the influence of (1) 
primary industry concentration and (2) power gained by the diversifica­
tion into highly concentrated industries on profit rates, the chosen 
measure of monopoly performance. Thus, it is hypothesized that there 
is a significant and positive relationship between profit rates and 
both primary industry concentration and diversified power. 
The weights used in the diversified power index and other diversi­
fication variables were calculated from employment data purchased from 
Q 
McGraw-Hill Plant Census, a division of McGraw-Hill, Inc. A list of 
individual plants belonging to the companies in the population described 
^The composite diversified power index is considered with the other 
structural variables in this section even though it is a direct result 
of endogenous conduct and was considered as such in Chapter II. The 
power index is considered as a structural variable here because of its 
close relationships in methods of calculation to the other structural 
variables and secondly because the result of the conduct employed in 
diversification is a structural change in the company (or the company's 
product mix). 
g 
The McGraw-Hill Plant Census includes over 85 percent of manu­
facturing employees and 88 percent of value added by manufacture. 
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above were supplied to McGraw-Hill. They in turn classified each plant 
into one 4-digit industry and indicated the number of production 
employees at that plant. Coverage of the total employment of any given 
company was determined to be sufficient for the development of the 
diversification indices if data were provided for 80-85 percent of the 
production plants of the company. This requires the assumption that 
those plants not covered were randomly distributed between the company's 
primary and nonprimary activities. (Various distributions of these 
data are presented in Appendix C). 
Total employment for each company and its subsidiaries was developed 
by summing the plant totals. The percent of company output in each 
4-digit industry (the weights) was then approximated by the ratio of 
employees in each 4-digit industry to total employment. Nonmanufacturing 
activities and services were excluded from both the numerator and the 
totals used in the denominator. 
The diversification data are understated because each plant 
(whether single or multi-product in nature) was classified into one 
4-digit industry. An observation of the relationship between multi-
product plants and the primary product of the company revealed that in 
most cases the multi-product plant is primarily engaged in the production 
9 
of the product that is also primary to the company. This bias 
is probably partially adjusted for by the fact that some diversifica­
tion could not be distinguished from vertical integration and was 
tabulated in the index as diversification. 
There was no statistical proof available to back this statement, 
but where checks could be made this statement was supported. 
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The absolute size of the firm was measured by the total assets 
of the firm. This variable is used in the regression system to test 
the hypothesis that firms achieve high levels of profitability from 
their absolute size. If the firm achieves high profitability because 
it is large relative to other firms in the industry or is in an 
industry with a few large sellers there is reason to suspect monopoly 
power. But if the firm achieves high profitability merely because 
it is large in absolute size the monopoly implications are not present. 
If both absolute size of the firm and concentration indexes are 
significant factors causing high profits further examination of the 
cost structures of the firms is needed to determine if the size is 
justified on efficiency grounds. 
An additional variable is needed to test the relationship between 
absolute size and profitability because of the varying product mixes 
of the companies. An index of the extent of diversification was developed 
for each company. This index is; where d is the number 
of 4-digit industries in which the company produces products. The 
multiple is needed to account for the two dimensions of product diversi­
fication. One dimension is the extent to which the firm produces non-
primary products, i.e., the ratio of non-primary sales to total sales. 
The ratio of non-primary sales to total sales was developed by 
multiplying the number of employees at each plant by the value of 
shipments per employee. The value of shipments per employee was taken 
from the size class and 4-digit industry in which each plant fell in 
the 1963 Census of Manufacturers. A total was then calculated for 
each company and its subsidiaries. The 4-digit industry representing 
the largest output was considered the primary industry and subtracted 
from the total to arrive at the non-primary sales used in the ratio. 
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The second dimension of product diversification is the number of 
distinct products the company produces. This dimension is accounted for 
by assigning each 4-digit industry^^ in which the firm maintains 
production a weight of one. 
There is no ^  priori reason for assigning weights of one to the 
various products produced. This weighting system was chosen over 
other systems for interpretational reasons. A declining balance system 
of weighting was studied. With this system if a company was producing 
five products the primary product would be weighted by one, the secondary 
product accounting for the next largest amount of output 4/5, etc., 
for other secondary products. There is little logic behind this system 
which may weight by 1/5 a product closely related to the primary product 
of the company in a manner that makes it deserving of more influence 
or weight. Weighting each product by one gives equal weights to all 
products regardless of the proximity of the product to the primary 
product of the company. 
A first order multiple was chosen to combine the extent of non-
primary output and number of products produced because there was no 
a priori reason to expect a nonlinear relationship. Thus the linear 
relationship provided a noncomplex interpretation of the indices. 
In summary, it is hypothesized that the diversified power index 
and the measure of the extent of diversification may account for a 
^^The breakdown at the 4-digit SIC presents a clear picture of product 
diversification that is not so obvious at the 5-digit level. The 3-
digit SIC overlooks a large amount of diversification because of the 
extent of many 3-digit industries. 
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significant amount of profit differences between firms not explained 
by the concentration of the company's primary industry. The power 
index takes into account the structure of the non-primary industries. 
The index of the extent of diversification accounts only for the 
number of products produced by the firm and the extent of the firm's 
output in these non-primary activities. No account is made of the 
structure of the non-primary industries in the latter measure. 
Measurement of the cost structures 
Aggregative cost curves were developed to determine the role of 
size and product diversification on the cost structure of the firms. 
A significant relationship between absolute size and profitability could 
be caused by monopoly power of the firm or scale efficiencies. Down­
ward sloping average cost curves would indicate the presence of the 
latter which calls for a different policy approach than if profits are 
not justified by scale economies or efficiencies from diversification 
but are derived from monopoly pricing. 
The tests here are not incorporated with the intent of determining 
in-plant scale effects in the production of any particular product but 
in finding scale effects in the operation and administration of 
multiplant- multiproduct firms. This raises the need for a nummeraire 
that accounts for the quantity produced by multiproduct firms. Prices, 
Pi, will be considered weights of the quantities produced. Thus total 
revenue represents a measure of output. This procedure is analogous 
to determining total cost "by weighting optimum input combinations 
by factor prices (13, pp. 66-67)." Average total cost (ATC) becomes 
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equal to total cost divided by total revenue (TR). Since in cross-section 
analysis constant prices can be assumed and differing product mixes are 
accounted for by the insertion of the diversification index as an indepen­
dent variable, the cost curves will reach a minimum point at the same level 
of physical output as would have been achieved using unweighted physical 
quantities. The minimum point will occur at a different point on the quan­
tity scale since the entire scale is shifted by the prices of the outputs. 
Total revenue, being equal to Z Pi Qi, could reflect monopoly pricing 
in the Pi's. This would cause price to be a monotonically increasing func-
12 
tion of quantity and could increase the extent of any downward tendency 
in the average cost curve. But total cost, TC, is also a composite I Pj Qj, 
Pj being the input prices. The Pj's may be influenced similarly to the Pi's 
only in a downward direction because of monopsony buying power. The food 
processing firms sell mainly to large national chains and purchasing co­
operatives for smaller food retailers. The processors in turn purchase 
their basic input, agricultural commodities, through either futures con­
tracts, farmers, or smaller specialized firms that perform intermediate 
services on the product. These markets are all considered highly competi­
tive in nature. Thus, if the firm can attain monopoly prices, in the sale 
of its products to monopolistic or oligopolistic firms it should also be 
correct to assume that it can achieve monopsony prices in the purchase of 
inputs from the competitive firms. 
— 
This is possible because product differentiation exists in the 
products under question and is carried out primarily by the larger 
companies that sell large quantities. 
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This argument invalidates the use of the cost curves as indicators 
of monopoly power. But if the tests using concentration indexes as 
measures of monopoly power show little or no significance in the 
relationship between the firm's concentration index and its profit­
ability the cost curves become valid indicators of the cost structure 
of the firms. In the presence of a significant relationship implicating 
monopoly power the cost curves can be used to strengthen the argument 
by hypothesizing a lower cost per dollar sales for the larger monopolis­
tic firms. 
Three cost curves are to be tested using total cost to total 
revenue as a measure of average total costs, administrative and selling 
costs to total revenue as a measure of the overhead costs common to 
all multiplant-multiproduct firms, and cost of goods sold to total 
revenue as a measure of average direct production costs. The independent 
variables are the size of firm measured by total assets and product 
mix measured by the diversification index, 
Measurement of barriers to entry and promotional conduct 
Two measures of barriers to entry were developed in an effort to 
account for capital requirements in the production of the company's 
primary product, and capital requirements created by product differen­
tiation. These two measures approximate the capital requirements in 
two functional areas of the firm but in no way estimate the total 
13 The results of these tests were presented as Appendix A because 
of the lack of any consistent relationships found with the accounting 
data used. 
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capital requirement of the large multiproduct firms. Secondly, these 
measures do not take into account the very important area of capital 
financing. 
Firms under different management in different industries have 
various abilities in obtaining capital. The ability to obtain capital 
finances may not only be a barrier to entry but may be a very signifi­
cant barrier to growth of established firms. The ability of firms to 
grow and expand is closely associated with both the molding of and 
stability of the structure of industries (51, 65). 
In view of these weaknesses, the measures of barriers to entry 
adapted in this study account for only a small segment of the possible 
barriers to entry. This must be recognized in evaluating the results. 
The data for the minimum optimal size plant in the firm's primary 
industry were taken from Tech. Study No. 8(57, pp. 97-99). In this 
publication the estimates made by Saving and Weiss (68, 75) using 
the survival technique are compiled and then brought up to date using 
1963 census data. With the survival technique the minimum efficient 
size plant is determined by (1) classifying the plants in an industry 
by size and (2) calculating the share of the industry output coming 
from each size class over time. If the share of output coming from a 
given size class declined over time, this size class does not represent 
efficient sized plants. Proceeding from the smallest size category 
upward to the larger categories, the first category in which output as 
a percentage of total industry output does not decline represents the 
minimum efficient size of plants. 
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This criterion assumes that inefficient plants to not survive or 
remain at their current size. They must innovate and grow (or decline) 
in size to compete with the more efficient plants. This is entirely an 
ex post examination and yields few predictive results. 
The hypothesized relationship is that the minimum efficient size of 
the plants in the firm's primary industry acts as a protective barrier to 
entry and increases the profitability of the firm.^^ 
Advertising, the second measured barrier to entry, increases the 
capital requirements of the firm and, similar to minimum efficient sized 
plants, should have a positive influence on profitability. Since the 
effects of advertising are cumulative the total advertising and promotional 
expenditures of the firms over a five year-period were used as the inde­
pendent variable^^ (63, pp. 162-179). This should be a better measure 
of the barriers to entry created by advertising than the current expendi­
tures since only a partial amount of the effects of the latter measure 
are felt in the current year. 
A second measure of advertising was used to account for the extent 
of product differentiation. This measure, the ratio of current advertising 
to total revenue, is a measure of the extent to which revenue generated 
through the sale of a product is used to differentiate the product from 
similar items. This measure is to some extent correlated with the five-
year total advertising expenditure discussed above and also measures the 
The size distributions of plants within each 4-digit food industry 
are given in Appendix B. 
^^Data were taken from an Economic Research Service project currently 
in publication stage. 
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additional capital required by a firm if it is to overcome the cumulative 
effects of advertising. The ratio of advertising to revenue represents 
the proportion of revenue that firms must expect to budget to advertising 
and promotion if they wish to differentiate their products and compete 
with the large advertisers.^^ 
The Cross-Section Regression Model 
The complete regression model used contains the profit rates as 
measures of performance; the concentration of the firm's primary industry, 
the diversified power index, and absolute size of the firm as measures 
of the firm and industry structure; and the extent of diversification, 
barriers to entry, and product differentiation as measures of conduct. 
The model tested is then: 
(1) = f(X^, Xg X_) where 
= net profit/net worth, 
= four-firm concentration ratio, 
Xg = E a^ where a^ = share of the firm's output in the 
ith industry, the concentration ratio for the ith 
industry, 
X^ = total assets of the firm, 
X^ = minimum optimum size plant, 
X^ = five-year advertising expenditure, 
Xg = advertising/sales, 
Xy = capital/output ratio. 
^^Bain considered the existence of high selling costs a measure of 
performance as well as a form of conduct. 
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The capital output ratio was added to adjust for the different levels 
of capital intensity of the firms in different industries. (It is the 
ratio of fixed capital, i.e., plant, equipment, and land, to net sales). 
If a significant positive relationship exists between these variables 
and the level of profitability there is evidence of monopoly power existing 
in firms in the food industries. If these variables account for a 
statistically significant amount of the variation in company profitability 
the same conclusion is reached. 
The significance of the relationship of these variables to the 
dependent variable had to be tested with four regressions because 
certain data items were missing for some companies. 
The first regression: 
(2) = f(X^, X^) was run using 134 observations (the entire 
population of firms used in this study classified primarily in food 
processing. In the second regression the variables measuring diversifica­
tion and minimum optimum size plant were added to give: 
(3) = f(X^, Xg, X^, X^, Xy). These data were available for 104 
corporations, a subset of those in regression (1). 
The third regression included the advertising variables for which 
the most data were lacking, but eliminated the diversification measures. 
This regression: 
(4) Y^ = f(X^, X^, X^, X^, Xg, Xy) was run with 51 observations. 
A fourth regression, corresponding to equation (1) was run using 
all data for 44 firms. The observations used to test equation (4) and 
(5) were the only subset of the population that showed any bias. The 
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advertising data were typically lacking for the small companies. The 
missing data which led to the selection of the subsets of firms in the 
tests of equations (1) - (3) were randomly distributed among large and 
small firms, diversified and non-diversified firms. Therefore, generali­
zation of the regression results to the original population should not be 
invalid. 
The same regressions were run using (1) net profit before taxes 
plus depreciation to net worth (Yg) and (2) gross margin to sales (Y^) 
as dependent variables to test for the effects of (1) depreciation as 
an accounting tool and (2) monopoly payments hidden in overhead accounts 
such as executive compensation. 
Cost curves were then estimated to determine the extent to which 
size of firm is justified by a downward sloping cost curve. The cost 
curves of the following quadratic form were tested; 
(5) ATC = b^ + b^ Xg + bg x^^ + b^ Xg 
(6) AOC = bg + b^ Xg + b^ x^^ + b^ Xg 
where 
ATC = total cost/sales 
AOC = overhead costs/sales 
Xg = total assets 
non-primarv sales , 
^8 total sales ^ 
Variable Xg was added to adjust for the differences in the product 
mix of the companies. The cost breakdown was calculated for 104 firms. 
A comparison of the regressions measuring the extent (if any) to 
which monopoly performance is caused by high concentration, product 
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diversification, and conduct to the extent to which size and diversifi­
cation are justified by scale effects (either real or pecuniary) provides 
an indication of the existence or nonexistence of a contradiction in 
current antitrust policy. In the Supreme Court decision on the Brown 
Shoe Case merger policy was shifted toward "...the protection of viable, 
small, locally owned businesses, even where economies of scale might be 
gained—(11, p. 297)" through the formation of large companies. The 
comparison of these regressions will not indicate the extent of the 
inconsistency between monopoly size and efficiency but should indicate 
its existence. 
In summary, the cross-section analysis was constructed to indicate 
the significance of the relationship between measures of monopoly power 
(concentration or structure and conduct) and monopoly performance (high 
profitability). The cost curves are indicators of the significance of 
scale economies. These regressions by-pass any direct analysis of the 
pricing system. However, monopoly pricing is measured by the degree to 
which the profit ratios are influenced by the measures of monopolistic 
power. 
Time Series Analysis 
Three objectives underlie the time series analysis: (1) to determine 
the effect of diversification on the level of profitability over time; 
(2) to determine the effects of diversification on the stability of 
profits overtime (risk aversion); and (3) to determine the differences 
in the growth of diversified and nondiversified firms. 
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A 30 percent sample was chosen randomly from the population used in 
the cross-section analysis. The ratios of profit to net worth were 
calculated for the companies for the period 1947-1965 from Moody's 
Industrials. 
Each firm was classified into one of four groups according to its 
level of diversification. In group one were those firms completely 
nondiversified over the entire period; In group two were those non-
diversified in 1947 but diversified in 1965; in group three were those 
slightly diversified in 1947 but significantly more so in 1965; and in 
group four were those being heavily diversified over the entire period. 
Since there were no empirical data available for years prior to 1965 
corresponding to the ratio of (non-primary sales/total sales) used in 
the cross-section analysis the firms were grouped and ranked ordinally 
in groups two through four from high to low diversification on the basis 
of information given in annual reports, Moody's, and various trade 
publications. These groupings were used throughout this segment of the 
analysis. 
The average profit/net worth was calculated for each group of firms 
for each year from 1947-65. This resulted in 19 observations for each 
group. An analysis of variance was then conducted to determine if there 
was any statistically significant difference in the average profit rates 
of the various groups of firms. 
Trend lines were then calculated for each group using profit/net 
worth as the dependent variable and time as the independent variable. 
Analysis of variance was again used to analyze the coefficients of the 
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trend to determine whether or not the trends in profit rates were signifi­
cantly different for the different groups of firms over the period. 
The variances of the annual profits of each firm were calculated 
for the 1947-65 period. Bartlett's test was used to determine the effect 
of diversification on profit stability. If the average variances of 
the groups are unequal the F ratio must be used to determine which groups 
have lower variance. 
The third objective of the time series analysis is to determine the 
relationship between growth and profitability. First, the firms in 
the sample primarily classified in food and kindred products were used 
in a Chi square contingency test to determine the existence of any overall 
relationship between profitability and growth. Average annual net profit/ 
net worth for each firm was used as a measure of profitability. Total 
annual sales data were deflated with the BLS implicit wholesale price 
deflator for the primary product of the firm. The average annual growth 
rate of each firm was calculated from these sales data. A 3 x 3 con­
tingency table was used with equal size classes for profitability and 
growth respectively. 
Second, a similar Chi square test was run to determine the 
relationship between growth and the diversified structure of the firm. 
The four groupings of diversification were tested against the same 
growth categories used in the previous test in a 4 x 3 contingency table. 
The results of the tests should indicate, as was described above, the 
effect of diversification on profits, profit stability and growth 
overtime. These results along with the results of the cross-section 
analysis are presented in Chapter V. 
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CHAPTER IV. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FOOD PROCESSING INDUSTRIES 
Growth in the Industries 
The structural characteristics of the food processing industries 
and the changes taking place in these characteristics in the 1947-65 
period are considered in this chapter. This is accompanied by a number 
of examples depicting relevant characteristics of certain of the larger 
food processing firms. 
The size of the food processing sector of the economy (SIC 20) is 
represented by a value added of $19,735 million, 1.5 million employees, 
and 36,928 establishments (82, Part II). This size is compared to a 
total value added of $17,656 million in chemicals and allied products 
(SIC 28), $15,261 million in primary metals (SIC 33), and $22,765 in 
transportation equipment (SIC 35). 
A comparison of these four major sectors of the economy is given in 
Table 2 for 1947 and 1963. As can be seen, the food sector has increased 
157 percent in value added compared to 232 percent for chemicals, 166 
percent for metals, and 290 percent for transportation. The only obvious 
differences in the 1947-63 changes in these sectors are the 24 percent 
decline in the number of establishments in the food processing sector 
compared to increases of 20 percent, 21 percent, and 94 percent in the 
number of establishments in chemicals, primary metals, and transportation 
equipment respectively, and the similar decline of 12 percent in the 
number of companies in food processing compared to slight increases 
in chemicals and primary metals and a sizable increase in transportation. 
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Table 2. Growth of major sectors of the economy^ 
Sector 1947 1963 % Change 
Foods and kindred products: 
Value Added ($000) $7,687,541 $19,734,544 157 
Capital Expenditures ($000) $ 820,847 $ 1,137,243 38 
Employment 1,338,187 1,554,423 16 
Establishments 41,005 36,928 -24 
Companies 36,122° 31,713 -12 
Chemicals and allied products; 
Value Added ($000) $5,317,001 $17,656,138 232 
Capital Expenditures ($000) $ 804,958 $ 1,545,689 92 
Employment 626,418 737,414 18 
Establishments 10,019, 11,996 20 
Companies 8,461^ 8,794 4 
Primary metals: 
Value Added ($000) $5,841,722 $22,765,674 290 
Capital Expenditures ($000) $ 354,974 $ 1,022,004 187 
Employment 1,174,498 1,601,158 36 
Establishments 3,703 7,196 94 
Companies 4,715^ 6,237 32 
^Source (80, Part II). 
^Company data are for 1954, since 1947 totals were not published 
by census. 
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This factor, the sizable decline in the number of companies in food 
processing, has drawn significant attention to the study of competition 
in this sector of the economy by the regulatory agencies and economists 
(57, 82, Part II). The first impression must be that there has been an 
increase in the extent of oligopoly in the industries in this sector. But 
there has been an increase rather than a decrease in the number of large 
companies which would imply that the concept of "more firms, more competi­
tion" holds. More companies are able to compete with the large companies 
rather than fewer, as would be the case if there was a strong monopoly 
under current. In 1947 there were only 31 companies in food processing " 
with assets of $50 million or more. In 1962 there were 68 corporations 
in the same size category or an increase of more than 100 percent (87). 
Over the 1954-63 period the 20 largest companies engaged in food 
processing increased their share of total value added in food processing 
from 22.1 percent to 22.8 percent. The 200 largest corporations increased 
their share of value added by only 5.8 percentage points (from 48.7 to 
53.5) (57, Appendix A). 
Changes in Concentration 
Of the 40 4-digit industries in the food and kindred products 
sector, 22 are considered comparable for the purpose of calculating 
17 
concentration ratios for the 1954-63 interval. Table 3 presents 
^^The Bureau of the Census considered industries sufficiently 
comparable to show historical data "...if the employment in the plants 
reclassified into the new SIC from other industries and reclassified 
out of the old SIC to other industries, accounted for two percent or 
less of the original total employment in the old SIC industry (83, p. 5)." 
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a picture of the changes in concentration for various intervals of firms 
in the industry size distribution of these 22 food processing industries 
(excluding alcoholic beverages). The percent of value of shipments 
accounted for by the four largest firms declined in eight industries 
from 1954 to 1963, remained the same in one case and increased in thirteen 
cases. The share of value added represented by the eight out of twenty-
two industries that declined was 30 percent. However, the average decline 
Table 3. Changes in the concentration ratios of 22 four-digit food 
processing industries, 1954-63^ 
Percentage points change 
in concentration ratio 
4 
largest 5-8 9-20 21-50^ 
Decrease 8 6 6 8 
No change 1 2 5 7 
Increase 1-3 8 11 7 4 
Increase 4-5 2 3 3 2 
Increase 7-5 3 1 1 
Totals 22 22 22 22 
^Source (83). 
^Data are available for 1958 and 1963 only. Historical data are 
not accountable for the remaining 17 industries. 
was 5.6 points per industry. The average increase for the 13 industries 
showing such a move was 3.7 points per industry. The share of value 
of shipments accounted for by companies ranked 5-8 increased in 14 
industries and declined in only 6. The 50 largest companies in these 
same 4-digit industries (which represent over 60 percent of value added 
in food processing excluding alcoholic beverages) increased their share 
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of value of shipments in 10 industries, witnessed no change in 8 
industries, and reflected a decline in 4 industries. 
These concentration ratios present an inconclusive set of evidence 
on the changing structure of the food processing industries. Over the 
nine-year period described, the increases in 4-firm concentration ratios 
were less than one-half of one percentage point per year. The 50 largest 
companies witnessed no change or slightly increased their share of output 
in 18 industries. This is all occurring in a period when the number 
of companies primarily engaged in food processing declined by more than 
12 percent. The changes in concentration ratios indicate that either 
the firms leaving the industry account for a small share of the market 
or the firms disappearing through mergers and abandonments are being 
picked up by existing firms of a variety of sizes. It is not completely 
a case of the largest growing through merger or purchase of smaller 
companies at the expense of the company ranked tenth or the fiftieth in 
the industry. In addition, more firms have entered the larger size 
categories. Thus, more than an examination of historical concentration 
trends is needed to determine the competitive aspects of the food 
processing industries. 
Productivity in the industry has increased significantly over the 
1947-65 period. Output per man-hour worked in food processing plants 
increased at an average annual rate of 2.4 percent a year from 1947-1955 
(89, pp. 7-9). The same index of productivity increased at an average 
annual rate of 3.5 percent from 1955-1965. During this same period 
total output increased 20 percent while man-hours worked decreased 
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6 percent. The rate of Improvement in output per man-hour has been 
significantly greater in the food manufacturing sector than the rate of 
2.7 for the total private nonfarm sector (83, p. 15). Kendrick estimates 
the increase in total factor productivity for food and kindred products 
to be from 132.2 to 147.3 over the 1947-53 period (43, p. 468). Estimates 
for later years are not available. This gives an average annual increase 
of 3 percent per year compared to 3.7 percent for all manufacturing over 
the same period. Thus, from one point of reference the food processing 
sector has performed at least as well as the average for total manufac­
turing. The regression analysis that follows will provide additional 
insights into the performance of these industries. 
Extent of Product Diversification 
A facet of structure that does not appear in the data above is the 
extent of product diversification of firms producing food products. 
Twenty-eight of the 200 largest companies manufacturing food products 
are primarily engaged in nonfood manufacturing (including some service 
industries) (57, p. 238). The 200 largest food manufacturers had 28,027 
establishments in 1963, 3,585 of which were classified in food manu­
facturing industries (57, p. 239). 
18 
The 100 largest food manufacturers held on the average 7.3 
19 leading positions in manufacturing classes. The 100 largest companies 
Ranked by value added by manufacturers in food and kindred 
products excluding alcholic beverages. 
19 
A firm is said to occupy a leading position if it is one of the 
largest producers ranked by value added of manufacturer in a 5-digit 
product class. 
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occupied 78 percent of the leading four positions in the 4-digit food 
industries. The same companies occupied 70 percent of the leading four 
positions of the 5-digit food product classes (57, p. 44-45, 50). This 
represents an increase from 63 to 70 percent from 1954 to 1963, or less 
than one point per year. 
The 200 largest food manufacturers produced products in an average 
of 3.7 four-digit food industries and 3.1 four-digit nonfood industries 
in 1963. The largest 20 firms were in an average of 8.9 food industries. 
This is an increase for the 20 largest companies from 5,4 industries in 
1954 and 2.2 industries for the 200 largest in the same year (57, p. 50). 
This represents a significant increase in the number of products (5 and 
7 digits) produced by these companies. 
20 
The ownership specialization ratio declined in 6 of the 10 food 
industry categories between 1954 and 1958 (80, p. 44). The ratio 
increased for two categories and two were withheld to avoid disclosure. 
21 
The industry specialization ratio declined in 5 categories, increased 
22 in 3, and was withheld in 2 categories between 1954 and 1958. The 
The ownership specialization ratio describes the percent of 
establishments in a given industry category that belong to companies 
classified in the same category. 
21 
^ The industry specialization ratio is the percent of establishments 
belonging to companies classified in a specific category that are also 
in the same category. 
22 
The Enterprise Statistics covering the 1963 Census of Manufacturers 
has not yet been published. Also the categories of industries have 
changed for 1954, 1958, and 1963 leaving few of the data comparable. 
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23 
multi-industry companies classified in food processing had only 38 
percent of their establishments classified in the same food industry 
as the parent company in 1958 (80, pp. 56-57). 
Diversification is not a recent phenomenon. Gort found that the 12 
food companies in his sample were in 78 four-digit manufacturing activities 
in 1947 and 81 in 1954. The average ratio of primary 4-digit industry 
payrolls to total manufacturing payable for these 12 companies was 
.763 and .783 in 1947 and 1954 respectively (39, p. 61). The same 12 
food manufacturing companies added 157 products and services between 
1929 and 1954. Forty of the additions were in nonmanufacturing activities. 
During the same period these 12 companies abandoned the production of 
54 products and services, 23 of which were nonmanufacturing activities. 
Of the 64 product additions made by these 12 companies into manufacturing 
activities, 44 products were added in industries growing at least as 
rapidly as the company's primary industry. 
Thus, product diversification is a structural change that has been 
altering the shape of industries for a number of years. A look at the 
diverse activities of select corporations will give further insight into 
the types and extent of product diversification. 
The structure of Armour and Bordens 
Two companies have been chosen for review, namely Armour and Bordens. 
It is not contended that these firms are the most diversified of the food 
A company is considered multi-industry if it has plants classified 
in more than one 4-digit industry. 
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processors, but both firms are old line companies that have been leaders in 
their respective primary industries since the late 19th century. Since 
their beginning they have made extensive additions to their product lines 
through internal expansion and mergers. 
24 
Armour & Co. was incorporated in 1863 as a livestock slaughtering 
firm. Armour's sales in 1966 exceeded $2 billion. In the same year about 
36 percent of Armour's assets were in food operations. The remainder of 
the assets were spread over chemicals and other industrial products, phar­
maceuticals, grocery products, agri-chemicals, and heavy equipment. 
Armour is still one of the four largest firms in the meat packing industry. 
In 1922 Armour was engaged in processing meat products and products 
from packing house by-products, e.g., fertilizers, soaps, leather products, 
and various other related products. The company also had an interest in 
General Stockyards Corproation (which it sold in 1931) and operated a 
system of branch houses. By 1966 Armour produced a number of products in 
the industries listed in Table 4. 
Armour's leading branded products are Armour Star meats, Vertagreen 
fertilizers for lawns and gardens, Dial soap (the nation's largest selling 
bath soap), Appian Way pizza mixes, and Bruce floor waxes and cleaners. 
Cryodry Corporation, a subsidiary of Armour, is a leader in the develop­
ment and use of microwave heat processing techniques. In 1965, Baldwin-
Lima-Hamilton Corporation was merged into Armour. This took Armour into 
an entirely new area, that of heavy equipment manufacturing and the 
development of desalination equipment. 
^^Information from Moody's Industrials and Annual Reports of Armour 
and Company. 
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Armour operates approximately 24 meat packing plants; 27 dairy and 
poultry processing plants; 3 plants specifically for processing shortening 
and edible oil products plus similar facilities at other packing plants; 
130 food branch houses; over 30 fertilizer processing plants plus phosphate 
rock deposit reserves; 4 industrial chemical plants; 7 grocery products 
plants; 4 pharmaceutical laboratories; 6 adhesives, coated products, and 
abrasives plants; one leather plant; one microwave processing plant; one 
tape plant; 6 construction, industrial and electronic equipment plants. 
The company's growth and expansion into these diverse areas has been 
divided among internal expansion and mergers. 
The Borden Company was incorporated in 1899 as Borden's Condensed 
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Milk Co., to succeed a business originally established in 1857. The 
present name was adopted in 1919. In 1966 Borden's total sales exceeded 
$1.5 billion. Slightly over 50 percent of Borden's output is dairy products 
and mainly fluid milk products. 
The company's operations are spread across other food lines, 
chemicals, pharmaceuticals, paints and finishes, fertilizers, resins and 
glues, plastics, latex and rubber products, and custom industrial machines. 
A complete list of their industry operations is given in Table 5. 
Among their widely selling branded products are Borden's dairy and 
food products, Drake's cake products. Eagle Brand cheese and butter, 
Cornstack canned vegetables, Starlac dry milk. Aunt Jane's pickles, 
Elmer's glue, Mistik tape, Robert Powers' cosmetics and many others. 
Data from Moody's Industrials and Company annual reports. 
Table 5. Listing of the production activities of the Borden Company 
Other food Chemicals and Mis c ellaneous 
Primary industry products related products Fertilizers areas 
Butter Canned fruits. Coated fabrics Superphosphate Resin and casein 
vegetables, baby and other glues and adhesives 
Cheese food, and food Pressure sensitive phosphatic 
specialties tapes fertilizers Printing ink 
Fluid, dry. 
condensed and Poultry and Hexamethyleneta- Mixed Hot melts and binders 
evaporated milk livestock feed 
supplements 
tramine fertilizers 
Asphalt felts and 
Ice cream, sour Industrial coating 
cream and Bread, cake. organic 






Confectionery synthetic resins and shipping 
products and nonvulcanizable 
elastamers 
containers 
Powdered fruit Rubber products 






Surface active Gypsum 
Coffee, chocolate and finishing 
and cocoa agents Tin cans 
products 





Custom made industrial 
machines 
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The total assets of Borden Company increased from $259.0 million in 
1950 to $698.3 in 1965. Over the same period Borden acquired $194.6 
million in assets through mergers and acquisitions (57, p. 116). Thus, 
26 
less than 50 percent of the growth was via external expansion. 
These companies are just two examples of the extent of diversifica­
tion in food processing firms. Numerous large companies classified in 
nonfood industries are diversifying into food operations. In 1967, a 
merger was approved by the stockholders of both companies making Wilson & 
Co-. 5 Inc. 5 a large meat packer and producer of athletic goodsj a part of 
Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., a diversified manufacturer primarily engaged in 
aerospace and electronics research and manufacturing. Textron, Inc., 
one of the nation's most conglomerated firms, is included in the poultry 
processing industry. 
The 1966 Fortune Plant and Product Directory lists 98 firms producing 
food and kindred products among the largest 500 manufacturing firms in 
the United States. These firms produced an average of 18 different 
products (5-digit) in 1966 compared with 15 in 1961. Of these 98 companies, 
24 were primarily in food processing and 23 in chemicals. All 24 food 
processing firms also produced chemicals and related products. 
Thus, this change in structural pattern could affect both the extent 
and type of competition among the large companies in industry. Looking 
back at Tables 4 and 5 it can be seen that Bordens is no longer free of 
This is not an entirely accurate measure of the two means of 
growth because after a merger the parent company and the purchased 




competition from Armour as was the case in the past. These two 
companies now compete not only with other companies but with each other in 
certain dairy products industries, canning industries, chemical and 
related industries, fertilizer industries, and numerous other cases shoim 
in the tables. The analysis in the following sections should provide 
some clues to the effects of this phenomenon on the performance of the 
firm and its relation to structural aspects of markets. 
In the past, of course, the two companies competed for the 
consumer's food expenditure to the extent that dairy and meat products 
are substitutes. 
91 
CHAPTER V. RESULTS OF THE REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
The Cross-Section Model 
The results of the regression analysis are presented in the approxi­
mate order as the variables were described in the previous chapter. 
The hypotheses being tested are that concentration measures explain 
a statistically significant amount of the variation in the profit rates 
of firms in the food processing industries. The addition of variables 
that account for other features of structure and conduct successively 
increases the significance of the level of explained variation. The 
positive relationship between the independent variables and the profit 
rates of firms (as a measure of performance) is necessary if the case-
by-case approach to anti-monopoly public policy questions is valid. 
The hypotheses are structured in a manner that makes the tests 
particularly adaptable to the computerized step-wise regression program. 
This program indicates the simple correlation coefficients, enters 
variables into the analysis in the order in which they explain the 
variation in the dependent variable, provides the regression coefficients 
as each variable is introduced, the final regression equation, standard 
errors of the coefficients, t values, partial correlation coefficients, 
2 
and multiple R values. Thus the variables will be considered in the 
context of the four equations described in Chapter III and evaluated on 
the basis of the contribution to explained variance of each added inde­
pendent variable. 
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The Influence of concentration and size of firm 
First it was hypothesized that there is a positive relation between 
the concentration ratio of a company's primary industry and the company's 
level of profitability. Concentration is used as a measure of the 
monopoly power firms derive from their base of operations, i.e., their 
primary industry. Thus, firms in the more monopolistically structured 
industries should achieve higher levels of profitability than the firms 
in competitively structured industries. 
This hypothesis was first tested with a simple linear regression 
between the 4-firm concentration ratio of each firm's primary industry 
and the firm's ratio of net profit to net worth. The correlation was 
positive but the simple correlation coefficient of .039 was not significant 
indicating that there is no reason to believe that there is a positive 
linear relationship between the concentration of a firm's primary industry 
and the firm's level of profitability. A plotting of the points did not 
yield any evidence of the relationship taking any other explainable 
mathematical forms. All that can be said from this evidence is that 
either (1) there is effective competition within the food industries 
with their various levels of concentration not having reached heights 
that indicate monopolistic performance or (2) concentration and profit­
ability are invalid measures of the existence of monopoly. The former 
tentative conclusion is chosen at this stage. 
The simple correlation, although still not high, yielded an r 
value of .15 which is significant at the 95 percent level when the 
companies classified in nonfood manufacturing activities but involved 
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in certain food processing activities were included. These companies 
were typically higher profit companies based in more highly concentrated 
industries than the food companies. 
The lack of any significant correlation between the profit rates 
of firms and their primary industry concentration could be caused by 
low profit rates for small firms in the commonly referred to competitive 
fringe of oligopolistic industries. 
A variable was added to determine the influence of the size of 
firm on profitability to account for this possibility. The size of firm 
was measured by the total assets of each company. Since individual 
firm observations were used, there are two sources of variance to take 
into account: the different levels of profitability within industries 
and the different levels of profitability between industries. 
The relationships between size of firm and profitability (measured 
by either net profit to net worth or net profit before taxes plus deprecia­
tion to net worth) within the food processing sector were not significant. 
This is somewhat consistent with the findings of Stekler (74, p. 30). 
Although Stekler's distribution of profits/net worth does indicate 
an increase as the asset size increases, the largest asset category 
is not the most profitable. The positive relationship is particularly 
strong until firms reach $500-1,000 thousand asset ranks. The rela­
tionship then levels off significantly with an increase of less than 
1.5 percentage points change from firms with assets of $5 million 
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28 
to firms with assets over $100 million. The various measures of 
profitability used by Stekler never yielded the highest profits for 
the largest size category of firms. The smallest firms were definitely 
the lowest profit firms. However » Stekler considered much smaller finns 
than are being considered in this study, which is another reason for the 
low correlation found. The firms in the present study were predominantly 
in the size classes showing little differences in profitability. 
An analysis of variance was run to determine the relation of profit 
variability within industries to profit variability between industries. 
29 
The analysis was run on five 3-digit industries. Profit/net worth 
was used as the random variable. The results are presented in Table 6. 
Table 6. Analysis of profit variance for five 
3-digit food processing industries 
Source of variation 
Degrees of 













Total 137 2.372 F = 1.78 
28 
The highest level of profitability appeared in the $50-100 million 
asset group in the years studied by Stekler. The four largest firms in 
each of the 3-digit industry groups including meat packing (with the 
exception of one firm), dairy products, canning, preserving, and frozen 
fruits and vegetables, grain mill products, and two of the largest 
bakery products firms had assets in excess of $100 million. 
29 
The industries were meat products; dairy products; canned, 
preserved, and frozen fruits and vegetables; grain mill products; 
bakery products; and other food miscellaneous products excluding 
alcoholic beverages. 
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The calculated F value of 1.78 gives no reason to believe that profit 
differences between industries are significantly different than profit 
differences within industries. 
A further test was run because of the possibility of a nonparametric 
distribution of profit rates. A weighted concentration ratio was câl­
in 
culated for each 3-digit industry. The 3-digit industries were then 
ranked according to concentration and average profit rates. There was 
no significant relation between the two rankings. The average profit 
rate in the most highly concentrated food industry group was not the 
highest nor was the average profit rate the lowest in the most unconcen-
trated industry for the group of corporate firms used in this study. 
The analysis of variance presented above was recalculated for 26 
4-digit food industries. Again there was no significant difference between 
the variability of profits within or between the large corporate firms 
31 in the industries in the study. 
The average level of profit within each of these same 26 4-digit 
food industries was calculated and ranked from highest to lowest. 
Similarly, the respective 4-firm concentration ratio for each industry 
was ranked and Spearman's rank correlation coefficient calculated. The 
nonparametric test yielded no significance indicating the independence 
of the two rankings. 
The 4-digit industries concentration ratios within a specific 
3-digit industry were weighted by the size of the 4-digit industry and 
an average was calculated for each 3-digit industry group. 
31 
There was no statistical significance at either the 95 or 99 
percent level for the F ratio. 
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It is not surprising that the multiple regression of 4-firm primary 
industry concentration ratios and asset size of firms on net profit/net 
2 
worth yielded an R of .0445; i.e., the concentration and size variables 
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explained less than five percent of the variation in company profits. 
A multiple regression was run for each 3-digit group of industries 
in an effort to determine how much profit variability of firms within 
each group can be explained by the asset size of the firms within each 
group. Although the coefficients were all positive for the size variable, 
the highest correlation coefficients for the quadratic forms on the six 
Industry groups was .26, which is not significant at the 90 percent level. 
The coefficients were not significantly different from zero. Thus, size 
variability among the large corporate firms within the respective in­
dustries explains little of the differences in profitability when measured 
by net profit/net worth. 
These further tests of the relationship between profitability and 
size of firm strengthen the earlier conclusion that industry concentration 
has little influence on profitability when measured by profit to net 
worth. Certainly if monopolistic profits are being made in an industry 
they are made by the large not the small firms. The elimination of small 
firms in this study (who would lower the average profitability of each 
industry) should bias any results of these tests upward. Even with this 
bias the relationships are not significant. Thus, the conclusion is 
A 20-firm primary industry concentration ratios were substituted 
for the 4-firm concentration because of its coverage of a wider range of 
the size distribution of firms within industries. The level of 
significance of the coefficients and multiple R were not changed 
significantly. 
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reached that in the general case the food industry concentration by 
itself is not high enough to cause substantial excess profits when 
measured by profits to net worth. This does not preclude the possibility 
that other factors could not cause excess profitability and monopoly 
performance in the food firms. 
The influence of diversification on monopoly power 
The 4-firm concentration of a firm's primary industry accounts for 
only that power a firm derives from operations in its primary industry. 
Many of the large firms in this study are highly diversified into a 
variety of product lines in such a manner that the firm might derive 
power from these other markets or from the combination of product markets 
in which it sells. Thus the diversified power index described in Chapter 
IV, i.e., E c^, where a^ is the share of the firm's output in the ith 
industry and c^ is the 4-firm concentration ratio of the ith industry, 
was added to the analysis. This index was calculated from data purchased 
from McGraw-Hill Plant Census for 104 food processing corporations. 
The hypothesis being tested here is that firms gain market leverage 
by being in a number of industries that permits them to have monopoly 
power in not only their primary industry but in other industries as well. 
This market power should show up in higher profits which would yield a 
positive correlation between the diversified power index and profitability 
measured by the ratio of net profit/net worth. 
The simple correlation of the diversified power index with profit 
to net worth yielded a correlation coefficient of .06, which is obviously 
insignificant. A quadratic relationship was fitted as was suggested in 
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Technical Study No. 8 (57, pp. 205-209). The quadratic equation explained 
less than one percent of the variation in net profit to net worth. 
However, the coefficients were similar to those reported in the previous 
. J 33 
study. 
A second measure of diversification was calculated that related 
strictly to the specific firm's market share. This measure is E a^ b^, 
where a^ is the share of the firm's output in the ith industry, is 
the share of the ith industry accounted for by the firm. This measure 
showed no relationship to profitability with a simple correlation coe­
fficient of .009. A simple ratio of nonprimary industry sales to total 
sales yielded a higher yet still nonsignificant result. 
It is possible that the diversified power index does not give 
adequate weight to the influence of the structure of a company's primary 
industry. Thus, an additional variable was calculated, E a^ c^, where 
Z ay Cj = (E a^ c^)-A^ C^, A^ being the share of the firm's output 
in the company's primary industry and is the concentration of that 
industry. The simple correlation between E a^ c^ and the ratio of net 
profit/net worth was .12, which is still insignificant at the 95 percent 
level but is higher than the correlation coefficient for any of the other 
measures of diversification and net profit/net worth. 
33 2 
The equation reported was Y = .0746 + .4881x - .2360x . Their 
product break out was at the 5-digît rather than 4-digit. The regression 
found in this study was Y = .051 + .235x2". 224*2•' significant 
difference in the levels of r2 between the two regressions will be 
discussed later. 
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The purpose of this variable was not to reveal information in a 
simple correlation but to allow primary industry concentration to enter 
with a weight of one and concentration of industries that account for 
other manufacturing activities of the firm to be weighted by their 
respective shares of the firm's total manufacturing employment. 
In the multiple regression these variables, i.e., primary industry 
concentration and weighted concentration of diversified activities 
explained a very insignificant amount of the different levels of 
profitability of firms. The addition of a variable to account for the 
size of firm increased the level of the explained variance only slightly 
leaving it at a level so low as to place doubt on the reliability of 
the coefficients as estimators of the true relation between market power 
achieved through diversification and the profitability of firms. 
The tentative conclusions reached at this stage must be that there 
is no linear or quadratic relationship between the profitability of firms 
in food processing industries measured by net profits to net worth and 
the structure of the firm's primary industry, extent of diversification 
into concentrated industries, and the absolute size of the firm. Thus, 
the hypothesis is rejected that these structural measures explain either 
individually or in combination a statistically significant amount of 
the variation in the profitability of large corporate food processors. 
These findings are consistent with the conclusions reached by Fuchs 
for the total manufacturing sector (36, pp. 278-291). Fuchs concluded 
that "rates of return on corporate assets are not very closely related 
to the concentration ratio...." even though he used industry averages 
for profit rates that eliminates all within industry variation (36, p. 291). 
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Bain concluded from his 1936-40 data that the regression line shows a 
downward slope for profit rates as concentration decreases, "...but the 
correlation is poor and the fit to any such line is obviously so poor 
that the inference of a rectilinear or other simple relationship of 
concentration to profits is not warranted (7, p. 313)." The industries 
examined by Bain exhibited a significantly higher average level of 
profits when 8-firm concentration was above 70 percent but average 
profitability increased significantly again for industries with 8-firm 
concentration ratios less than 30 percent. 
Levinson found the correlation between concentration and profit­
ability ranged from 0.071 to 0,755 using cross-sectional comparisons 
indicating no stable relationship between the two factors between 1947 
and 1958 (49). 
The evidence of these studies accompanied with the present findings 
supports the conclusion that there is little relationship between 
profitability and concentration in the food industries. If the large 
multiproduct food corporations possess monopoly power it is not evident 
in performance measured by profit to net worth. There is equally as 
much variability of profits of firms within a given level of primary , 
industry concentration, size of firm, and levels of diversification as 
there is between the various levels of these factors. In addition no 
relationship was found between average profitability and the average 
level of each of these three factors when groupings were made to eliminate 
within industry and within group variation. 
Additional findings are evident in the relationship between the 
extent of product diversification and profitability. The extent of 
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product diversification was measured for each corporation by two ratios; 
">e share o£ 
the company's output outside its primary industry; and second, 
<TotarSnSun^°Mp"oy«e„t' "hers d is the number of 4-dlgic 
manufacturing industries in which the company produces goods. Neither 
ratio takes into account the structure of an industry into which the firm 
is diversified nor the extent to which a firm is diversified into any 
one industry. The ratios account only for the share of company output 
in nonprimary activities and the number of nonprimary activities in 
which the firm is engaged. 
Table 7 summarizes the simple correlation coefficients between 
the two measures of diversification, size of firm, and profit/net worth. 
Table 7. Simple correlation coefficients for diversification, size, and 











Asset size 1 .0913 
Net profit/ 
net worth 1 
a^ nonprimary employment 
1 total manufacturing employment 
= (D^) d where d = number of 4-digit industries in which the 
company is an active producer. 
* 
Statistically significant at the 99 percent level. 
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The correlations clearly indicate that the diversified firms are no more 
profitable than the nondiversified firms. Neither did the level of 
profitability increase from slightly to highly diversified firms. It 
cannot be concluded from these data that diversification did not increase 
profitability for individual firms over time. This possibility will be 
covered in the time series analysis. A number of firms, particularly the 
large meat packers, have shown an improvement in profitability since 
they diversified. Diversification in other firms could have ceased any 
decline in profits. The correlation coefficients in Table 7 indicate 
that for a cross-section of large food processing corporations, the 
diversified firms are no more profitable than the nondiversified firms. 
The correlations also indicate that the large firms are more 
diversified than small firms. This is consistent with the findings 
of Gort (39, p. 65). More of the effects of diversification will be 
discussed in the time series analysis. 
The influence of barriers to entry 
Measures of barriers to entry were next incorporated into the analysis 
to determine their respective influence on the profitability of firms. 
The first measure used was the percent of primary industry necessary to 
have a "minimum efficient sized plant." This measure accounts for the 
firm's plants in its primary industry only, not the size of plants in 
diversified activities. It is expected that as the minimum efficient 
size of plant increases in a particular industry barriers to entry are 
heightened thus protecting existing companies from increased competition 
and increasing their rewards or profitability. 
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The data for this variable were taken from data tabulated by the 
National Commission on Food Marketing which updates the studies of 
Stigler, Saving and Weiss (57, pp. 248-253). Using the survival 
techniques the size category of the minimum efficient size plant was 
determined in each 4-digit industry. The lower bound of this size 
category was then divided by the total employment of the industry to 
determine the share of industry necessary in such a plant. 
The correlation between minimum efficient size of plant and the 
profitability of a company's primary Industry indicated no signlficancQ 
at the 90 percent level. The simple correlation of .09 is significant 
indication that the relationship is not one of simple linearity. 
A high correlation was found to exist between the minimum efficient 
size plant of a company's primary industry and the 4-firm concentration 
ratio of a company's primary industry. This relationship must be regarded 
as unusual since the largest share of output in any of the 4-digit food 
industries accounted for by the minimum efficient size plant was slightly 
in excess of three percent and most were less than one percent. However, 
there was a negative (though insignificant) relationship between the 
minimum efficient size plant in a firm's primary industry and the 
absolute size of the firm. This is accounted for mainly by the small 
size of the industries having a large share of output accounted for by 
the minimum efficient sized plant relative to a number of the large food 
processing industries and the fact that the firms in this study primarily 
classified in these industries were not among the largest in the study. 
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The second barrier to entry considered was the level of product 
differentiation created by advertising. Three measures of advertising 
were tested individually to determine the placement of high advertisers, 
i.e., by size of firm, structure of primary industry, level of diversifi­
cation, and the relation between advertising and profitability. 
The extent of product differentiation and level of selling costs 
was first measured by the amount of generated revenue devoted to adver­
tising, i.e., the level of advertising per dollar of revenue. Assuming 
that advertising increases the salability of a firm's product, the ratio 
of advertising to total revenue is the extent to which revenue must be 
placed in advertising for the firm to increase sales and counteract the 
advertising of other firms. 
The second measure, the absolute level of annual advertising 
expenditures, accounts for the absolute level of capital outlay necessary 
for firms to compete (at least in the form of advertising) with the large 
national advertisers. Advertising in this sense is strictly a barrier 
to entry both to new entrants and to small firms desiring to move into 
the large national markets. 
The cumulative buildup of advertising influence on the salability 
of a product discussed in Chapter II was measured in this study by the 
aggregative level of advertising expenditures by each firm over the 
previous 5-year period. 
It was hypothesized that larger firms in concentrated industries 
were the high-level advertisers. First, the large firms because they 
have the financial resources to promote large scale advertising. Second, 
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if a firm has monopoly power it must be large relative to its competitors 
and must have few competitors. A barrier to entry would be erected to 
protect a monopoly position or to forestall increased competition. This 
should result in high advertising in highly oligopolistic industries. 
Thus, there should be a positive relation between the level of advertising 
and primary industry concentration, size of firm, and diversification. 
The positive relationship between advertising and diversification is 
expected because advertising effectiveness, which is at least in part 
measured by the exposure rate of a particular advertisement, can be 
Increased through product diversification. A company can expose two 
products at a reduced cost per product because of the heavy discounting 
policy particularly in network television advertising. Also the 
diversified company can, with the cost of one mailing, jointly promote 
through coupon offers, etc., a number of products. Thus, all of 
these variables should be positively correlated with the level of ad­
vertising. 
The extent of intercorrelation between the three measures of 
advertising would not permit their inclusion in multiple regression 
analysis. The results to be reported are from simple correlation 
coefficients and multiple regression in which only one advertising 
variable is included with other structural measures. 
The simple correlation coefficients given in Table 8 indicate the 
existence of a positive linear relationship between the current revenue 
devoted to advertising and promotion and the level of diversification 
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that is significant at the 95 percent level.However, the relationship 
34 
Advertising data were available 
firms. These firms were biased upward 
entire corporate population considered 
for 51 of the 134 food processing 
in size with respect to the 
earlier. 
Table 8. Simple correlation coefficients for advertising variables, size of firm, concentration 
level of diversification and profitability for 51 major food processing firms 
4-firm Current 
concentra- Asset size Advertising/advertising Five-year 




concentration -0.14 0.30 0.05 -0.06 -0.10 -0.02 
Asset size 
of firm 0.15 
** ** ** 



















^Concentration ratio is for the primary industry of each firm. 
= nonprimary employees/total manufacturing employees. 
* 
Significant at 95 percent level. 
** 
Significant at 99 percent level. 
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between the absolute level of advertising and concentration and between 
five-year cumulation of advertising expenditures and concentration were 
not significant at the 90 percent level. In addition, the relationship 
between advertising to sales and size of firm although positive was not 
significant at the 90 percent level. There is a highly significant linear 
relation (99.5 percent level) between both the absolute level of 
advertising and size of firm and five-year advertising expenditures and 
size of firm. 
This set of relations does not yield the conclusion that high 
advertising is used as a barrier to entry in concentrated industries. 
It should be expected that not only the rate of advertising to sales is 
positively related to concentration but also if the intent is to erect 
a barrier to entry the absolute level of advertising should be high. 
The lack of the latter result is probably accounted for by the relatively 
smaller size of most of the highly concentrated industries in food 
processing. In addition the firms in this sample were biased toward the 
larger firms and as was stated above the very largest firms were not 
35 
all classified in the highly concentrated industries. In fact, for 
this sample of 51 firms the relation between size of firm and industry 
concentration was slightly negative. The larger firms with larger 
absolute levels of advertising could be achieving an equally high 
exposure rate for advertisements of their products with a lower propor­
tion of sales revenue being devoted to advertising expenditures because 
of the volume discounting practices in effect for various forms of advertising. 
35 
Only 14 percent of food industry value added originates in industries 
falling within Bain's type I oligopolies (57, p. 207). 
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Advertising appears to be used by those to whom it would benefit 
as a barrier to entry. The relations indicate that it is more than a 
barrier to entry. If it were only a barrier to entry it would be 
protecting a profit position of certain firms from deterioration. The 
level of advertising to sales shows no significant linear relationship 
to the level of profit of firms measured by the rate of profit to net 
36 
worth. In addition it was reported earlier that there was no 
significant relation between a firm's primary industry concentration 
and its level of profitability measured by net profit to net worth. 
This tentatively indicates that advertising is a form of competition 
used by the large firms to differentiate their products from others 
and place their brands firmly in the minds of consumers. In this sense 
advertising acts as a barrier to entry differentiating the firm's product 
from close substitutes. But it also represents a costly form of compe­
tition between existing rivals. 
A positive correlation was found between the share of revenue devoted 
to advertising and the extent of product diversification in the firm. 
The correlation coefficient explaining the relation between the absolute 
level of advertising and the extent of product diversification was .56 
which is significant at the 95 percent level. Similarly, the coefficient 
describing acceptability of the hypothesized relationship between five-
year advertising expenditures and the extent of product diversification 
was significant at the 99.5 percent level indicating a strong positive 
relationship between the variables. 
36 
The simple correlation coefficient was -.142. 
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Thus, the hypothesis is accepted that there is a positive linear 
relationship between the level of advertising and the extent of diversifi­
cation in firms classified in food processing. Additional data were 
not available to determine the extent to which products of a diversified 
firm were jointly advertised. It is known from observation of network 
television advertisements and reports in the advertising trade publica­
tions that some firms use the joint promotion schemes extensively. Thus 
heavy advertisers could diversify to achieve a fuller utilization of 
their already large advertising expenditures. 
The inclusion of the advertising variables had a noticeable effect 
on the regression model. The regression including primary industry 
concentration, asset size of firm, minimum efficient size plant, and the 
ratio of advertising to sales as independent variables explained a 
statistically significant (at the 95 percent level) share of the variation 
in company profits measured by the ratio of net profit/net worth. The 
statistical significance indicates that the relationship found are very 
probably true relationships, i.e., not chance relationships. But the low 
level of the percent of variation in profitability explained by these 
variables (less than 14 percent) indicates that other factors have a 
more significant effect on profitability. The explained variance with 
annual expenditures substituted for the ratio of advertising to total 
revenue was 24 percent of total variation in net profit to net worth. 
However, an insignificant level of variance was explained when the five-
year aggregate was used. 
The complete set of data were available for 45 observations. The 
measures of barriers to entry were added to the structural measures 
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(primary industry concentration, size of firm, and diversified market 
power) to determine the total influence of the factors usually associated 
with industrial structure on the profitability of firms. Less than 20 
percent of the variation in the profitability of individual firms engaged 
in food processing is explained by these measures. The regression 
coefficients were all of the expected sign but all had high standard 
deviations and low t values making the level of reliability of the 
estimates quite low. The one exception was the minimum efficient size 
plant in a company's primary industry. This coefficient was reliable 
at the 95 percent level and exhibited a high positive relationship to 
the level of profitability. The coefficient of 9.3 indicates that a 
one percentage point increase in the minimum efficient size plant increased 
profitability by 9 percentage points. However, it must be remembered 
that a one percentage point increase in the minimum efficient size plant 
would be at least a 100 percent increase for most of the food processing 
industries and would involve an increase in the value of shipments of 
at least $100 thousand per plant. The partial correlation, which measures 
the correlation between two variables in a multivariate problem under 
the restriction that the common association with any of the remaining 
variables is eliminated, between minimum efficient size plant and the 
company profit rate holding the other factors constant was .31. The 
addition of this variable explained more of the variation in the level 
of profits than any other single variable. 
This result seems unusual since Bain and others studying barriers 
to entry found minimum efficient size plants to be lacking in the food 
processing industries. These other studies involved a larger universe 
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of industries, e.g., comparisons of barriers to entry in the auto 
industry to the food industries. In this type of comparison the food 
industries would have very low barriers. However, comparisons involving 
only the different industries within food processing present a different 
universe. The minimum efficient size plant in meat slaughtering employed 
1-9 employees. The minimum efficient size plant in meat processing 
employed 100-250 employees. The minimum efficient size plant in canned 
specialities employed 250-500 employees. Thus, there are substantial 
differences in the capital requirements reflected in these employment 
differences of minimum efficient sized plants within food processing. 
The complete regression is summarized in Table 9 with coefficients, 
t values, and partial correlation coefficients. 
Table 9. Coefficients relating profit rates to structure 
Variable 
Regression 





concentration 0.1434 0.9232 0.1521 
Asset size of firm 0.0000 0.1969 0.0328 
Diversified 
power index 0.2625 0.5955 0.0987 
Advertising/sales 0.3042 0.1830 0.0305 
Five-year 
advertising budget 0.0005 0.7068 . 0.1117 
Minimum efficient 
size plant 9.300 1.9662* 0.3114 
Capital/output 
ratio 
-1.2420 -2.9290 -0.4387 
* 
Significant at the 95 percent level. 
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The capital output ratio of the company was added as was suggested 
by Collins and Preston (82, p. 717) to account for differences in the 
amount of fixed capital required to produce a given amount of revenue, 
i.e., differences in capital intensities between firms in differing 
industries. The variable was estimated by the ratio of book value of 
fixed assets (land, buildings and equipment) to total revenue. This 
variable provided a highly significant negative coefficient indicating 
that as the amount of capital facilities required to generate a dollar 
of revenue Increases the level of profitability declines. 
This relationship is explained in part by depreciation charges. 
As the level of fixed capital assets increases the level of depreciation 
increases which is a charge against total revenue and thus reduces 
profits. However, the rate of increase in depreciation would have to be 
an increasing function of the level of fixed capital assets. There is 
little ^  priori reason to expect this to be true other than the extent 
to which this rate of change is a factor of rapid depreciation write­
off systems. The remainder of the explanation must rest in other 
factors such as higher capital costs for certain firms because of 
imperfect capital markets and the influence of the substitution of 
capital assets for labor. Implications relating to these latter factors 
will be discussed as other measures of profitability are substituted 
for the ratio of net profit/net worth. 
In summary the measures of the structure of a firm, the structure 
of its primary industry, the barriers to entry, and degree of product dif­
ferentiation explain only a very small portion of the profit differences 
113 
that exist between different corporate firms in the food processing 
industries. These variables could explain less than 20 percent of the 
variation in food company profits. When the capital output ratio was 
included to adjust for differences in the levels of capital intensity 
among the various firms the level of explained variance increased to 
30 percent. The reliability of the estimated coefficients was still 
very low for all variables other than the minimum efficient size of plant 
and the capital output ratio. It was shown that the relationship 
between profitability and size of firm within industry was very weak and 
not explained by linear or quadratic equations. A similar result was 
found to exist across industry lines in the food processing sector. 
The firms in this study are the large industry leaders down to firms 
of $5-10 million in assets. Since the very small firms are eliminated 
from the group of firms considered here, the averages are not brought 
down for the cases where monopoly performance might be present as they 
would be if industry averages had been used. The firms in this group 
are the large firms in concentrated and unconcentrated food industries. 
Thus, monopoly elements in any industry should differentiate the 
performance of the largest firms in that industry from large firms in 
more competitive industries. But the structural variables of neither 
the firm nor the industries into which it is diversified had a significant 
influence on performance measured by profitability. 
The inclusion of the capital output ratio increased the level of 
explained variation in profitability more significantly than any of the 
measures of structure or barriers to entry. This variable is more 
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directly related to the level of technology and the production function 
of the firm than to any expected conditions of competition. 
The conclusion reached is that the measures of structure, barriers 
to entry, product differentiation, and product diversification had little 
consistent influence on the level of performance measured by high 
levels of profitability in the food processing industries except in 
the extreme cases. The existence of certain structural characteristics 
can then be considered necessary but not sufficient conditions for the 
existence of high profit rates among the food processing firms. 
The influence of depreciation and tax charges on profit measures 
Depreciation, as was explained earlier, is an accounting tool and 
has doubtful relevance as a measure of capital usage. Since various 
forms of depreciation apply under the tax laws to different assets and 
different firms use different accounting procedures with regard to 
depreciation, a measure of average gross profitability defined as net 
profit before taxes plus depreciation to net worth was substituted for 
net profits to net worth as the dependent variable. This variable 
eliminates any effect accounting depreciation might have on the 
profitability of firms and assumes no capital cost other than interest 
payments and repairs and maintenance. It is similar to the cash flow 
concept which in a sense is a measure of the financial powers or abilities 
of firms. The variables described above were rerun through the same 
correlation and regression analysis to determine the differences in 
profitability that might be reflected because of firms of varying sizes 
and industries. 
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The results of the correlation analysis are given in Table 10. The 
correlation between the three measures of advertising and promotion 
expenditures and the other variables must have a higher r value than 
the other relationships to be of equal level of reliability because 
these data were available for a smaller sample of firms. 
The relationships between a firm's primary industry concentration 
ratio; asset size; diversified power index; level of diversification; 
minimum efficient size of plant in its primary industry and profitability 
measured by the ratio of net profits after taxes plus depreciation to 
net worth (average gross profitability) respectively, are not signifi­
cantly different than when tested against net profit to net worth. 
The coefficients remain at a very low level of reliability even though 
the table indicates small changes in their levels. The relationships 
between the concentration of a firm's primary industry and average gross 
profitability is only slightly increased. The relationship between size 
and profitability declines with this measure as does the correlation 
between power achieved through diversified activities and average gross 
profitability. There was an increase in the correlation between the 
diversified power index and average gross profitability. But to repeat, 
the changes in these relationships are not adequate to allow the 
acceptance of the hypothesis that they are linearly related. 
The relationships between the measures of selling costs and average 
gross profitability change significantly. The correlation between 
advertising to sales and profitability had a negative sign although 
statistically insignificant when profits were measured by net profit to 
net worth. This relationship becomes positive and significant at the 95 
Table 10. Simple correlation coefficients comparing structural variables to profit/net worth and 
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0.096 0.027 0.298 0.049 0.056 0.457 0.066 0.109 
0.616 0.628 0.148 0.683 0.779 0.135 0.091 0.051 
0.071 0.015 0.308 0.408 0.370 0.346 0.062 0.145 
1 0.823 0.430 0.761 0.433 0.034 0.124 0.008 
1 0.229 0.558 0.485 0.024 0.084 0.074 
1 0.698 0.270 0.172 0.142 0.315 
1 0.633 0.172 0.217 0.069 
1 0.159 0.177 0.012 
1 0.102 0.025 
1 0.401 
^Because of differing degress of freedom the correlation coefficients for variables 4, 5, and 6 
require an r value of .23 to be significant at the 95 percent level whereas the other variables require 
an r value of .16 to be significant at the 95 percent level. 
117 
percent level when profits are measured by the average gross profitabil­
ity ratio. The only apparent answer for this relationship is that the 
companies with high percentages of revenue devoted to selling and 
promoting products must use liquidity derived from large depreciation 
reserves to advertise. This relationship is not as strong for the 
largest volume advertisers. The firms for which it holds are identified 
as those that devote the largest share of revenue generated from sales 
to promoting their products. 
The simple correlations yield little suggestion that depreciation 
charges are used by large firms in such a manner as to hide monopoly 
returns. Depreciation, by the nature of accounting, can provide firms 
with additional liquidity which may be used for advertising by certain 
firms, growth and expansion by others, and research and product develop­
ment by still others. But the results of the tests conducted yield no 
immediate implications concerning any monopoly power held by large firms 
with large levels of depreciation costs other than via its use in fi­
nancing advertising. 
The multiple regression analysis with net profit after taxes plus 
depreciation to net worth also yielded results very similar to the 
results described earlier with net profit to net worth being the dependent 
variable. The first multiple regression run with 134 observations 
with the concentration ratio of a firm's primary industry, the asset 
size of the firm, the minimum efficient size plant in the firm's primary 
industry, and the firm's capital output ratio yielded the following 
regression coefficients and t values and explained less than two percent 
of the variation in average gross profitability. 
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Y = .2209 + .079 - .OOOOXg + .057X^ + .088X^ 
(1.04) (-.620) (.034) (.729) 
where X^^ = 4-firm concentration ratio 
Xg = asset size of firm 
Xg = minimum efficient size plant 
X^ = capital/output. 
Obviously, the level of explained variation is too low to allow 
any reliability to be placed in the estimated function. The addition 
of the diversified power index, i.e., (Z C^) - (a^ C^) had an 
insignificant effect on the explained variance (which was still below 
two percent). 
The complete regression model run on the 44 observations described 
above included the 4-firm concentration of a firm's primary industry, 
the firm's asset size, diversified power index, minimum efficient size 
plant, advertising to sales ratio, and five-year advertising expenditure. 
The linear equation explained 12 percent of the variation in profitability 
compared to 19 percent when net profit/net worth was used as the 
dependent variable. The addition of the capital output ratio increased 
the explained variance to 34 percent of total variance which is 
significant at the 95 percent level of reliability. 
The complete regression with corresponding standard errors was 
found to be: 
Y = .141 - 0.115X^- 0.0000X2 - 3.025X2 + .916X^ 
(0.1200) (0.0000) (3.653) (.3275) 
sf . .34 
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+ l.Ol&Xg + 0.0004Xg - 0.1353X^ 
(1.128) (0.00063) (0.3404) 
where <• 4-firm concentration 
Xg = asset size 
X^ = minimum efficient size plant 
X^ = capital/output 
X^ = advertising/sales 
Xg = five-year advertising 
Xy = diversified power index 
The standard errors of the estimates of all coefficients are large 
relative to the size of tV - coefficient with the exception of the capital 
output ratio. The sign on the capital output coefficient becomes 
positive and significantly different from zero. This is as would be 
expected since firms with highly capital intensive production techniques 
would have higher depreciation allocations. It must be noted with 
this'regression as with the previous regression (with net profit/net worth 
as dependent variables) that this one variable which is more closely 
related to the production technology of a given firm than to the structure 
of the markets in which it produces explains more of the variability in 
profits (measured by either technique) than all of the structural 
measures combined. 
It should be noted also that the signs on the measures of market 
power derived from the structure of a firm's primary industry and from 
its diversified activities become negative, i.e., there is a negative 
relationship between a firm's primary industry concentration, diversified 
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market power, absolute size and average gross profitability. This again 
supports the conclusion that the largest firms and those in the most 
concentrated industries are neither the most profitable nor gain the 
37 
most liquidity from depreciation reserves. 
The influence of structural variables on average gross margin 
The relationship between the average gross margin of a company 
and the structural features of the company and industries in which it 
operates was tested with correlation and regression analysis in a manner 
identical to that used with the other measures of profitability. Firms 
with more market power than others can charge a price that insures it 
a higher margin over production costs. This per unit margin, as was 
described above, can be used for increased advertising, research and 
development, excess executive compensation, etc., which may benefit or 
hinder competition. Average gross margin was calculated for each firm 
by subtracting from total revenue the cost of goods sold and dividing 
by total revenue. It was expected that the measures of structure would 
have a positive relation to average gross margin for as the levels of 
the structured measures increase the extent of monopoly power shown in 
higher gross margins is increased. 
Table 11 presents the simple correlation coefficients including 
average gross margin. As in the previous table, the variables represent 
104 observations with the exception of advertising/sales, total current 
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The change in the sign from a positive level using the larger 
sample to the negative level using the smaller sample is due to the bias 
discussed earlier in the smaller sample. 
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^Because of differing degrees of freedom the correlation coefficients for advertising/sales, current 
advertising, and five-year advertising require an r value of .23 to be significant at the 95 percent level 
whereas the other variables require an r value of .16 to have the same level of significance. 
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advertising, and five-year advertising expenditures, which represent 50 
observations. The latter three variables require a higher simple corre­
lation to be significant at the 95 percent level because of the smaller 
number of degrees of freedom. 
Table 11 indicates that the strength of the correlations between 
the structural variables and average gross margin increases over the 
correlation between the same structural variables and net profit to net 
worth. The linear relationship between concentration in a firm's primary 
industry and average gross margin explains more of the variability 
in the latter variable than a linear relation between the former variable 
and net profit to net worth. The relationship is still very weak, i.e., 
the two variables do not tend to move simultaneously. The relationship 
between size of firm and average gross margin is significant at the 99 
percent level. A similar level of significance was displayed in the 
relationships between market power derived from nonprimary activities, 
i.e., Z a. C. - (a C ) and average gross margin; the level of diversifi-
1 1  p  p  
cation, i.e., nonprimary sales/total manufacturing sales and average 
gross margins; advertising/sales and average gross margins; and current 
advertising and average gross margins. Insignificant relations were 
found between average gross margins and (1) diversified power index, 
i.e., Z a^ Cj, the measure used in the NCFM study, (2) the composite 
measure of the level of diversification, i.e., ^"""pt^^sales^^^) d, 
where d is the number of 4-digit industries in which the firm operates, 
and (3) the minimum efficient size plant. The remaining correlations 
were positive and significant at the 95 percent level. 
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These relationships can be put together to show economic as well as 
statistical significance. First, the largest firms (not necessarily 
those in the most concentrated industries) have the highest average gross 
margins. These firms gain significant market power from their nonprimary 
activities. They are also the largest volume advertisers which is highly 
correlated with average gross margins. This raises two possible explana­
tions for the high margins held by the large companies. First, the higher 
margins could be the result of real or pecuniary economics in the production 
of the goods. If this were true there should be a negative relation 
between direct production costs, i.e., cost of goods sold, and size of 
firm. The simple correlation between cost of goods sold and size of firm 
is -0.05, which causes one to reject the hypothesis that there is a linear 
relationship between the two variables. The regression coefficient was 
zero to five decimal places with a large standard error. Thus, the 
hypothesis that the coefficient was less than zero was rejected. 
The second possible explanation is that the larger firms achieve a 
higher margin by selling their products at higher prices. Since production 
costs were shown to be no lower for the large firms the higher margin must 
be due to higher prices being charged. This raises the question, how 
can firms selling the same product in the same markets charge different 
prices? The large firms with the high margins also had high advertising 
costs. "Coupon offers" and "price-off" offers are both advertising and 
price competition. Other forms of advertising differentiate the 
advertised product from the nonadvertised product in the minds of con­
sumers. Thus, with a differentiated product the firm can charge a 
higher price. The large advertising expenditures increase the level of 
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overhead costs which in turn brings the rate of net profitability down 
to the level of smaller companies. 
Secondly, the large firms in food processing are virtually the only 
firms that have large research and development budgets. Markham and 
McFarland point out that firms in the largest size class of food processing 
firms (5,000 or more employees) account for less than one third of the 
total food processing sales but approximately 80 percent of R & D expendi­
tures made by food processing firms (52, pp. 91-101). The largest firms 
spent 3/10 of one percent of each sales dollar on R & D compared to 
2/10 for the middle size group (1,000-4,999 employees), and 3/100 of 
one percent for the smallest size group of firms. Thus, the largest food 
firms spent ten times as much on R & D as the smallest firms in terms 
of expenditures as a percent of sales. Markham and McFarland went on to 
indicate that 75 food processors listed in Fortune's 500 Largest 
Corporations accounted for "as much as 90 percent of the total" 
R&D expenditures of food firms(52, p. 98), 
A correlation between R&D expenditures and degree of conglomerates 
measured for these 75 firms by the number of 4-digit industries in which 
they operated indicated the existence of a significant positive relation 
between the variables. Thus, as the degree of conglomerateness(called 
diversification here) increased the level of R & D expenditures as a 
percent of sales increased significantly. 
These results accompanied by the current findings indicate that the 
higher prices charged by the large firms are not only the result of 
advertising and promotion but also quality and innovative competition 
that is the result of research and development programs. 
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The multiple regression analysis, as would be expected because of 
the higher simple correlation between the structural variables and average 
gross margins than between the structural variables and net profitability, 
explained a significant share of the variation in average gross margins 
with different combinations of independent variables. 
The regression between the 4-firm concentration of a firm's primary 
industry, the asset size of the firm, and average gross margin Y, 
was run for 134 companies classified in food processing. The following 
results were obtained^ 
Y = 0.092 + 0.144 X^ + 0.0000 X_ 
(0.066) (0.0000) 
The coefficients were both greater than zero at the 95 percent level 
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of significance. The level of explained variance was significant at 
the 95 percent level but was less than 10 percent. Thus, the fit must 
be considered weak. 
The addition of the capital output ratio as an Independent variable 
increased the level of explained variation to 17 percent. 
The addition of the diversification variables had little effect on 
the level of explained variation. The linear regression still explains 
less than 10 percent of the variation in average gross margins. The 
sign on the coefficient for diversified power achieved through nonprimary 
38 
The t value for X2 was 2.49. The computer program dropped all 
digits after five decimal places. Since the observations for this 
variable were in millions of dollars a coefficient as small as .000001 
indicates an increase of $1 million in assets and increases the level 
of average gross margin by one unit. 
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activities was positive and the coefficient was significantly greater 
than zero at the 95 percent level of reliability. However, as can be 
seen in the regression below the coefficients for size and concentration 
decline to the point at which they cannot be considered different from 
zero. 
Y = 0.10 + 0.073 + 0.000 + 0.3424 X^, 
(0.077) (0.00) (0.197) 
where X, = Z a. C. - (a C). 
4  X X  P  P  
The complete regression model given in Table 12 includes advertising 
and selling costs, minimum efficient size plant, and the capital output 
ratio in addition to the variables discussed above. This regression 
explains 35 percent of the variation in average gross margins. 
Table 12. Table of regression coefficients 
Partial 
correlation 
Coefficient Standard error coefficient 
Constant 0.128 
Concentration -0.032 0.096 -0.056 
Size -0.000 0.0000 -0.245 
Advertising/sales 0.646 1.027 0.104 
Five-year advertising 0.001 0.00 0.306 
Minimum efficient plant -5.076 2.925 -0.278 
Capital output 0.576 0.262 0.344 
: Ci - (»p %•> 0.190 0.273 0.11 
The negative signs on concentration and size are explained by the 
sample of firms. This regression was run on the sample of 44 firms 
that was biased upward by including mostly large firms. These results 
127 
indicated that it is not the largest firms that have even the high 
margins. It is the next size group of firms. The partial correlation 
coefficients indicate the influence of size, advertising, minimum 
efficient size plant and diversification on margins. But the most 
significant variable is again the capital output ratio which relates more 
directly to the production technology of an industry than to its existing 
structure. 
Conclusions of cross-section analysis 
A number of conclusions can be drawn from the cross-section analysis 
described above that relate to the competitive aspects of the food 
processing industries. First, it was hypothesized that high company 
profitability is a result of market power that a company derives from 
the structure of its primary industry, the company's absolute size, and 
its diversified activities which are chosen in such a way to increase, 
jointly with the market power derived from the company's primary operations, 
the total market power and pricing influence of the firm. It was found 
that size, primary industry concentration, and the diversified power index 
explained very little of the differences in profitability (net profit/ 
net worth) of the firms in food processing. The firms in this study 
were the large publicly held corporations listed by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission. Therefore, the group excluded the very small firms 
and the privately owned partnership and proprietorships. This sample 
was chosen because if firms have monopoly power, they must be the large 
firms in an industry, not the small firms. If firms exhibit monopoly 
performance derived from the structure of their primary industry there 
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should be consistent and posftiire relationships between the structural 
variables described above and company profitability. The result and 
performance from monopolistic power should accrue to a firm that has 
such power, not necessarily to the performance of entire industries where 
the small powerless firms are averaged in the same series with the large 
monopolistic firms. The largest companies in an industry did not tend 
to be the most profitable as would be expected in the presence of 
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monopoly power. Thus, there seems to be little evidence of market 
power manifest In the form of high levels of profitability in food firms. 
Second, neither the power derived from nor the level of diversifi­
cation had an upward influence on profitability. However, it cannot 
be determined from the cross-section analysis whether or not diversifica­
tion ceased a downward movement in profitability. It can be said that 
the diversified firms exhibited little differences in levels of profit­
ability from non-diversified firms. 
Third, the large firms are also the largest advertisers but spend 
less per dollar of sales than medium sized firms. Both advertising and 
minimum efficient size plant displayed a positive relation to profit­
ability even though the former was very weak. 
This finding is not limited to the food processing industries. 
Blair found that in a large number of industries, both food and nonfood, 
the largest firms are not consistently the most profitable. Similarly 
he found an absence of any relationship between profitability and size, 
as reflected by rank within industry. He found that for the 290 manu­
facturing corporations listed by SEC only 13 percent of the companies 
ranked number one in their industry by asset size made over 15 percent 
return on net worth compared to 21 percent ranked 6, 7, and 8 res-
prectively (82, pp. 1551-1555). 
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When average gross margin was used as the dependent variable to 
measure performance the structural variables increased in their levels 
of significance and ability to explain the variation in the dependent 
variable. Concentration, siae, advertising and diversified market power 
were more highly related to average gross margins than net profitability. 
The higher margins seemed to be the result of higher prices, not lower 
costs. The higher margins do not result in higher profit rates. Thus, 
there appears to be a changing pattern of competition between the smaller 
firms and those in less concentrated industries and the large firms in 
concentrated industries. The former compete and survive by using price 
competition. The latter use product differentiation, quality, packaging 
and promotion as competitive tools. 
Relation of Results to Earlier Studies 
The results of my study display both consistencies and inconsis­
tencies with earlier studies described in the review of literature. 
This is not surprising since the results of studies relating structure 
to performance have been quite varied. Bain, as was quoted earlier, 
found little relationship between concentration and industry profits. 
Similarly, the simple correlation of profit rates to concentration was 
relatively low in the Fuchs study. 
Other studies using both more aggregative measures of industry 
concentration and more narrowly defined concepts of industry concentra­
tion have found higher relations between profitability and concentration. 
The Weiss study used industry averages at the 3-digit level of classifi­
cation (92). The NCFM study incorporated concentration ratios for 
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individual firms but used averaging and weighting processes to present 
their final results in such a way that little could be said about the 
individual firm (58, pp. 202-210). Their results apply only to group 
averages and not to individual firms and thus do not fit the hypothesis 
of this study. 
Similar results precede this study in relating the size distribution 
of firms to profitability. When the very small firms in food processing 
are included, there is a definite upward trend in the relation of profit 
rates to size of firm (74, p. 107). This is not true when the sample 
includes only large and medium size firms. The largest firms in the food 
processing sector were not the most profitable (74, pp. 26, 30, 32). 
Blair found that only 13 percent of the companies ranked number one in 
their industry had profits of 15 percent or more (82, pp. 1551-1555). 
A smaller percent had profits of less than five percent of net worth. 
Thus, the largest companies are not primarily the highest profit companies 
but they sustain fewer low profit periods or losses than the smaller 
companies. This is consistent with the findings of my study and supports 
the low correlations found between profitability and size of firm. 
Little research has been done prior to this study to quantify the 
influence of diversification on company and market performance or more 
specifically on the relationship between company diversification and 
profitability. Gort presented one of the earlier studies on diversifi­
cation (39, pp. 65-78). He found, as was shown in the present study, 
that diversification and size of firm are highly positively correlated. 
There was no consistent relationship between diversification and growth. 
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Finally, for 111 manufacturing companies he found that profit rates were 
not correlated to diversification, nor was the change in diversification 
correlated with the change in profitability. The results of Gort's 
study for all manufacturing are consistent with the findings of the 
present study for food manufacturing corporations. 
The study conducted for the NCFM bears a more direct relationship 
to the hypothesis being tested in the present study. The NCFM study 
tested the relationship of diversified structure of a firm to profit­
ability of a firm by using what I have called the diversified power index. 
A few comments should be made concerning the misuse of data in the 
NCFM study. This should bring to light the reasons for using certain 
data and measurement techniques incorporated in the present study. The 
study begins by comparing various segments of the economy (57, pp. 1-3). 
Food manufacturing is not an industry as is stated in the caption to 
the figure presented in the study but a sector of the economy. There 
are numerous industries and markets in the food manufacturing sector 
whether industries be defined by substitutability of products or similarity 
of production processes. Food manufacturing is defined by the SIC 
as a major 2-digit economic sector. On the other hand, motor vehicles 
and parts is an industry defined by the SIC as a 4-digit industry. It 
belongs to the sector of our economy that encompasses all transportation 
equipment. Petroleum refining represents a group of petroleum 
industries but again does not encompass a number of related petroleum 
products such as paving and roofing materials, lubricating oils, and 
others. It is not surprising that food manufacturing is much larger than 
the other economic segments used in the NCFM study since an economic sector 
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is being compared to specific industries or partial industry groupings. 
The second general point to be made about the use or misuse of data 
in the NCFM study appears in the section entitled Postwar Industry 
Growth (57; pp. 5-16). This section is broken into six parts, each con­
sisting of a description of a 3-digit group of food manufacturing 
industries. The major misuse of data is in the comparison of the assets 
of the five leading companies in each industry group with total industry 
assets. The asset figures for individual companies were taken from 
Moody's Industrial Manuals which are quite consistent in reporting 
totally consolidated financial data (including balance sheet data) for 
all companies reported. If the consolidations of subsidiary organiza­
tions are only partial consolidations, they are noted in Moody's. 
The consistency of data from one corporation to another is known and 
makes intercompany comparisons valid where adjustments are made for 
the degree of consolidation. 
The more difficult data to obtain are those for industry totals. 
The NCFM study used the 3-digit industry asset totals published by the 
U. S. Internal Revenue Service in The Source Book of Statistics of 
Income. The basis of a corporation under the filing system required by 
the Internal Revenue Service (1RS) is a legal one and has little 
relation to the economic concept of a corporation or the definition of 
a corporation used by the Bureau of the Census, i.e., all resources 
owned by or controlled by a common decision making unit (at the highest 
level of decision making). 
A corporation may file returns to the 1RS in three forms: (1) 
completely consolidated; (2) completely unconsolidated; and (3) partially 
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consolidated. There is evidence that few corporations file completely 
consolidated returns. The Link study (80, Part III) shows rather con­
clusive evidence of this fact. In 1958, Census was able to match only 
1.6 percent of all corporations filing tax returns to Census defined 
corporations. These were not all complete matches since Census accepted 
partial matches when it was felt that a representative part of a Census 
defined corporation was identified in 1RS records. If corporations had 
filed completely consolidated returns, there would have been near 
100 percent match. 
The 5-company totals used in the NCFM study represent highly 
consolidated financial data. The industry totals represent only shades 
of consolidation. Thus, the relation (nearness) of the 5-company total 
to the industry total must be greatly exaggerated. A similar situation 
exists for the concentration ratios presented in other data given in 
the report (57, pp. 222-224). 
In searching for data to test the major hypothesis of this study, 
the most serious void was the lack of well-defined industry financial 
data. Some of the problems of 1RS data were indicated above. In 
addition to the consolidation problem, the 1RS system of classification 
is not identical to that of the Census Bureau so one cannot rely on 
having the same grouping of firms in both sources. In sumamry, if one 
is interested in a consolidated total for some data item on corporations 
primarily classified in a particular industry, the Census Enterprise 
Statistics are virtually the only source. This source contains little 
if any financial data other than value added and value of shipments. 
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If nonconsolidated data are desired to give a relatively clean picture 
of a particular product line, 1RS data may be a proxy but again these 
data are not directly comparable to Census size distributions and can 
yield spurious relations if the two data series are compared. This 
explains the careful use of the descriptions of relations between factors 
in a firm's primary industry and the firm in this study and also led to 
the use of Moody's consolidated data and the diversification variables 
to adjust for differing product mixes of firms classified in the same 
primary industry. 
The last general point to be made concerning the NCFM study pertains 
not to the misuse of data but to the presentation of a number of data 
tables, the source of which is identified as a special tabulation by 
the Bureau of the Census, without describing why the tables were pre­
sented nor discussing in any way the implications of the data presented. 
The data being referred to are those concerning the "leading positions" 
held by the 100 largest food manufacturers. As an example, there were 
116 food product classes in 1963. The 100 largest food manufacturers 
occupied one or more of the eight leading positions in 114 of these 116 
product classes (57, p. 46). On first glance this seems to be a very 
relevant description of control but a little investigation indicates 
it to be almost a tautology. The 100 largest firms, being distributed over 
116 product classes, merely by being the largest firms should occupy 
most of the leading positions. The NCFM study goes on to show that the 
leading firms occupy an even larger percent of the leading positions 
in concentrated product classes than in unconcentrated product classes. 
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This is even nearer to being a tautology than the former statement. 
The industries (although they do show some variability in size) would 
not be concentrated if they did not have large firms in them. Thus, 
it would be Interesting to know more about the purpose of this vast 
gathering of data or at least the intent in mind, but there appears to 
be no hypothesis related to these data, at least in the NCFM report. 
The specific purpose at hand is to compare the results of the 
correlations between the diversified power index and profitability for 
the food processing firms in the NCFM study to similar correlations 
in the present study. The diversified power index was calculated for 
85 firms in the NCFM report using 1950 data. The diversification data 
were taken from a 1950 survey of the 1,000 largest manufacturing companies 
conducted by the Federal Trade Commission. Concentration ratios were 
taken from 1950 to 1958 data. This gave the data being used at least 
an eight-year spread (although the intent is to examine a cross-section 
of the firms). The diversified power index was calculated by multiplying 
the 4-firm concentration ratio for each 5-digit product manufactured 
by the firm by the value of shipments of each product respectively, 
summing these products, and dividing by the firm's total value of 
shipments. 
These indices of market power were then correlated to the average 
profit rates of each firm over a three-year period (1949-51). Results 
were not presented in the NCFM report for the regressions using ungrouped 
data. The data and results that were presented were subject to the 
following grouping procedure: first, whenever one or more firms had 
identical diversified power indices, the firms were combined and a 
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weighted average profit rate was calculated using total value of shipments 
of each firm as weights; and second, concentration size classes were 
combined to yield a group size of at least $200 million in value of 
shipments for each observation. 
This correlation without the grouping procedure differs from the 
correlation and regression analysis of the present study only slightly. 
First, the diversification data in the NCFM study cover the year 
1950 whereas the data in the present study cover the 1965 period. Most 
firms in food processing were considerably more diversified in 1965 
than in 1950. Thus, if this factor is to effect concentrated power 
derived from diversification, the power index covering 1965 should be 
consistently higher than the same for 1950. The second difference does 
not allow a valid comparison of the raw data of the two studies. 
The NCFM study incorporated 4-firm concentration ratios for 
5-digit industries. Product data for the present study were not 
specifically detailed to allow breakdowns narrower than the 4-digit 
industry level. The 4-digit industry gives a clearer picture of product 
diversification and conglomerateness than the 5-digit breakdown developed 
by the SIC. The 5-digit breakdown places in separate product classes 
many items that are highly substitutable and horizontally related in 
the food product lines. Those products would fall in the same market. 
The narrower product classification will give a higher index to 
the NCFM study than the 4-digit classification used in the present 
study. The degree of difference may be enough to cancel the effects of 
an increase in diversification over the 15-year period. 
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The grouping procedure of the NCFM study resulted in 20 observations 
of the diversified power index and weighted profit rates. These grouped 
observations are reproduced in Table 13 (57, p. 206). A quadratic function 
used to determine the relationship between weighted profit rates and 
diversified power yielded the following equation; 
(1) Y = .0746 + .4881 X - .2360 X^, 
2 
with R = .829, where Y = weighted profit rates and X = diversified 
power index. This fit seemed extremely good. The nonlinear form 
indicates that 83 percent of the variation in average profits of the 
grouped observations was explained by the averages of the grouped 
diversified power indices. The standard errors of the estimates were 
not given so the reliability of regression coefficients could not be 
determined. 
A direct interpretation of this regression indicates that less than 
20 percent of the variation in profitability remained to be explained 
by other factors, e.g., strikes, down swings in certain markets or 
cyclical behavior, internal efficiency, and differing cost of financing 
operations, as well as factors such as high promotion costs and barriers 
to entry. These factors are not all incorporated in the diversified 
power index. Thus, further examination of the index seemed desirable. 
An identical nonlinear regression was run with the 1965 data of the 
present study. The observations were not grouped in any way. The 
following regression resulted: 
(2) Y = .0512 + .2351 X - .2248 X^ 
(.376) (.444) 
2 
with an R of .006. The standard errors of the estimates are in parentheses. 
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Table 13. Weighted concentration ratio and profit rates 
for 20 groups of food manufacturers, 1950^ 
Weighted Weighted 
Number Average Total concen­ Weighted profit 
Group of size of value of tration profit rate for 
number firms firms shipments ratio rate^ groups 
Millions Millions 
1 5 $ 43.0 $ 215 31 7.7 
2 4 191.5 766 35 7.8 
3 6 272.5 1,635 36 6.7 
4 3 1,497.0 4,419 37 5.5 
5 3 105.0 315 39 9.3 
Average 30-39 6.2 
6 6 57.3 344 44 7.2 
7 13 100.8 1,310 46 9.5 
8 5 39.8 199 47 7.6 
9 5 117.2 586 48 10.1 
10 3 72.3 217 49 9.3 
Average 40-49 9.2 
11 4 187.3 749 50 14.0 
12 3 179.0 537 51 12.4 
13 3 230.3 691 52 12.3 
14 3 258.3 775 54 12.2 
15 2 195.5 391 59 14.2 
Average 50-59 12.9 
16 3 193.0 579 64 14.6 
17 3 123.7 371 68 14.5 
Average 60-70 14.6 
18 3 50.3 151 71 16.0 
19 2 161.5 323 80 15.3 
20 6 59.2 355 88 17.4 
Average 70-90 16.3 
Total 85 $14,928 
^Net profit after taxes as percent of net worth. 
^Source: (57, p. 206) 
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The difference in the levels of coefficients is not extremely great 
since the data differ in time by 15 years and involve different levels 
of concentration. However, the reliability of the estimates in the 
2 present regression is very low as is shown by the low R and high standard 
errors of estimate relative to the size of the coefficients. 
The explained variance was higher (although still extremely low) 
when E a^ b^ was used as a measure of diversified power, where a^ is 
the share of company output in each 4-digit industry and is the share 
of that industry accounted for by the firnu Standard errors were lower 
and values more respectable although still not extremely significant. 
The regression yielded the following results: 
(3) Y = .086 .245 X - .103 
(.189) (.074) 
The first clue as to a reason for the discrepancy in the results 
of the two studies is presented in a footnote of the NCFM study 
(57, footnote 25, p. 207). When the firms were grouped to yield a 
minimum size of $100 million in value of shipments, the correlation 
coefficient was .67. When the groups had a minimum size of $300 million, 
the correlation was .91. As would be expected, the explained variation 
was very sensitive to the grouping procedure. Since there is no a priori 
reason for using one size group over another, this degree of change in 
magnitude of correlation must cause skepticism of the results. No data 
were presented to allow an evaluation of the effects of the size of the 
groups on the level or significance of the coefficients. At the 70 
percent level of concentration the estimated equation yielded profits 
ranging from 14.9 to 15.9 percent. However, plugging the 70 percent 
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concentration ratio into the quadratic to which the footnote refers 
(equation (2)) yields results outside this range of profits. This seems 
to uncover an inconsistency in the reported results which may be an error 
in estimation or simply a printing error. 
To further examine the effect of grouping on the use of averages 
the same grouping and averaging procedures were applied to the data of 
the present study as were incorporated in the NCFM study. The observa­
tions were first ranked according to the level of the diversified power 
index and grouped into deciles. Average profit rates were calculated 
for each decile. These calculations are presented in Table 14. 
Table 14. Average profitability of firms distributed 
by deciles of diversified power 
Diversification Number Average 
index of firms profits 
.0 - .10 
.11 - .20 25 08.6 
.21 - .30 38 09.2 
.31 - .40 21 09.1 
.41 - .50 6 13.2 
.51 - .60 5 14.4 
.61 - .70 5 14.4 
.71 - .80 3 15.2 
There becomes an obvious relationship between average group profitability 
and the decile of diversified power. These results are very similar 
to those presented in the NCFM study where average profits were shown 
to be 7.5 percent for the 21 firms with a power index of less than 40 
and 14.2 percent for a power index greater than 60 (57, Table 5, p. 204). 
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The most significant difference between deciles in the NCFM study was 
between those firms with diversified power index below 50 and those above 
50. The obvious break in the present study occurred at an index of 40. 
This difference could be explained by the use of 5-digit product classifi­
cations in the former study and 4-digit industry classifications in the 
present study. 
The raw data of the present study were grouped according to the 
two rules of the NCFM study and the quadratic regression was again 
estimated. The following estimates resulted; 
(4) Y = -.1022 + .9872 X -.9648 X^ 
2 
with an R of .79. The coefficients differ greatly from the estimated 
regression using ungrouped data and from the estimates of the NCFM study. 
As was mentioned earlier the results of the regression using ungrouped 
data were not presented in the NCFM study so it is not known what effect 
grouping had on their estimates. 
These results raise the following obvious questions: (1) Why is 
there such a close positive ranking between average profit rates for the 
deciles yet correlation and regression analysis based on ungrouped data 
yield completely unreliable results? and (2) Are the results obtained 
from the grouped data economically meaningful? 
The answer to question (1) lies mainly in the statistical character­
istics of the data. In order to have such a low level of explained 
variance using ungrouped data yet an extremely high level of explained 
variance with grouped data, the within group variation must overwhelm 
the between group variance. Analysis of variance on the grouped 
observations resulted in an F = 1.5, indicating that the experimental 
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error mean square was as large as the mean square for treatments, i.e., 
the variation within groups is as large as the variation among groups. 
Thus the hypothesis could not be rejected, on the basis of the data in 
the present study, that there are no differences among the effects of 
the treatments (grouped by diversified power) in the experiment. 
Thus there could be a lack of any central tendency within the groups 
or the mean could be a poor measure of this central tendency. 
The NCFM study reported that the observations were grouped because 
of the greater variation in profits of the smaller, less diversified 
firms relative to the larger, more diversified firms. It is not obvious 
from the data presented in the study that this is the case even though 
this is usually a legitimate assumption. The shortcoming of this 
assumption in these data is probably that they were taken from a popula­
tion of the 1,000 largest manufacturers in 1950. Since food processing 
is only one segment of manufacturing, this would have included only the 
large food manufacturers and eliminated the smaller ones that exhibit 
greater variance in profits. In the large firms there is no reason to 
believe one group will have greater profit variance than another. 
Calculation of the relative variation within the groups used in the 
NCFM study indicated that the group of firms with a diversified power 
index of less than 40 percent, had a relative variation of 15 percent; 
group two, those with a power index between 40 and 49 percent, had a 
relative variation of 9 percent; group three, those with a power index 
between 50 and 59 percent, had a relative variation of 9 percent; and 
group four, those with a power index greater than 60 percent, had a 
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relative variation of 11 percent. Thus there is little difference in 
the relative variation of the observations about the means of each 
respective group. 
Secondly, the column titled average size firm in Table 13 indicates 
that the largest firms fell in major group one, i.e., firms with diver­
sified power indices less than 40. This major group had the largest 
relative standard deviation. Much smaller firms (almost the smallest 
firms in the sample) fell in major group four, i.e., firms with a diver­
sified power index greater than 60. Thus the reason given for grouping 
the data is not justified by the data presented. 
Whenever group averages are used as observations in regression 
analysis, the interpretation is different than under the use of 
individual ungrouped observations (90, p. 105). For example, the per 
capita consumption of California might be compared to the per capita 
consumption in Illinois, with these observations regressed on the average 
size of firms in each state to determine the influence of big business on 
wages. The results apply to the people of each state, not to persons 
or individuals within the state. In the NCFM study, the purpose was 
to determine the relationship between the performance of individual firms 
measured by the level of profit rates and the structure of the industries 
in which the firm operates. There is no a priori basis for averaging 
in this analysis. The results desired should apply to individual firms, 
not firms grouped by some arbitrary set of rules. 
Waugh and Abel indicated the extreme effects averaging can have 
on levels of significance and lesser effects on the correlation coefficients 
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(90, pp. 105-115). They recommended that any time group averages are 
used in regressions, two-way groupings such as those used by Yule and 
Kendall be adopted and each grouped observation be weighted in the 
regression by the number or individual observations used in obtaining 
the average to correct for the effects grouping has on individual 
observations (90, p. 114). Neither treatment was applied to the NCFM 
data. 
The second question that needs to be considered concerns the logic 
of the results. It must be recalled that these relationships between 
profit rates and concentration no longer describe the relationship between 
average industry profit rates and industry concentration but the relation­
ship between the profitability of firms and the concentration ratio of 
the firm in each industry in which it has output weighted by the share 
of the firm's output for each industry respectively. The results can 
no longer be interpreted as a high relationship between industry con­
centration and industry profitability. 
The firms in the sample are described as being diversified, thus the 
relationship could be caused by being in numerous industries, or by being 
in a few highly concentrated industries. The data do not allow a specific 
pinpointing of the cause. However, the relationships between profits 
and the share of output in nonprimary activities was shown above to be 
stronger than the relationship between profits and diversified power. 
Second, the index presented a weighted concentration figure that 
was no higher than the firm's primary industry concentration for 79 
percent of the observations in the present study. The index was actually 
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lower than the primary industry concentration ratio for 60 percent of the 
observations. 
Third, the index makes no account of the degree of nodal commonality 
of the various products or production processes being combined in a 
diversified firm. A higher positive relation would be expected if a 
firm captured a large share of its primary product market and also close 
substitutes or products where marketing or production know-how could be 
transferred from the primary product than where there is no relationship 
between the products or production processes. 
Fourth, the diversified firms should be more profitable than the 
nondiversified firms if diversification is a mechanism by which firms 
accumulate and use market power. This should be apparent in the relation­
ships between the extent of diversification and profitability (independent 
of concentration ratios). It was indicated above that this test produced 
results that were not significant. 
Fifth, the predicted values of the equation presented in the NCFM 
study seem rather unrealistic for the food processing firms (58, Table 13, 
p. 208). A firm with weighted concentration ratio (or diversified power 
index) of 70 percent would receive profits of 30 percent on net worth. 
However, they have no observation groups showing a profit rate greater 
than 17.4 percent. The equation estimated for the present study using 
grouped averages would predict a profit rate of 12 percent if the diver­
sified power index were at 70 percent and 10 percent if the index were 
30. Thus, the predicted values from this equation are reasonable but the 
intercept term of equation (4) seems quite highly negative for a year 
that was relatively profitable for food processors. The time series 
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data reported in the next section strengthen the fact that there is little 
difference in profitability of diversified and nondiversified firms. 
The sixth point to be made concerning the high relationship and 
the use of the grouping procedure is implicit in the NCFM table repro­
duced as Table 13 but never discussed in their analysis. There is an 
average size firm implicit in each concentration group which has been 
calculated and added to Table 13. The group which included the largest 
average size of firm had the lowest average profit rate. A similar 
result is apparent in the group containing the second largest average 
size firm. The group with the highest average rate of profitability 
had an average size of firm among the smallest of all groups. The 
average size of firm in this group was $59.2 million in value of shipments. 
The 1950 Source Book of Income Statistics indicates that the 3 or 4 
largest firms in most food manufacturing industries (3-digit) were larger 
than this. The firms in the NCFM study were classified on a 5-digit 
product breakdown. However, in 1954 the 100 largest food manufacturers 
held one or more of the leading positions in 95 of the 103 food product 
classes. Thus, the firms in this size class were not among the largest 
industry leaders. 
This implicit size distribution of firms that accompanies the re­
gression analysis leads one to consider the approrpiate public policy 
approach. The results seem to imply that smaller firms in highly 
concentrated industries should be attacked whereas large firms, that 
might also be in highly concentrated industries but have reduced their 
total diversified power index by spreading their production over a 
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number of products, be left alone. This logic has obvious failures and 
shortcomings. 
Thus, the writer concludes that these six points make the results 
of the regressions using grouped observations highly tenuous and increases 
the acceptance of the fact that relatively few cases of extreme market 
power exist where the power is derived from diversification among food 
processing firms. Also it seems more plausible and realistic to use an 
index that gives the company's primary industry concentration ratio a 
weight greater than that of its diversification activities and use 
another variable, e.g., Z a^ - a^ C^, to account for power achieved 
from diversified activities. It might be desirable to take a further 
step and weight the index by the nodal commonality of the products and 
processes involved. This latter weighting procedure was not followed 
in the present study. 
Summary of Cross-Section Results 
To summarize the cross-section results, it can be said that 
concentration measures of a firm's primary industry, the size of the 
firm, and the diversified power of the firm as measured in the present 
study indicated no systematic influence on the performance of firms 
measured by the profitability of firms and thus account for little of 
the variation in the profitability of firms engaged in food manufacturing. 
The same independent variables are positively related to the average 
gross margins of firms in food manufacturing. The conclusion was reached 
that this discrepancy indicates that small firms compete by charging 
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lower prices and having lower costs because less money is allocated to 
advertising and promotion. Larger firms in more concentrated industries 
engage in nonprice competition. Product differentiation accomplished through 
massive advertising and promotion efforts allow the firms to charge higher 
prices. The cost of these promotional campaigns plus research and develop­
ment and other overhead costs permit the large firms in concentrated 
industries to achieve a rate of profitability that is not necessarily 
higher than that of the smaller firms in less concentrated industries. 
When other independent variables are added to the model to explain 
other common features of structure and conduct, e.g., level of expendi­
tures devoted to advertising and promotion, minimum efficient size plant, 
and a capital output ratio to adjust for different levels of technology, 
a statistically significant portion of the variation in the profit 
rates of firms in food processing can be explained. In the model 
encompassing the entire set of measures of structure and conduct the 
predicted coefficients were robust and at an unreliable level of signifi­
cance. The distributions of the observations used to depict concentration 
(both primary industry and diversified power) indicated that a positive 
40 
relationship does exist between these measures at the extreme levels. 
The weakness of the degree to which structural measures account for 
differences in the profitability of firms has implications concerning 
40 
The lack of any significant differences between the results 
using 4-digit 4-firm concentration ratios, 4-digit 20-firm concentration 
ratios, or 3-digit average concentration ratios indicates the weakness 
of concentration ratios. Each measure is a single valued parameter 
used to approximate the size distribution of firms in an industry. 
Each of the above measures represents a different part of the size 
distribution and should yield differing results.-
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(1) the effectiveness of profit rates as the only measure used in 
evaluating the performance of firms in industries or markets, and (2) 
the use of profit rates and structural measures in a case-by-case approach 
to antitrust enforcement. These implications will be discussed in 
Chapter VI. 
Results of Time Series Analysis 
The three hypotheses to be tested with time series data were 
described in Chapter III. Each of these hypotheses was tested with a 
33 percent random sample of the firms used in the cross-section analysis 
for which profit and total growth data were collected for the 1947-1965 
years. The firms were ranked ordinally on the basis of product 
diversification and placed in four groups as described in Chapter III. 
Group I contained those firms that were completely undiversified over 
the entire period; Group II was made up of firms that were nondiversified 
in 1947 but diversified in 1965; Group III was made up of firms that 
were slightly diversified in 1947 but witnessed a major increase in the 
degree of diversification between 1947 and 1965; and Group IV was made 
up of firms heavily diversified over the entire period. This grouping 
resulted in 16 firms in Group I, 21 in Group II, 10 in Group III, and 
12 in Group IV. 
The first hypothesis to be tested is that diversified firms were 
more profitable over time than nondiversified firms. This hypothesis 
was tested with a 4 X 3 chi-squared contingency table. The rows of the 
table represented the four groups of firms, the columns represented three 
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profit ranges; low profit rates defined as firms with average profits 
over the period of less than 5.5 percent; medium profit firms were those 
with profits between 5.5 and 12 percent; and high profit firms were 
those with profits in excess of 12 percent. The contingency table 
yielded a chi-squared coefficient of 4.53. Thus, the hypothesis could 
not be rejected that average profitability over time was independent of 
the states of product diversification for the food processing firms. 
Because of the limitations of the data and the tests employed, all that 
can be said is that diversified firms tend to be no more profitable over 
time than nondiversified firms. It cannot be concluded from this test 
that diversified firms are no more profitable than they would have been 
had they not diversified. The lack of ability to pinpoint the time 
period when firms made significant changes in their product mix or the 
existence of multiple changes in the product mix over time eliminated 
the possibility of testing this hypothesis with the data available. 
The average profits of the firms in each group were calculated for 
each of the 19 years. Trend lines were then calculated for each group 
to investigate further the profit characteristics of diversified and 
nondiversified firms. 
The trend lines: 
Group I Y = .081 - .003 X 
Group II Y = .094 - .003 X 
Group III Y = .110 - .002 X 
Group IV Y = .103 - .002 X 
indicate little difference in the intercept of the four groups. However, 
the diversified firms had a slightly slower rate of decline in profits 
than did the nondiversified firms. (The negative slope is caused by 
151 
the selection of the high profit postwar years for the initial years in 
the period.) 
The second hypothesis tested was that the highly diversified firms 
grew more rapidly (in terms of total assets) than the lesser or non-
diversified firms. A 4 X 3 chi-squared contingency table was again 
used to test the hypothesis. The four rows of the table again represented 
the four levels of diversification. The columns represented; (1) firms 
that grew by less than 1.3 percent per year; (2) firms that grew from 
1.4 to 7.3 percent a year; and (3) firms that grew by more than 7.3 
percent a year. A chi-squared coefficient of 6.82 did not allow the 
rejection of the hypothesis that growth is independent of the groupings 
of firms according to diversification. It suggests merely that diversi­
fied growth is a substitute for horizontal growth. Again the weakness 
of the test does not allow us to conclude that the firms that diversified 
would have grown as rapidly as they did had they not diversified. 
The third hypothesis tested with the time series data was that 
diversification is a method used to avert risk and thus reduces the 
profit instability of firms. Again the data were not available to con­
struct a direct test of this hypothesis. The average variances of the 
firms in each of the four groups were calculated. The Bartlett's test 
for homogeneous variances was then used to determine whether or not 
the average variances of firms in the four groups differed significantly. 
The Bartlett's test led to the rejection of the hypothesis that 
2 2 
the variances of the four groups are equal (% = 13.778 > 99)(3) ~ 11»3)* 
It was then necessary to construct tests to determine the signifi­
cance of the differences in variances and an ordering of the differences 
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by groups. The most significant differences were between groups I and 
2 2 
IV. The hypothesis was rejected that (.995 level of 
significance). From the previous test they were determined to be un-
2 2 
equal leaving only the result that . Similarly 
2 2 2 2 
c^i > 0^ > Og > O4 ' Thus, the average variance in the profitability 
of firms is lower for the diversified group than the nondiversified 
group. This would support the Markowitz contention that diversification, 
even though it may be into cyclical unstable industries, has a stabilizing 
effect on profit rates of firms. 
In conclusion the time series data supported the cross-section 
analysis with regard to the level of profitability, i.e., the average 
profitability of the group of diversified firms was not significantly 
greater than that of the nondiversified group. The group of diversified 
firms exhibited a more stable level of profit rates than the non-
diversified firms indicating the possibility of averting risk through 
changes in the product mix. 
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CHAPTER VI. MARKET STRUCTURE AND ANTITRUST POLICY 
Structural elements of industries have long been considered important 
in evaluating firms brought before the courts for antitrust violations. 
Measures of industry concentration, barriers to entry, and size of firm 
have long been used in these cases. Thus it is important to consider 
the implications of the present study on antitrust policy. Since mergers 
have the most striking effect on changing industry structure—the main 
independent variable of the present study—this chapter will concentrate 
on merger policy. 
The research studies conducted purporting to analyze the molding 
forces of our industrial structure indicate that the three major merger 
waves since 1895 have played a significant role in the development of 
both firm and industry structures (39, 58). The waves are dated 1898-1902, 
1926-1930, and 1946-1956. The importance of these waves is reflected 
by the fact that at least three-fifths of the 100 largest corporations 
in 1955 had an important merger somewhere in their history. Thirty-one 
of these mergers took place prior to 1904 (58, p. 4). 
The first merger wave, which peaked between 1898 and 1902, trans­
formed our industry structure from one of small, locally held firms 
into industries made up of a few very large enterprises. The second 
wave reflected both the emergence of new industries arising from our 
industrial development and an attempt to restore the concentration 
levels of the previous movement that were beginning to deteriorate. 
The third movement, following the end of World War II, appears to be 
marked by a lower peak but a longer duration. 
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It can be said, with due respect for these studies, that the results 
of attempts to explain the causes of waves are less than significant. 
In many cases the findings are in conflict. The merger waves appear 
to have little relation to the rate of industrial growth, the rate of 
innovation, and the improvement of transportation facilities (58, p. 6). 
These factors were more significant in the later waves. The early waves 
appear to be related to periods when the capital markets were strong 
and the securities markets were favorable. All merger waves are posi­
tively correlated to the business cycle. There appears to be little 
correlation between the legal atmosphere and the merger waves, since 
one of the stronger waves occurred during and after the strengthening 
of Section 7 of the Clayton Act. And at present there appears to be 
a relatively strong merger movement even though in recent years the 
courts have acted upon cases referring to forms of vertical and conglom­
erate mergers that were never before brought under the antitrust laws. 
The economic and legal aspects of mergers will be discussed with 
attention focused on the cases dealing with conglomerate mergers. The 
courts have made a distinction between three types of mergers; horizontal, 
vertical, and conglomerate. In order to remain consistent with the 
legal record the horizontal merger is defined as the acquisition of the 
stock or assets of a firm producing an identical product or close 
substitute to the products of the acquiring firm and operating in the 
same geographical market; a vertical merger is the acquisition of the 
stock or assets of a firm which buys the product sold by the acquirer 
or a firm from which inputs of the acquiring company are purchased; 
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and the conglomerate merger is the acquisition of a firm producing a pro­
duct that has no economic relationship to the acquirer. The courts have 
tended to use the strict definition for horizontal and vertical mergers 
and leave the residue of cases fall into the category of conglomerate 
mergers (67). 
Mergers and Antitrust 
Merger cases have been brought to court under both the Sherman Act and 
the Clayton Act, However, both laws, prior to the Celler-Kefauver Act 
amending Section 7 of the Clayton Act, proved to be quite inadequate in 
handling the situation. The Sherman Act did not deal specifically with 
mergers. A merger could be held illegal under this Act only if it repre­
sented "...a contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or 
conspiracy, in restraint of trade," or if it reflected "...a person who 
shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire..., to 
monopolize..." Thus, it was very easy for firms to by-pass the first sec­
tion by having no formal contract. Most cases had to be tried under Sec­
tion 2. Section 2 was equally as troublesome because it required the 
courts to prove an intent to monopolize whereas most mergers could be justi­
fied as good business practice on the part of the firms. Thus only extreme 
cases of monopoly which involve evidence of an expressed intent to monopo­
lize hold under the Sherman Act. 
The Clayton Act, in Section 7, originally stated "...that no corpor­
ation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the 
whole or any part of the stock or other share capital of another 
corporation...where the effect of such acquisition may be substantially 
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to lessen competition between the corporation whose stock is so acquired 
and the corporation making the acquisition, or to restrain commerce in 
any section or community, or tend to create a monopoly of any line of 
commerce (85, p. 731)." Thus, in 1914 the first law making it illegal 
to merge through stock acquisition, if competition is substantially 
lessened or a monopoly tendency is created, was written into the statutes. 
This allowed firms to be found guilty of an illegal stock acquisition of 
another firm if such acquisition tended to lessen competition between 
the acquired and acquiring firms removing the rule that an intent to 
monopolize had to be proven. 
Two major weaknesses can be found in the law as originally written. 
First, the law did not specify that any distinction be made between 
horizontal, vertical, or conglomerate mergers. Thus up to recent years 
only horizontal mergers have been successfully tried under the Act. 
Secondly, the law did not cover asset acquisitions. Any merger by 
asset acquisition had to be tried under the Sherman Act which again 
required the proof of intent to monopolize. The evidence of the problem 
is shown by the following cases. In Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining, 
Anaconda controlling 22 percent of the copper output of the U. S., 
purchased another small producer (38). The court said that the relatively 
small portion added to Anaconda's control did not constitute an attempt 
to monopolize and thus did not make the merger illegal under the Sherman 
Act. The Columbia Steel Case involved the acquisition by Columbia Steel, 
a west coast producer of certain specific fabricated products, of 
Consolidated Steel Corporation (16). A review of the history of the 
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case revealed that United States Steel had acquired government plants 
at Geneva, Utah, which increased its ingot capacity from 31.4 percent to 
32.7 percent. The merger was approved by the Attorney General. United 
States Steel made plans to start a cold-reduction mill in California to 
fabricate the steel-rolling 'semies' coming from the plant at Geneva. 
They then altered the plans and acquired the Consolidated Steel Co. which 
purchased less than 1/2 percent of national consumption of 'semies' but 
three percent of west coast consumption. By defining the market narrow 
enough, percentages of market control were increased to the point at which 
the government felt this merger violated the Sherman Act since it would 
foreclose a sizable amount of competition as a vertical merger and 
eliminate competition as a horizontal merger. The court found that this 
elimination of competition was too small to represent a restraint of 
trade. In answer to the government's charge of monopolization, the court 
said that since a monopoly was not achieved, the government must prove 
an intent to monopolize. The government could not produce evidence of 
intent. 
A similar vertical integration case involved the merger of the 
Yellow Cab Co. with the Checker Cab Manufacturing Corporation (94). The 
government charged that the companies had illegally foreclosed 80 percent 
of the market in Chicago and other major cities by allowing the Yellow 
Cab affiliates to purchase only from the Checker Cab Co. The court 
concluded that this vertical integration did come under the Sherman Act. 
But even though sizable proportions of the industry were involved there 
was again no proof of intent to monopolize. 
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In 1950 the District Court of New York held, in the case of the 
United States v. Celanese Corporation of America, that "A merger with 
another company...does not constitute an indirect acquisition of stock, 
although it is an acquisition of the property represented by the stock, 
and although an acquisition of stock may be incidental to the merger 
(14)." This loophole was then quickly closed by the Celler-Kefauver 
Amendment to Section 7 of the Clayton Act. This amendment stated that 
any corporation under the jurisdiction of the FTC should not acquire 
"...the whole or any part of the assets of another corporation,.., if the 
effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition 
or to tend to create a monopoly." The amendment also included vertical 
and conglomerate as well as horizontal mergers. In the original version 
of the law the tests of legality were; (1) the substantially lessening 
of competition between the acquiring and the acquired corporation, (2) 
the tendency to create a monopoly related to a line of commerce, and (3) 
evidence of a restraint of commerce in any section of the country. The 
amended version of the law removed the first mentioned test of legality 
and required only that competition be restrained in some market to con­
stitute a violation of the law (18). 
Economic effects of mergers 
The economic effects of horizontal and vertical mergers are quite 
apparent. On the negative side the mergers represent a technique through 
which the firms can greatly increase the concentration of power in an 
industry. 
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Having achieved dominant market power they can force competitors 
out of business by the use of various pricing policies. Once the role 
of the large firm is felt by smaller competitors in the industry, the 
dominant firm may effectively set policy and competitive standards for 
the industry (which may not be considered competitive). 
The vertical merger forecloses competition not only between the 
acquired and the acquiring firms but to other firms that might sell to 
or buy from the companies involved in the merger. 
The negative aspects of mergers are not sufficiently widespread to 
make them illegal per se. In fact certain respects of mergers are highly 
desirable. Merger is one technique by which a firm can liquidate its 
holdings. It is especially beneficial in cases involving family firms 
in which liquidation might be deemed necessary for personal reasons. 
It is a technique by which a firm in financial difficulty can gain the 
skills and know-how necessary to make it an efficient operation. Without 
the possibility of merger the firm would become insolvent and thus be 
completely removed from competition. If the firm is merged with a com­
petitor some competition is foreclosed but the assets of the firm still 
remain as a competitive segment of the industry. Thus a capital assets 
market provides suitable rewards for successful entrepreneurship and the 
free transferability directs the assets into the hands of the more 
efficient operators. 
Firms may merge to achieve levels of production that yield economies 
of scale, i.e. a reduced average total cost of operation. If these 
economies can be achieved without giving the firm such an advantage as 
to allow it to drive competition out of business the economies are 
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desirable. However, if the company gains monopoly power through these 
economies there is no force present to guarantee that the firm will pass 
the efficiency gains, at least in part, on to the consumer. The company 
could charge monopoly prices, earn monopoly rewards and have a serious 
effect on the efficient allocation of resources. The consumer pays 
monopoly prices, output is retarded, and the price system is no longer an 
accurate indicator for the attraction of resources. This point was 
specifically disputed in the Brown Shoe Case wherein the courts stated 
that Congress, in passing the law, had intended to "...promote competition 
through the protection of viable, small, locally owned businesses, even 
where economies of scale might be gained (11)." 
Economics of the amended act 
With the amendment of Section 7 of the Clayton Act came a new econom­
ic approach to mergers. Section 7 as amended does not deal strictly with 
either monopoly or pure competition but rather with the monopoly power or 
market power achieved by firms in an oligopolistically structured market. 
Monopolistic pricing and predatory activities may be used long before a 
firm has achieved a monopoly position. These practices along with other 
anti-competitive activities will be successful depending on the market 
power of the firm initiating the activity and the relative strength of his 
competitors. The law and the court's interpretation of the law have 
assumed a positive correlation between the size of a firm, the number and 
size of competitors, and the success of anti-competitive activities. There 
fore, concentration and trends in market concentration play a dominant role 
in determining the possible anti-competitive effects of a merger. 
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One serious problem with concentration measures and oligopoly theory 
is that there exists no clearly measurable division between competitive 
and noncompetitive industries nor between mergers that are substantially 
anti-competitive and mergers that are not to be substantially anti­
competitive. Therefore, any guidelines to be used by business have come 
from the Supreme Court decisions and the regulatory agencies. In the 
Continental Can Case (2) once the courts had defined the relevant market, 
they found that the control of 25 percent of such market by the merged 
firm approached that held by the merged firms in Philadelphia National 
Bank (67) and Alcoa (2) thus setting a basic ground rule for determining 
the upper limits of market share needed to substantially lessen competition. 
In the Brown Shoe Case the court stated that if there has been any trend 
toward increased concentration in an industry, any further mergers, 
regardless of how small, might represent a tendency toward decreases in 
competition^^ (11). This rule was again used in the Von Grocery Case (88). 
The combined rulings seem to imply that any merger accounting for in 
excess of 25-30 percent of the market will be subject to antitrust action. 
Mergers accounting for a smaller market share will not be tolerated if 
the above mentioned changes in structure are present. 
The courts as well as Congress have shown that the intent of the 
bill was to stop economic concentration in its incipiency. This places 
special emphasis on information indicating any trends toward high 
concentration in an industry. It also makes any possibility of acquiring 
^^The government has more recently used this ruling in a case being 
brought against the Pabst Brewing Co. 
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proof of guilt of actual anti-competitive practices by firms delusive. 
It assumes a direct relationship between concentration and competition 
and disregards efficiency. Therefore, the courts must judge the cases 
on the probable and potential effects the merger or change in concentration 
will have on competition. Three 1963 Supreme Court cases clearly 
indicate the significance the courts are placing on potential competition. 
The Continental Can Case involved the purchase by Continental Can 
of Hazel-Atlas Glass Company (21). Continental Can produced no glass 
containers and Hazel-Atlas produced no metal containers. The courts 
defined the relevant market to be the glass and metal container industry 
and found that this merger would substantially lessen competition since 
glass and metal containers were being used as substitutes in the soft 
drink and beer industry. The cross elasticity of demand and inter-
changeability of use were used to determine the relevant market. The 
court said that "... in determining anticompetitive effects (one) must 
look at the structure, history, and future of the market involved (21)." 
The Penn-Olin Case involving the formation of a joint subsidiary for 
the production of sodium chlorate was declared illegal on the grounds 
that it could foreclose competition between the parent companies even 
though the subsidiary did not contain a sizable portion of the market 
(65). In the El Paso Natural Gas Case the courts cited the merger with 
Pacific Northwest Pipeline Co. as illegal since it again represented a 
potential threat to competition (even though the District Court found 
that Northwest could not put together a project to serve California with 
natural gas acceptable to the regulatory agencies). The purpose of 
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Section 7 is "...to arrest the trend toward concentration, ..., before 
the customer's alternatives disappear (ed) through merger... (65)." 
Since the gas industry is greatly expanding the courts found this merger 
to be a threat to competition. 
To clarify the rule the courts disregarded the potential injury 
to competition in the Lever Brothers Case (48), and in the Crocher-Anglo 
National Bank Case (22) and stated that potential competition cannot 
realistically be lessened if the markets are geographically set apart. 
Also, in Crown Zellerbach the court said that the potential to produce 
does not insure the potential to sell. However, in Brown Shoe they 
indicated the need to take into account the convertibility of plants (11). 
It appears as though the action in Continental Can, El Paso Natural 
Gas, and Penn-Olin cited above will tend to lessen the number of conglo­
merate merger cases since many mergers which previously would have been 
considered legal may not be such, when the market is defined to include 
potential competition that might arise between the two firms. 
These cases clearly come under the law which was reworded to include 
not just harm done to competition between the acquired and acquiring 
firms but substantial lessening of competition "... in any line of commerce 
in any section of the country... (8l)." 
Conglomerate mergers 
The effects of a conglomerate merger on competition are not as 
apparent as those of the type described in the first part of this paper. 
This, in turn, causes a need for a reconsideration in the tests of 
legality. 
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Concentration in any one market may not be increased as an immediate 
result of the merger. But the combined market power derived from being 
in various markets may give the firm leverage to operate in a manner 
not open to single product firms. Such vague concepts as the ability of 
these firms to (1) shift vast financial resources into single markets, 
(2) create barriers to entry merely by possessing such a powerful threat 
to new entry, and more relevant economic concepts such as the ability 
to achieve economies of scale not open to the single market operator 
must be considered in the economies of.mergers in the conglomerate area. 
Few cases have dealt specifically with conglomerate mergers and those 
doing so date back only to about 1957. Therefore there is little 
established record indicating just how these mergers are to be handled. 
Turner has listed a number of possible effects of conglomerate 
mergers C78i. These will be discussed in turn. 
First, the conglomerate merger may enable the acquired firm to 
operate at a lower cost of production due to economies of scale in dis­
tribution, promotion, management , research and possibly in the acquisi­
tion of capital. If the economies of scale are sufficiently large, the 
merger may drive less efficient single product competitors out of business 
in the industry of the acquired firm. It is up to the courts under the 
present antitrust policy to decide whether or not these mergers are 
illegal because of the efficiency gained over competitors. 
In the Brown Shoe Case the courts gave some indication of their 
position on economies of scale gained through merger (11, p. 344). 
Brown Shoe Company, a producer of shoes, acquired the G. R. Kinney Co., 
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Inc. which operates a retail chain of shoe stores. The retail outlets 
could purchase directly from the producer eliminating the wholesaler and 
thus reducing distribution costs on their own brands of shoes. The court 
concluded that this could result in driving competitors out of operation 
thus reducing the level of concentration in the industry. The retail 
shoe industry is relatively non-concentrated so this represented a 
foreclosure of a small segment of the market. The merged company accounted 
for less than five percent of both the production and sale of shoes. 
The court, after stating that the antitrust laws were to protect 
"competition, not competitors," continued by saying that they must not 
"...fail to recognize Congress' desire to promote competition through 
viable, small, locally owned businesses (11)." Although they did not 
specifically indicate that mergers were illegal because of efficiency 
gained, they did allow the latter aspect, the protection of small 
competitors, to take precedence over these efficiencies. Similarly, the 
court disregarded the stimulus this merger might have, if increased 
efficiency is involved, for increased efficiency in other firms in what 
is obviously an atomistically structured industry. 
From a purely economic point of view it might be quite difficult to 
justify a conglomerate merger on the basis of scale economies since with 
purely conglomerate products it seems unlikely that any such economies 
will exist at least in production and distribution. Even with such 
purely conglomerated products there may be economies in promotion 
and capital costs. Turner found that capital costs declined with 
increases in the size of plant. However, it must be remembered that 
the legal definition is not so pure as to include only this narrow class 
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of mergers as conglomerate. It also includes product extension and market 
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extension mergers. 
Product extension mergers may enable the firm to produce products 
not in the same market as the firm's primary product but similar to the 
primary product in many respects, e.g., distribution, production, promo­
tion. It is highly feasible to expect economies of scale in these types 
of mergers. 
The second factor concerning diversification or conglomerate mergers 
is that the diversified firm may find it profitable to cut its price in 
one product market to gain customers, cushioning it's losses in this 
market by gains in other diversified areas. This may be of a predatory 
nature or otherwise. If it is of a predatory nature with specific intent 
to reduce competition and drive competitors out of business the action 
is illegal per se under Section 3 of the Clayton Act. This predatory 
action must be separated from a competitive attempt on the part of the 
diversified firm to improve it's position in the sale of one product by 
using another product as a loss leader. This type of price cutting could 
force increased efficiency in one market. Predatory price cutting 
presents the same problems when connected with conglomerate mergers 
that the practice presents when used independent of any type of merger. 
If the pricing policy substantially lessens competition in any market 
and if the power to use such a pricing policy is derived from mergers 
there are no apparent reasons why the merger or the practice should be 
accepted. At the same time there is no reason to assume that every 
'A purely conglomerate merger has never been tried in the courts. 
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conglomerate merger places a firm in a position to use predatory pricing 
policies or that every merger is promoted in an effort to achieve the 
potential to use of such policies. 
A third possible consequence of conglomerate mergers is that 
competition in the industry of the acquired firm may be restricted 
because the existing firms may be afraid of retaliation from the new 
diversified firm, and in the same manner new entry is deterred because 
of the same fear of the diversified firm. This fear comes from the fact 
that the diversified firm may be able to transfer massive amounts of power 
from one industry to another. This power might be transferred in the 
form of pure size, financial strength, promotional experience, or the 
use of similar selling and distributional facilities. The measurement 
of potential competition is extremely vague and demands much more care 
in its interpretation than it has been given by the courts. Theoretically, 
if excess profits are high enough in a given industry, anyone with 
lower profits in other industries and capital availabilities is a po­
tential entrant. Thus potential competition can be a very real com­
petitive force. But the capital availabilities of other firms and numerous 
other factors may limit the number of potential competitors. The fact 
that a firm has studied the possibility of entering a given product 
line does not make them a potential competitor (31). 
Two recent decisions indicate the courts' position on the transfer­
ability of power and potential competition. The Procter & Gamble Case 
represents the most recent and widely publicized case ruled upon by the 
Supreme Court as a conglomerate (product extension) merger (19, p. 15, 773). 
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The Procter & Gamble-Clorox Case 
In 1957 Procter & Gamble purchased Clorox, a bleach producer. The 
Federal Trade Commission issued a complaint on September 30, 1957, 
against Procter & Gamble (P & G) charging that it had violated Section 
7 of the Clayton Act by its acquisition of Clorox Chemical Company 
August 1, 1957. After evidence was heard by P & G appealing the decision, 
the Commission, on June 15, 1961, entered an order remanding the case 
to the hearing examiner for the reception of post acquisition evidence. 
The Commission stated that, at this time, there was not sufficient evi­
dence to declare the merger illegal (29, pp. 3-4). The Commission filed 
a Second Initial Decision on February 28, 1962, in which an order of 
divestiture was made. The decision of illegality was based on the 
probable lessening of competition in the liquid bleach industry for one 
or more of seven reasons (29, pp. 61-62). On November 26, 1963, the 
Commission issued the Final Order requiring the divestiture of Clorox 
by P & G. This order modified the earlier decision by allowing for a 
spin-off type divestiture (30, pp. 1-3). 
This final order was based on finding five major areas where the 
merger could cause a substantial lessening of competition in the liquid 
bleach industry. The decision of the Commission was upheld by a unanimous 
vote of the Supreme Court in a decision delivered April 11, 1967, thus 
reversing an earlier decision of the U. S. Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit (31). The five areas of contest will be reviewed here 
after going through a brief history of the markets involved. 
The relevant line of commerce was determined to be the household 
liquid bleach industry. Although there is some overlap between liquid 
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bleach, industrial bleach, and powdered bleach the evidence presented 
concluded that (1) industrial bleach is a much stronger solution than 
the 5-1/4 percent sodium hypochlorite solution used in household liquid 
bleaches and (2) dry bleaches are of a light duty nature whereas liquid 
bleaches are heavy duty, the former being approximately twice as expensive 
as the latter and primarily used in bleaching fine fabrics that cannot 
withstand the heavier bleaches (30, p. 40). Therefore, there is enough 
distinction in the markets to consider the liquid household bleach 
market as a separate entity. Concepts of cross elasticity of demand were 
used in this determination. The court did not mention the substitutabil-
ity of household detergents containing bleaching ingredients and pre­
sented little evidence of the price interdependence among the products. 
The relevant geographic market was determined to be the United 
States and a number of regional submarkets. Since Clorox is the sole 
national producer of bleach the national market was considered but the 
more relevant impact of the merger was said to be in the various sub-
markets where Clorox had different competitors and different market 
shares. (Purex was not considered a national corporation even though 
they sold in areas of the country representing 64 percent of the popula­
tion.) (30, p. 40-41). The household liquid bleach industry at the 
time of the merger was characterized by high concentration, six firms 
accounting for 79.8 percent of total U. S. sales. Clorox, with annual 
sales slightly less than $40 million, accounted for 48.8 percent of 
total national sales, and Purex, the next ranked competitor, accounted 
for 15.7 percent (30, p. 5). Purex, unlike Clorox, produces a number 
of other products in the areas of soap and household cleaning agents. 
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The remaining 20.2 percent of the market not accounted for by the 
six largest firms was shared by approximately 200 small local and 
regional producers. Most of these 200 firms had assets of less than 
$75,000 (30, p. 6). 
Bleach is characterized by a low sales price relative to the volume 
of the commodity. Thus, freight costs commonly average more than 10 
percent of unit costs making it unprofitable to ship bleach more than 
300 miles from the location of the manufacturing plant, allowing for 
the regional nature of competition (30, p. 1). Although Clorox and Purex 
had the same number of plants they compete in less than half of the 
nation (30, p. 42). 
In the regional markets, Clorox, in 1957, accounted for 56 percent 
of sales in New England, 64.3 percent in Metropolitan New York, 71.6 
percent in the Middle Atlantic States, 42.4 percent in the East Central 
States, 28.6 percent in Metropolitan Chicago, 34.5 percent in the West 
Central States, 52.6 percent in the Southeast, 48.4 percent in the 
Southwest, and 39.2 percent in the Pacific. The largest regional 
market share held by Purex was 42.4 percent in the Pacific region 
(29, p. 19). 
Clorox had also achieved, through advertising, a brand allegiance 
not attainable by most other bleach manufacturers because of their 
financial limitations. 
In 1957 P & G had total net sales of $1,150 million. P & G manu­
factured a number of low-priced, high-turnover items in the following 
areas; soaps, detergents and cleansers; food products; toilet goods; 
and paper products. These products are complementary to household 
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liquid bleach in that some may be produced with similar facilities, 
marketed through the same channels, and promoted by the same means (31, 
p. 9). Therefore the merger is more accurately classified as a product 
extension merger than ,i purely conglomerate merger. P & G, the principal 
producer of soaps, detergents, and cleansers, along with two other 
competitors account for over 80 percent of total sales of these products. 
P & G was in turn the nation's largest advertiser in 1957 spending 
approximately $80 million (principally television advertising) and 
$47 million dolalrs for domestic sales promotion (30, p, 12), 
After a two-year study of the liquid bleach industry P & G decided 
it would not be advisable to enter the industry directly because of 
the apparent requirement of a heavy investment if a substantial share 
of the market were to be achieved. They did recommend entry by acquisi­
tion of Clorox. 
With this background focus can be shifted to the five economic 
reasons used as a basis for the Commission's complaint and order of 
divestiture. The Commission declared that since this merger was not 
of a horizontal or vertical nature present quantitative evidence of 
immediate reductions in concentration or foreclosure of competition 
cannot be used as evidence. Thus, if mergers of this type are to be 
judged by the courts it must be accomplished by rough estimates 
(possibly qualitative) of the mergers' effect on competition in the 
relevant market (30, p. 53). 
In the Clorox Case the first important factor is the great 
discrepancy in size "...between Procter and, not only Clorox, but any 
firm in the liquid bleach industry (30, p. 53)." The Commission argued 
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that, because of the sheer size of the merged company and the relatedness 
of the products, there is little doubt as to the existence of substantial 
cost savings which would give the acquired firm a "substantial" competi­
tive advantage in the industry. These cost savings are particularly 
relevant in advertising. The effectiveness of advertising on low-priced, 
high-turnover items seems to be closely related to the volume of ad­
vertising. The court did not, in the same qualitative vein, consider 
how much monopoly power could influence price via the demand for liquid 
bleach even if these economies allow it to accumulate monopoly power. 
Also related to the size factor is Congress' intent to protect small 
business in the amended version of the law. This merger could place the 
small business firms in this typically small business industry in great 
jeopardy. In an effort to remain in business, the small companies could 
seek out large companies willing to merge. This would convert a small 
business industry into an oligopoly of giants (30, p. 55). 
Second, at the time of the merger the household liquid bleach industry 
was already highly concentrated. Even in the existence of this high 
concentration the courts said there was evidence of price rivalry and 
product convenience competition. Procter's entry could stop any possible 
déconcentration and create barriers to entry. Feared much more than 
Clorox, however, the Commission produced evidence citing a reduction 
in the increases in concentration from 1953 to 1957. Subsequent to the 
acquisition these marginal changes reversed direction (29, p. 31). 
Procter could even use it's dominant position in the bleach industry 
to reduce competition in other markets. Clorox could be used as a 
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"...tying product, loss leader, or cross-coupon offering..." on present 
Procter products or new products the company may choose to introduce 
(30, p. 60). 
One is reminded here of the statement of Judge Hand relating to a 
monopoly case in the 1940's ; "That percentage (90 percent of the 
relevant market) is enough to constitute a monopoly; it is doubtful 
whether sixty or sixty-four percent would be enough and certainly thirty-
three is not." Clorox at the time of the merger accounted for 50 percent 
of the household bleach industry. The next largest producer was 
approximately one-fourth the size of Clorox and in many sections of the 
country much smaller. The relevant question again seems to become how 
much more monopoly exploitation could come from the merged company that 
was not already being achieved by Clorox? 
Third, Procter, because of the similarity of its existing product 
lines to bleach, its admitted knowledge of marketing low-priced, high-
turnover items, its size and record of growth and addition of product 
lines, was a very significant potential competitor. It has been pointed 
out by Bain that a potential competitor may have enough influence on a 
market to cause the oligopolists to charge a price far below the 
monopoly price making it unattractive for entry (5, p. 189). Potential 
competition in this way plays a role very much like real competition in 
regulating the oligopoly price. 
In the Procter Case the merger was said to have eliminated the 
most probable entrant and possibly the only prospective entrant into 
the liquid bleach field (30, p. 61). The merger was then regarded as a 
substantial lessening of competition in the household liquid bleach industry. 
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Fourth, Procter, because of the strength it derives from its already 
diversified base, was said to possess great leverage that may be shifted 
into the bleach industry at will. The flexibility given Clorox by the 
merger was manifest in the Erie, Pennsylvania incident. Clorox effectively, 
through rapid response, won a market share battle with Purex by extensive 
advertising and promotion that had not been used extensively before. 
Purex, by promoting bleach in a new container using Erie as a test market, 
won more than 30 percent of the market. Clorox, using extensive advertising, 
"price-off" coupons and premium offers forced Purex's share to seven 
percent (30, p. 10). This was considered to be a clear indication of the 
power amassed by the merger. This power must certainly be considered as 
a retarding factor to any new competition in the industry. 
The concept of market leverage required the existence of certain 
conditions in other markets in which the firm competes. The firm must 
have significant monopoly power in its primary industry if it is to shift 
resources and power into other market areas without facing potential 
harm in its primary market. For example, a time when P & G resources 
are being devoted to capturing larger shares of the bleach market would 
be an ideal time for its competitors in the soap and detergent market 
to attempt to capture a segment of P & G's share of these markets. Thus, 
the parent must hold a strong monopolistic position in its primary 
(or in fact any other) industry in which it produces goods and does not 
wish to loose its market share. 
Fifth, the merger gave Clorox a chance to achieve advertising 
discounts, and efficiency in production and distribution not possible 
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prior to the merger (30, p. 64). 
First, a number of personnel from P & G were placed in high positions 
in Clorox spreading their technical marketing know-how into this new 
area. If P & G were to use its sales force to promote and sell Clorox 
rather than the conventional broker system this could further increase 
economies in the distribution of Clorox. 
Second, plants in Kansas City and Boston were closed because in 
the Kansas City case P & G felt production could be more efficiently 
operated if the plant was moved to the location of the Kansas City 
P & G plant. In the Boston situation it was felt that the Eastern 
territory could be more economically served from the Jersey City Clorox 
plant (29, p. 28). 
The most significant impact of scale economies was to be felt in 
the areas of advertising and promotion. Immediately following the 
acquisition Clorox adapted promotional programs using price-off labels, 
free premiums, price reducing coupons, and other premiums. These methods 
of promotion had not been used by Clorox for a number of years (29, p. 30). 
It is somewhat distracting from the government's case to admit that these 
promotional techniques had been used in the bleach industry at some date 
prior to the merger and were used at this previous date by Clorox. 
Thus, this was not a promotional innovation introduced in this industry 
by P & G. 
In advertising, Clorox made many changes after the merger. Ad­
vertising policies in magazine and radio media were altered. In spot 
television advertising, the total monthly average number of seconds 
used increased from 49,234 before the acquisition to 100,257 after the 
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acquisition (29, p. 35). This increase in advertising came at a great 
unit cost reduction because of advertising discounts. A total coordination 
of the P & G and Clorox advertising could result in even further savings. 
Maximum volume discounts available in network television advertising were 
25-30 percent. Clorox, prior to the merger probably did not advertise 
enough to receive discounts of any substance. Purex, in advertising all 
lines of its products received a six percent discount from one network 
and 15 percent from another. The combined Clorox-P & G advertising budget 
could entitle Clorox to at least 33-1/3 percent more advertising for the 
same money (29, p. 44-45). These savings by a dominant firm in an 
industry not characterized by massive advertising could have a very 
significant influence on the many small companies that can muster up, at 
most, small amounts of finances for local advertising. And since Congress 
expressed, in debating the law, a desire to protect small local competitors, 
these efficiencies could only harm local competition and create additional 
barriers to entry. However, evidence was not produced that indicated 
that P & G received this level of discounts. 
On the basis of these five factors divestiture was ordered by the 
Commission and upheld by the Supreme Court. Past acquisition evidence 
was given little weight in either decision. Instead the findings of the 
Final Order and the Court Decision were based on the potential effects 
of the acquisition. 
Justice Douglas, in delivering the Court Opinion, stated that, 
contrary to the Court of Appeals, possible effects must be heavily relied 
upon if anticompetitive practices are to be arrested at their incipiency 
(31, p. 8). All mergers regardless of type are to be judged under the 
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same standard, i.e., if the merger or acquisition has the potential to 
substantially lessen competition in some line of commerce in some section 
of the country. And Justice Douglas went on to state that the probable 
anticompetitive effects of this msrgcr are (1) to allow for the substitu- ' 
tion of a very powerful firm for an already dominant firm which will 
increase barriers to entry and dissuade smaller competitors from aggres­
sively competing and (2) to eliminate the most likely and only potential 
competitor (31, p. 8-9). Therefore, the ruling the the Court of Appeals 
was reversed in favor of the Commission. 
Justice Harlan, in a concurring opinion, stressed the need in this 
new area of mergers for a better explanation of the Commissions* findings 
and the Court's ruling to establish "...future administrative and judicial 
application of Section 7 of the Clayton Act to this kind of merger... 
(31, p. 1)." Also he heavily stressed the importance and application of 
the theories and research of Bain in the evaluation of mergers and other 
features of industrial organization. Economic research, although admittedly 
incomplete in the area of oligopoly and industrial organization, was given 
its first real promotion in the Courts by Justice Harlan. 
The Reynolds Metal Case is the first judicial test of amended 
Section 7 relating to conglomerate mergers (60, 67). Reynolds, producing 
40 percent of the aluminum foil and being the largest producer of the 
product, in 1956 acquired Arrow Brands, Inc., a firm to which Reynolds 
sold foil for the purpose of converting into florist foil. Arrow 
controlled 33 percent of the florist foil market. The relevant market 
was determined to be the florist foil market. Using this as the relevant 
market the courts found that this "conglomerate" merger would substantially 
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lessen competition. The courts tried this case as a conglomerate merger 
only after finding that the evidence would not support the fact that 
Reynolds had illegally foreclosed competition by a vertical merger. Under 
the definition of vertical mergers given, above this type of policy in 
confronting this merger is inconsistent with both economics and law and 
must be evaluated in this perspective. Their argument in supporting the 
decision that the merger should be dissolved was that Arrow now had 
access to huge financial resources that would be transferred from Reynolds, 
thus giving them an undue competitive advantage. The fact that the products 
of Reynolds and those of Arrow are in no way complementary and that the 
Reynolds brand would be of little advantage to Arrow were discounted in 
the case. A note in the Yale Law Journal points to a number of tests 
that could have been used in the Reynolds case since there were approxi­
mately ten years of post acquisition evidence available to and acceptable 
to the court (60, p. 1271). If competition is substantially reduced by 
the merger there should be barriers to entry. There might be evidence 
of price cutting of a predatory nature. The courts used neither of the 
tests. It appears as a case similar to the Brown Shoe Case in which the 
courts were protecting competitors at the possible expense of increased 
efficiency. The transfer of power could enable a more efficient means 
of production which could in turn eliminate a number of small competitors. 
In the Reynold's Case the court stated that there would be cases where 
mergers are necessary to preserve competition at adequate levels or to 
produce "countervailing, competitive, economic, or social advantages 
(60)," Thus, they did not want the ruling of this case to be considered 
a per se rule. However, "countervailing" and "social advantages" are 
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new terms in antitrust that were not defined in an economic framework 
and leave the rule of law extremely vague. 
Reciprocity 
Diversification may take place so that a firm might gain power, 
prestige, profits, stabilization., obsolescence of product lines or as 
a protection against monopoly prices that might some day be asked for a 
commodity that the firm buys. Closely related to this last factor is the 
concept of reciprocity which has been brought to attention by the recent 
Consolidated Foods Case (20). Reciprocity, however, Is not as new as 
this case. For the conglomerate firm this is one way to improve sales 
and deny competitors equal access to the market. 
Survey results published in 1961 disclosed the fact that 100 percent 
of those questioned in the chemical industry, petroleum industry, iron 
and steel industries considered reciprocity a significant factor in their 
buyer-seller relations (71, p. 70). Of the 300 purchasing agents responding 
to the questionnaires, 72 percent indicated the importance of reciprocity 
in their selling activities. It is common in the theory of trade relations 
to assume that "...every purchase earns a purchase credit...(40, p. 875)" 
which obligates the seller to buy from the buyer. The value of the 
purchase credit depends upon the importance to the supplier of the 
company's purchase, the volume of products the supplier demands, and 
the amount of reciprocity the supplier might have over the buyer (counter­
vailing reciprocity) (40, p. 875-876). 
Turner elaborates on these conditions by stating the following five 
necessary conditions if reciprocity is to significantly influence 
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purchasing decisions C7i3, p. 1387). First, assume that there are three 
firms engaged in the system—A, B, and C. A sells a product to B, B 
in turn sells a product it produces to C. A conglomerate merger takes 
place between A and C, The conditions for reciprocity are then; 
(1) the conglomerate firm must either be the only firm both 
selling A and buying B or it must be one of the leading 
buyers of B. 
(2) the conglomerate firm must be a relatively substantial 
buyer of B (to gain a sizable amount of purchase credits). 
(3) If the conglomerate firm is a distributor rather than a 
user of B's product, it must have some degree of monopoly 
power in its market in order to have leverage over B. 
(4) Industry B must be imperfectly competitive. 
(5) Industry B must account for a substantial part of the 
sales of A, or reciprocity could not affect a substantial 
foreclosure of competition in the market. 
In the absence of reciprocity the economic man acting as the decision 
maker for the firm will choose to purchase commodities or resources from 
the firm offering the price-quality combination that most exactly 
satisfies his need. Reciprocal dealing can only hinder this competitive 
purchasing. It may force the purchaser to buy from a less efficient, 
low-quality, high-cost producer. And in doing this it can foreclose a 
sizable segment of the market. Thus, to gain protection from counter­
vailing reciprocity and to protect or enhance sales, the firm is faced 
with a strong incentive to diversify. This leads to a system of power 
building upon power which could, if the five conditions mentioned above 
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are met, lead to a substantial lessening of competition. Before condemning 
all reciprocity as illegal it must be realized that the make-up of barter 
is such that some reciprocity must be expected as a normal part of the 
buyer-seller relationship. However, since any amount of reciprocity 
hinders the efficiency of the competitive process, reciprocity should 
be held to a minimum. The court's implication that, in the absence of 
coercion, reciprocity is generally legal is quite liberal (3, p. 118). 
In the 1930's the FTC brought three cases Involving reciprocity 
under the "unfair methods of competition" clause of the FTC Act. In 
1931 the FTC charged the Waugh Equipment Company with reciprocal dealings 
that involved unfair methods of competition (91). Arthur Moeker, Frederick 
W. Ellis, and J. B. Scott, who were vice-presidents of Armour & Co., 
(Scott being vice president in charge of traffic control), owned sizable 
amounts of stock of the Waugh Co., a producer of draft gears for railroad 
cars. Scott would ship Armour's products only through rail companies 
using Waugh equipment. Their shipping amounted to about 250,000 carloads 
per year making the sum sizable enough to warrant, in the eyes of the FTC, 
action as an unfair method of competition. The Commission ordered the 
defendants to cease and desist the practice. The companies complied 
with the order. 
In 1932 the Commission brought similar action against Mechanical 
Manufacturing Co., again a producer of railroad equipment controlled 
by R. O'Hara and W. A. Mayfield, the manager and assistant manager of 
traffic control for Swift & Co. (54). Swift was shipping only through 
rail firms using mechanical equipment. The case again ended with a 
cease and desist order. 
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Another similar case involved the California Packing Corporation (12). 
California Packing indirectly owned the Encinal Terminals, a wharfinger 
at Alamedo, California, owned directly by the Alaska Packing Company. 
California Packing would purchase materials only from firms using the 
Encinal Terminals. 
These three cases stress the coercive nature, the basis of power, 
and the foreclosure of the markets to competitors thus suppressing 
competition in these reciprocal dealings. The supplier, having no occasion 
to purchase products from the merged firm, is likely to be foreclosed 
from competition. However, the Commission had only limited power in 
these cases since Section 5 of the FTC Act was determined by the courts 
to require the proof of coercion. 
The most recent case is the 1965 Consolidated Foods Case which 
directly follows the pattern of firms A, B, and C in the hypothetical 
example given above (20). Firm A is Gentry, Inc., a producer of de­
hydrated garlic and onions used in the production of soup; firm B is a 
soup producer buying dehydrated garlic and onions from Gentry, and firm 
C is the Consolidated Foods Corporation, originally a wholesaler of food 
products that purchases soup from companies in category B. In 1951 
Consolidated acquired Gentry in a conglomerate merger. Justice Douglas 
in delivering the opinion of the court stated that "...reciprocity made 
possible by such an acquisition is one of the congeries of anti­
competitive practices at which the antitrust laws are aimed, if the 
probable consequence of the acquisition is to obtain leverage in one 
field or another (20, p. 913)." 
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In 1950, prior to the merger, Gentry had about 32 percent of the 
total sales of dehydrated garlic and onions, or 28 percent of the 
dehydrated onion market and 57 percent of the dehydrated garlic market. 
Together with Basic Vegetable Products, Inc., they accounted for 
about 90 percent of the industry output. In 1958, Consolidated sent 
letters to its distributing divisions which read in part as follows: 
"Oftentimes, it is a great advantage to know when you are calling 
on a prospect whether or not the prospect is a supplier of 
someone within your own organization. Everyone believes in reci­
procity providing all things are equal... 
"Attached is a list of prospects for our Gentry products. We 
would like to have you indicate on the list whether or not you 
are purchasing any of your supplies from them. If so, indicate 
whether your purchases are relatively large, small or insigni­
ficant. .. 
"Will you please refer the list to the proper party in your 
organization... If you have any special suggestions, as to how 
you would be helpful in properly presenting Gentry to any of 
those listed, it will be appreciated (20)." 
The courts found a strong indication that food processors did not 
regard the products of Gentry as being of equal quality to those of 
competitors. A typical indication is the following reply from Armour 
stating that they would "...assure (Consolidated) that it is the desire 
of our people to reciprocate and cooperate with you..., and (we are) 
sure that if our quality obstacles can be overcome, your quotations will 
receive favorable consideration... (20)." The Supreme Court decided 
that the connection between Consolidated and Gentry would allow recipro­
city to be used that would give Gentry an unfair advantage over its 
competitors. In effect the court, ruling against the merger, shifted 
from the position stated above—that reciprocity in the absence of coercion 
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is legal—to the position that the potential or the existence of the power 
to reciprocate is a violation if it could substantially lessen competition. 
Reciprocity, as was mentioned above, can be recognized both in an 
organized form or as nonsystematic friendship buying as part of barter. 
As Hausman has pointed out a firm using organized reciprocity usually 
follows an organized course of conduct, the suppliers are chosen as a 
class to operate on, the sales and purchasing agencies operate together 
and share information, and the firm as a whole operated in such a manner 
as to purchase from customers whenever possible (40, p. 881). As a 
solution to the problem Hausman suggests making the following actions 
illegal per se: (1) simple reciprocal dealing agreements when used other 
than in the course of genuine barter; (2) forcing reciprocal agreements; 
and (3) systematically using purchases as purchasing power for sales 
purposes (40, p. 882). 
These per se rules might function properly in a case such as the 
Northern Pacific Railway Case in which the railway company compelled 
the grantees or lessees of land owned by the railway to ship anything 
produced over their routes providing the rates were competitive (59). 
However in cases such as those mentioned above (e.g. Consolidated 
Foods) these factors are not readily identifiable, violating the first 
necessary condition set down by Kaysen and Turner for the effective use 
of per se rules. Likewise the per se rules would not be effective in 
cases involving internally generated diversification. Since reciprocal 
buying involves a distortion in competitive efficiency, any case where 
there is a high probability of reciprocal dealing or an indication of 
such action should not be tolerated by the courts. 
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Conclusions 
The conclusions that can be drawn from the case history relating to 
conglomerate mergers are very limited. The Reynolds-Arrow merger was 
vertical, not conglomerate, from an economic point of view. The cases 
involving reciprocity deal specifically with conduct or potential conduct. 
The Clorox Case does involve product extension, which is one form 
of conglomerate merger, but the product is closely related in function, 
type, and distribution to the products of the acquiring company. There­
fore, little is learned from this case about the court's reaction to 
mergers where the products are further removed. Clearly, product exten­
sion mergers come under Section 7 of the Clayton Act and currently are 
to be judged by the same standards as other mergers. 
Second, the courts stressed very strongly the merged company's 
ability to shift power into various markets. Where the merged company 
greatly dominated any other company in the relevant markets, the merger 
should certainly be suspect. But this does not appear a sufficient 
condition for the existence of anticompetitive performance. 
Third, potential competition and its elimination must be given 
significant weight especially if the market being entered is already 
highly concentrated or if there is a tendency toward increased concen­
tration in the market. But again the potential entrants are not only 
those firms that have studied the possibility but includes many other 
firms. 
Fourth, economies of scale, particularly in advertising and promotion, 
will be held in low regard by the court if they endanger competitors 
and should be so held. 
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But, as Justice Harlan stated in his concurring opinion, this 
decision is very lacking of any guidelines for mergers in this area. 
Further evidence of the effects of conglomerate mergers and diversifi­
cation mergers must be forthcoming from economic research to provide 
a basis for regulatory policy in this area. 
Revisions of Antitrust Policy Suggested by Research 
One of the specific intents of the present study was to provide 
empirical evidence in support of the use of structural measures in deter­
mining the extent of competitive or noncompetitive performance in food 
processing. The results of this study do not support this policy 
criteria. Concentration and size of firm were not significantly related 
to profitability. Primary industry concentration and a measure of 
diversified power explained a highly nonsignificant amount of the 
variation in profitability. Only when all of the measures of structure 
and conduct were included in the model could a significant amount of 
the variation in the profitability of food processing firms be explained. 
Even in this case the most significant explanatory variables were the 
variables to adjust for differences in the levels of technology, the 
minimum optimal size plant, and primary industry concentration. The 
cumulative effects of advertising played a significant role in explaining 
profit variation but this aspect of competition is seldom considered in 
antitrust cases. In this model the regression coefficients on primary 
industry concentration, absolute size of firm, the ratio of advertising 
to sales, and the diversified power index were not reliable because of 
large standard errors. 
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It must be recognized that profitability measures are only one of a 
number of possible measures of performance (but a commonly used indicator 
of monopoly performance with regard to efficient resource allocation). 
It was revealed in an earlier chapter that food industries show as 
much productive efficiency as national averages for all industries. 
Food prices have risen less than a number of other commodity prices. 
There have been a number of technological innovations in the food in­
dustries and large firms have carried on research and development programs. 
Thus, one might suspect that the structural measures are not highly 
related to these other measures of performance even though empirical tests 
were not conducted. In addition to these features, it was found that 
in a number of industries the absolutely largest firms are not the most 
profitable. 
The results of this study do not allow generalization over the entire 
economy since the food processing sector was the only area of manufacturing 
area covered. Undoubtedly most of the comments to be made relative to 
antitrust policy carry high degrees of validity in other areas of produc­
tion. 
High concentration levels in a given industry are at most necessary 
conditions but certainly not sufficient conditions to conclude that 
monopolistic performance is present in a given market. Concentration 
levels can at best act as a warning signal, but not as an adequate 
indicator of anticompetitive practices. 
The relevant market must be defined if concentration measures are 
to be calculated. Much more consistency could be used by the regulatory 
agencies in defining the relevant market. A distinction must be made 
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between the relevant market and the industry in which the involved 
product is classified. Economic theory makes this distinction in both 
demand theory and production theory. In demand theory the market demand 
for a given commodity assumes quantity demanded is a function of not 
only the price of the commodity in question but also the price and 
availability of other products (substitutes and complements) in the 
market. Thus antitrust policy must be concerned more with market 
structure than industry structure. 
The first policy recommendation is not one of a general change in 
the laws but a change of interpretation of markets. A broader inter­
pretation of the market is needed that takes into account close sub­
stitutes in the domestic markets that come from either domestic pro­
duction or imports. This will require more evidence relating to cross-
elasticities of both supply and demand and increased measures describing 
inter-commodity price sensitivity and commodity substitutability. 
This approach will not eliminate the borderline cases. But more 
empirical evidence in the public record could yield better guidelines 
for business and enable the court to provide more consistency in market 
delineation from one case to another. This could eliminate many of the 
market delineations of the types made in previous cases that have been 
considered decision oriented by many writers (ID). 
The second point to be made again calls for an alteration in the 
interpretation of evidence, not a general change in the laws. This 
point is that a reduction in the number of plants or companies (which 
has attracted so much attention to the food manufacturing sector of 
the economy) in a particular industry is neither a necessary nor 
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sufficient condition for anti-competitive activities in a given market. 
To make these anti-competitive accusations it is necessary to be able 
to determine whether the firms are being driven out of the industry 
by monopolistic pricing policies or by their failure to maintain levels 
of efficiency consistent with those of their competitors. If the 
latter is the case, as it has been with "Mom and Pop" food stores, 
creameries, canneries, etc., in a number of the food industries, the 
disappearance of firms is an indication that the price system is re­
allocating resourcesi Of course in the latter case if the plaintiff can 
prove that economies of scale or other means or production efficiency are 
not present the courts must determine if anti-competitive practices 
were used by the defendant. This approach requires much more than 
structural information. 
This concept relating to the use of changes in the number of firms 
can be expanded and applied to other structural measures. Until more 
is known about the relationship or lack of relationship between structural 
measures such as concentration, size of firm, product mix, etc., and the 
performance of markets, than is contained in this study or previous work, 
these measures are simply not enough evidence to conclude that non­
competitive performance is present in a market. The important deter­
minants of market performance and market outcomes in oligopoly theory, 
i.e., the various oligopoly models including the game theory approach, 
rest on behavioral conditions relating to the conduct of the participants 
in a market. This suggests that in merger cases the relevant evidence 
should be post acquisition evidence. The relevant questions should be; 
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What conduct is permitted after the merger that was ruled out by 
competitive pressure before the merger?; What changes in market perfor­
mance have taken place after the merger? 
The administration of such a law requires that mergers be attacked 
after sufficient evidence has been gathered to answer the questions 
given above. This requires the merger to settle and the merged company 
to function, possibly as much as a few years, before regulatory action 
be taken. This concept has been considered particularly undesirable 
by other writers because of the costly nature of divestiture as the 
post merger period lengthens. But the costly nature of divestiture has 
two effects on merged or merging companies. First, if the merger will 
have a strong adverse impact on market performance, the probability of 
a divestiture being required is increased and the merger will be dis­
couraged. Second,-if anti-competitive conduct after the merger causes 
not only a cease and desist order governing the conduct but also a 
divestiture order there will be present a strong incentive to avoid 
anti-competitive conduct. 
This post acquisition information is extremely pertinent to mergers 
involving very small shares of a market, e.g.. Brown Shoe or Von Grocery, 
and conglomerate mergers. The Brown Shoe Case involved less than five 
percent of the market. The court decision had little to do with protecting 
competition. The divestiture was based on the intent of Congress to 
protect small, locally owned business (11). The Von Grocery Case 
involved approximately 10 percent of the market. The relevant facts 
in the court's divestiture decision was the disappearance of firms in 
the market. There was no evidence or statement in the decision concerning 
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the reason for this disappearance. In addition the merged firm was still 
not the largest firm in the market. The court stated that it was the 
desire of Congress to have monopoly halted at its incipiency as a 
justification of its decision (88). Any change in the number and size 
distribution of firms cannot be considered an increase in monopoly power. 
The changes in structure or resource reallocation brought about by 
the competitive mechanism, and this must include aspects of the capital 
market, must be separated from those changes brought about by monopoly 
power. 
The use of potential effects in merger cases must be a very cautious 
one until more of the gaps are filled in the triad of structure, conduct, 
and performance. This caution should increase as cases move from the 
simpler horizontal market conditions to vertical and conglomerate 
conditions. 
Post acquisition evidence is of vital importance in conglomerate 
and product extension mergers. The empirical findings of the present 
work find insufficient evidence of the influence of product extension 
mergers on market performance to use strict antitrust rules governing 
their regulation. Thus, changes in market conduct and market performance 
caused by the merged firm which are anti-competitive in nature must be 
present rather than merely potential conditions. 
Changes in the nature of competition are particularly relevant in 
product extension cases. The influence of large scale advertising and 
other forms of non-price competition that might be introduced into an 
industry that had previously been characterized by price competition 
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must be considered undesirable if the advertising does not generate a 
continuous flow of price and quality information. This concept is 
relevant to the large conglomerates that qualify for advertising dis­
counts and joint product promotion. 
In summary, the policy changes suggested are changes that can be 
made by court interpretation and do not inherently require rewriting the 
antitrust laws. The changes do not eliminate the often considered in­
consistency in the laws relating to internal expansion and merger 
expansion. The effect a merger has on competition is more drastic ia 
the short run but the differences between external growth and internal 
growth tend to disappear in the longer run period. A more consistent 
policy toward mergers such as the policy presented above placing emphasis 
on conduct and performance and making use of structural elements and 
the potential results of a change in structure only in the extreme and 
obvious cases, e.g., cases falling in the extreme mentioned in the Judge 
Hand quotation above would aleviate some of the Inconsistency. This 
would eliminate many cases where the potential effects are less than 
obvious and where there is little reason to believe the acceptance of 
one merger in a market will cause a wave of mergers in the market that 
are not warranted by competitive aspirations. 
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CHAPTER VII. CONCLUSIONS 
The results of the empirical analysis presented earlier lend little 
support to the hypothesis being tested. This does not reduce the im­
portance of the results. The hypothesis tested was that the dimensions 
of market structure and the structure of a firm should have a positive 
and significant effect on the profitability of the individual firms in 
the market. The influence on the large firms in the market, the ones 
that would hold the monopoly if it existed, should be much different 
than the influence on smaller firms. Similarly, the positive relation­
ship between profitability and monopoly power should be apparent between 
large firms in "monopolistically" structured industries and large firms 
in more "competitively" structured industries. 
The tests presented earlier indicate very weak relationships between 
a company's profitability and the concentration of its primary industry, 
its size, and its diversified activities. These weak relationships do 
not allow one to disregard the structure-conduct-performance relation­
ships. They do suggest that the existence of certain structural 
conditions are not sufficient evidence to guarantee monopoly performance. 
The existence of a significant relationship between these same variables 
and average gross margin indicate a change in the forms of competition 
but not necessarily a reduction in competition. The new forms of 
competition must be evaluated on their own merits. They must be 
evaluated as substitutes for price competition, not as a lack of total 
competition. In addition their control, particularly forms of ad­
vertising competition, would require changes in the antitrust laws. 
194 
This change would be in the form of direct controls of certain activities 
of which little is known about their economic importance. 
There are two critical weaknesses of this study. First, profits 
are used as a measure of performance and various forms of profitability 
are the only empirical measures of performance tested. Although profits 
are the most readily available measure of performance and should have a 
direct relationship to monopoly resource allocation and monopoly pricing 
they are a direct measure of neither. Excess profits cannot be separated 
from normal profits. The Influence of dynamic elements on profits cannot 
be eliminated with certainty in a cross-section analysis. The selection 
of a suitable time for the cross-section does not allow one to adjust 
for building programs or product innovations of some firms and not others 
that would have a significant influence on their profitability. 
The choice of a profit measure contributes some additional arbi­
trariness to the analysis. Some measures of profitability are more 
suited to particular hypotheses but most measures follow similar dis­
tributions (74). The calculation of a profit measure differs among 
companies as they use different accounting conventions. This data 
difficulty cannot be corrected in secondary data of the type used above. 
The second weakness of this research and possibly a significant 
factor in the failure to account for many of the differences in levels 
of profitability among firms that are related to competitive aspects 
of markets is the failure to consider a number of other important 
measures effecting market competition. Each of these will be considered. 
Markets were considered to be appropriately defined by the Standard 
Industrial Classification. Ta the food industries the substitutability 
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that exists among food products probably calls for a broader classifica­
tion than the 4-digit classification used. The exceptions might include 
products such as milk and other baby foods. The classification does 
not account for the local or national nature of markets but the in­
fluence of national corporations in most local or regional markets 
erases some of this problem. In either case, the secondary data do not 
allow for the adjustment of either condition without resorting to averages 
that may further distort the data. 
A measure was not incorporated that would have accounted for 
differences in the structure and conduct of the markets in which the 
food manufacturing firms purchased inputs. The more competitive the 
input market, the more influence a dominant firm in an imperfect 
manufacturing market will have over the determination of input prices. 
A similar condition holds for the buyer concentration in the 
vertically forward market. The more competitive the buyers the more 
influence the manufacturer has over the price for which he sells his 
manufactured food product. 
The structure of demand for any product in a market has a signifi­
cant effect on the extent to which a firm can increase the price of its 
product regardless of its monopoly power. If demand is highly inelastic 
the monopolist may have sufficient power to significantly enhance price. 
But if demand is highly elastic a firm with monopolistic control of a 
product may not have monopolistic control of the market (including 
substitutes) and thus be limited in the influence it has over price. 
The last factor to be mentioned, and possibly the most important 
of the excluded factors in determining the structure of a firm and in 
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turn the structure of an Industry, is the influence of the capital market. 
Firms do not just randomly grow to dominance in an industry while others 
stand still. They grow because they have access to the capital necessary 
for growth (55). A capital market functioning perfectly will adjust 
capital availability and charges on the basis of risk. Since different 
firms in different markets face different levels of risk the cost of 
capital should vary from market to market causing different rates of 
return and different commodity prices. 
Imperfect capital markets may have a drastic influence on the 
structure of firms. If capital funds are rationed by size of firm, 
past performance of the firm or monopolistic power estimates of the firm 
made by the supplier the influence on market structure as well as on 
the growth of firms is obvious. Capital could be rationed in such a 
way as to create monopoly power. 
This does not account for the possible influence of internal v. 
external financing and how rationing if used might influence this trade­
off. It does indicate that the structure-conduct-performance relation­
ship is not a one way relationship but a multidirectional relationship 
with no one segment of the triad being the obvious dependent factor. 
These excluded factors were not considered at this time because 
the hypothesis of the present research was to determine the influence 
of the commonly used dimensions of firm and market structure on the 
performance of firms that would be expected to possess monopoly power 
in a market. The additions of these factors mentioned above to this 
model should increase the level of explained variability of profit 
rates but it is not expected that they would account for all variability. 
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Other factors such as pricing and behavioral conditions, labor strikes, 
internal operations and organization that are not commonly a part of 
industrial organization should play a significant role in the determina­
tion of profit rates of firms in various markets. These additional factors 
must be incorporated in the model before the structure-conduct-performance 
relationships can be disregarded but the influence of conduct and 
forms of oligopolistic behavior will still play a dominant role in the 
development of markets and the determination of market performance. 
It can be concluded that the diversified firms as a group were no 
more profitable over time than the nondiversified firms. The diversified 
firms had greater profit stability and were less prone to extremely 
high or low profits. Thus, the aversion of risk by diversification 
seems to be relevant in food manufacturing. 
This research leaves much to be done in the area of industrial 
organization if we are to understand the formation and structure of 
markets as well as the determinants of market performance. There is 
an enormous need for data on individual firms of the type classified 
by the Census Bureau. There is an additional need for consistency in 
the collection and presentation of data by various government agencies. 
The provision of data by individual firms would allow the building 
of industries into the markets they serve. It would allow more 
flexibility in the use of different concepts of markets as they relate 
to different hypotheses. 
Of greatest need, however, is the development of theories and 
models that not only explain the relationship between factors that 
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influence market performance but that define in a workable fashion 
performance. The development of concise, testable concepts in this area 
lags far behind the provision of suitable data. 
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APPENDIX A. THE NATURE OF THE COST CURVES FOR THE FOOD INDUSTRIES 
The existence of high profit rates in large firms is not absolute 
evidence of monopoly power. The high profits could be caused by 
economies in the operation of large firms. This information can be 
found with the construction of average cost curves and a comparison of 
average cost curves to profit rates. 
The firms under study are multi-product firms requiring an adjusted 
quantity measure to provide a common denominator for the average cost 
measures. The denominator chosen was the dollar measure of output to 
total revenue. Since profits are being viewed as a residual, i.e., 
TC profits = TR - TC, any increase in "quasi" average costs, —, must be 
accompanied by a compensating decrease in the profit rate, Thus, 
to test the hypothesis that monopoly exists anytime the profit rate 
increases without a decrease in average costs requires a shift in the 
measure of profits to a ratio of profit to net worth. But since no 
consistent relationship was found between profit to net worth and size 
of firm it is not surprising that no consistent relationship exists 
between TC/^  ^and size of firm. 
A number of the average cost curves estimated with linear and 
quadratic regression equations had positive slopes. The multiple 
correlation coefficients were consistently non-significant at the 95 
percent level indicating that the form of the cost curves was probably 
not that of a quadratic. The regression coefficients were significantly 
different from zero for enough of the three digit food processing 
industry groups to cause alarm. Thus, the concept of average cost 
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curves for multi-product firms promoted by Carter and Dean was re­
evaluated. 
Average total cost is being defined as total cost per dollar of 
sales, TC/^ gy An increase in the ratio of TC/^  ^indicates only that 
the profit margin per unit of sales has declined. It does not necessarily 
mean that average cost per physical unit of output has declined, nor 
does it necessarily indicate that the rate of return on invested capital 
has declined. 
Total cost is defined as Z where c^  is the cost per unit of 
the ith input and is the amount of the ith input employed. Total 
revenue is total cost plus total profit or 2 p^  q^ , where p^  is the 
selling price of the ith output and is the quantity sold of the ith 
output. Increasing average costs defined as above could be caused by 
an increase in TC with no change in TR, i.e., profits per dollar of 
43 
sales decline, or by a reduction in p^  with an inelastic demand curve. 
However, a firm with monopoly power would never lower price in the 
inelastic range of its demand curve. Since the monopolistic would never 
produce in the inelastic range of his demand curve, any reduction in 
his prices in the elastic portion of his demand curve would cause a 
more than proportionate increase in quantity thus increasing total 
revenue. This has caused him to move to a new point on his total cost 
curve which may represent an increase, decrease, or no change in average 
total costs defined as costs per physical unit of output. If average 
These changes could occur only with non-perfect competition and 
differentiated products. 
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cost per physical unit of output is constant, TC/„„ will decline because 
IK 
of the increase in TR. But if average cost per physical unit of output 
is declining, IC/^  ^may or may not decline depending on (1) the rate 
of change in total costs and (2) the rate of change in TR which is 
determined by the elasticity of demand. Thus, for time series analysis 
there seems to be no straight forward interpretation of TC/^  ^without 
information about the elements that make up TR, i.e., price and quantity. 
In cross-section analysis firms of different sizes are being related 
under the assumption that if firm x is smaller than y, growth of firm x 
will cause it to take on the cost structure of y. But since the firms 
are still of a multi-product nature and sell differentiated products 
it is impossible to conclude that a higher TC/^  ^ratio for x than y 
means declining average total costs measured in quantity equivalents. 
If the larger of the firms has monopoly power in any or all of its 
products the difference could be from monopoly prices rather than lower 
real average total costs. These facits of the changing ratio cannot be 
separated without price data and pricing information. Thus, for the 
purposes of this study the hypotheses concerning cost efficiencies had 
to be ignored because TC/^  ^provided only an addition measure of profit 
margins or price-cost margins and one that was inferior to the average 
gross margin concept used in the research. 
The cost curves derived with the use of total revenue as a weighted 
measure of output were found to be neither linear nor quadratic for 
the five 3-digit food industries studied. The ratio of advertising 
costs to total revenue was positively related to size of firm (measured 
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by total assets) in the meat products industry. The regression coeffici­
ents were significantly different from zero and the coefficient of 
44 
multiple correlation was significant at the 90 percent level. 
The general administrative expenses were significant and positively 
related to the asset size of firm for canned and frozen fruits and 
vegetable products, grain mill products, and bakery products. Other 
measures of costs, i.e., total costs to total revenue and cost of goods 
sold to total revenue, indicated no significant relationship to the 
size of firm although the estimates did provide negatively sloped 
"quasi" average cost curves as would be expected. 
The same curves were run for the food processing sector as a whole 
using the ratio of non-primary to total sales to account for differing 
levels of product heterogeneity within the firms. Again the changes in 
"quasi" average costs could not be explained by either a linear or 
quadratic relationship to size of firm or extent of diversification. 
Total cost to total revenue displayed a downward sloping relationship 
to the factors and size of firm played a much more important role than 
extent of diversification. General administrative expenses (or over­
head) to total revenue displayed a positive relationship to size and 
diversification but in this case the extent of diversification played 
the dominant role. This could possibly be evidence that overhead 
expenses increase in diversified operations, i.e., diversification 
does not cause economies of scale in such operations as management. 
44 
_ The best fit was with a quadratic relationship in which multiple 
R was .62. 
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Thus, the lack of any consistent relationship between size and these 
cost curves is consistent with the lack of a relationship between profit 
rates and size of firm. The cost measures seem to be of little additional 
use. 
It should be emphasized that in addition to the weaknesses pointed 
out in the Carter-Dean cost curves, accounting data obtained from 
secondary sources of the type used in this study are very poor. Even 
though at an aggregative level the accounts should provide some degree 
of consistency from one firm to another, there are enough differences 
in accounting techniques to greatly weaken the usefulness of the data 
for cost studies. 
Thus, the cost analysis that was intended to provide support to 
and yield further evidence of monopoly power or lack of monopoly power 
proved to be of little use because of the lack of relationships and 
the weaknesses of the measures. 
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APPENDIX B. DATA USED IN THE SURVIVAL TECHNIQUE TO DETERMINE 
THE MINIMUM EFFICIENT SIZE PLANT 
Table 15. Change in the percentage share of value added, by employment size class of 
establishments in food manufacturing, 1954 to 1964 (in percent)^  
Size class, number of employees 
Total 
value 100- 250- 500— 1,000-
SIC Industry added^  1-9 10-19 20-49 50-99 249 499 999 2,499 2,500+ 
20 Total food 
and kindred products 
2011 
2013 
1963 100.0 3.3 4.7 12.2 14.9 26.4 16.6 14.7 5.3 1.8 
1954 100.0 4.0 5.1 12.3 15.6 26.1 15.1 11.1 7.5 3.1 
Change 1954-63 -.7 -.4 — • X -.7 + .3 +1.5 +3.6 -2.2 -1.3 
Meat slaughtering 
plants 
1963 100.0 3.2 3.1 8.3 8.6 14.4 13.0 13.2 17.8 18.4 
1958 100.0 3.8 3.0 8.0 8.0 12.5 13.5 10.8 21.5 19.1 
1954 100.0 2.2 2.6 7.2 8.2 12.6 11.1 13.1 15.9 27.0 
Change 1954-63 +1.0 + .5 +1.1 + .4 +1.8 +1.9 +.1 +1.9 -8.6 
Meat processing 
plants 
1963 100.0 3.9 5.8 14.5 15.2 33.7 16.6 10.3 
1958 100.0 7-1 7.5 16.6 17.4 28.4 13.7 9.4 & 
1954 100.0 5.0 6.8 15.0 18,3 26.3 14.8 4.7 9.1 
Change 1954-63 -1.1 -1.0 -.5 -3.1 +7.4 +1.8 -3.5 
D^ata has been withheld to avoid disclosure. Data are included in next smaller size class. 
N^ote:—Figures may not add due to rounding. 
S^ource: (58, pp. 248-253). 
Table 15. (continued) 
Size class, number of employees 
Total 
value 100- 250- 500- 1,000-
SIC Industry added 1-9 10-19 20-49 50-99 249 499 999 2,499 2,500+ 
2015 Poultry dressing 
plants 
2021 
1963 100.0 2.2 2.4 7.8 14.5 45.2 21.0 6.9 
1958 100.0 3.7 3.5 8.9 22.8 41.3 19.9 & 
1954 100.0 7.0 5.1 14.9 22.9 41.5 8.7 EL 
Change 1954-•63 -4.8 -2.7 -7.1 -8.4 +3.7 +19.2 cL 
mery butter 
1963 100.0 19.1 13.8 32.2 21.2 13.7 
1958 100.0 18.1 14.9 27.5 16.8 16.6 6.0 
1954 100.0 14.1 16.0 24.9 17.9 16.4 10.8 
Change 1954-•63 +5,0 -2.2 +7.3 +3.3 -2.7 -10.8 
2022 Natural and process 
cheesed 
1963 100.0 14.2 12.2 21.1 16.9 18.7 16.9 * 
1958 100.0 22.0 13.7 21.0 16.6 15.5 11.1 * 
1954 100.0 15.7 12.2 24.4 22.6 25.2  ^ * 
Change 1954—63 —1.5 0 —3.3 —5.7 +10.4  ^ —— 
2023 Condensed and 
evaporated milk 
1963 100.0 1.7 3.7 18.1 33.0 43.5 
1958 100.0 2.1 2.9 20.3 42.0 32.8 
1954 100.0 3.3 6.0 19.5 39.7 31.5 
Change 1954—63 —1-6 —2.3 —1.4 —6.7 +12.0 
a 
a 
D^ata prior to 1963 has been adjusted to include special dairy products. 
Table 15. (continued) 
Size class, number of employees 
Total 
value 100- 250- 500- 1,000-
SIC Industry added 1-9 10-19 20-49 50-99 249 499 999 2,499 2,500+ 
2024 Ice cream and 
frozen desserts 
1963 100.0 4.1 7.0 23.7 26.6 30.2 8.5 
1958 100.0 4.6 7.7 21.5 26.8 23.9 15.6 8i 
1954 100.0 5.6 9.2 21.8 26.1 22.5 8.4 6.3 
Change 1954-63 -1.5 -2.2 +1.9 +.5 +7.7 -6.2 SL 
2026 Fluid milk® 
1963 100.0 3.5 4.7 14.3 19.7 34.5 15.3 6.8 
Qi 
1958 100.0 4.2 5.6 15.9 20.2 28.2 17.9 8.0 
1954 100.0 2.6 6.5 15.4 18.9 28.7 16.3 7.9 di 
Change 1954-63 +1.1 -1.8 -1.0 +. 8 +5.8 -1.0 -.9 Ql 
2031 Canned and 
cured seafoods^  
1963 100.0 2.9 5.1 20.1 18.4 15.4 13.0 25.1 
1958 100.0 3.7 3.7 17.7 19.9 9.6 16.8 28.7 
1954 100.0 3.3 3.9 14.9 21.3 13.2 17.2 26.2 
Change 1954-63 -.4 +1.2 +5.2 -2.9 +2.2 -4.2 -1.1 
®Data prior to 1958 has been adjusted to include fluid milk and other products. 
D^ata prior to 1958 has been adjusted to include canned seafood and cured fish. 
Table 15. (continued) 
Size class, number of employees 
Total 
value 100- 250- 500- 1,000-
SIC Industry added 1-9 10-19 20-49 50-99 249 499 999 2,499 2,500+ 
2032 Canned specialties® 
1963 100.0 .4 .4 1.9 1.7 5.2 20.0 70.3 ^ — —  
1958 100.0 .2 .4 1.5 2.1 6.6 16.5 72.6 â. â 
1954 100.0 NA" NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Change 1958-63 + .2 0 -.4 -.4 -1.4 +3.5 -2.3 â â 
2033 Canned fruits 
and vegetables 
1963 100.0 1.2 2.7 7.8 12.8 33.3 22.5 13.4 6.2 
1958 100.0 1.4 3.0 9.5 14.2 29.6 23.5 18.6 & 3L 
1954 100.0 1.4 1.9 8.3 11.7 26.0 16.1 14.0 20.5 â 
Change 1954-63 -.2 +• 8 -.5 +.9 +7.3 +6.4 -.6 -14.3 3. 
2034 Dehydrated food 
products 
1963 100.0 2.6 4.0 8.9 14.0 17.1 38.8 14.7 
1958 100.0 3.9 8.5 13.4 12.9 31.8 29.5 â 
1954 100.0 2.7 3.5 12.0 10.3 49.7 21.8 â 
Change 1954-63 -.1 +.5 -3.1 +3.7 -32.6 +31.7 3. 
2035 Pickles, sauces, 
salad dressings 
1963 , 100.0 3.4 5.3 11.9 12.3 31.4 35.7 
1958 100.0 4.9 5.6 13.6 15.9 22.8 37.2 â 
1954 100.0 6.3 5.7 13.1 14.9 27.5 32.5 â 
Change 1954-63 -2.9 -.4 -1.2 -2.6 +3.9 +3.2 â 
®Most establishments classified in this industry in 1958 were classified in canned fruits and 
vegetables. 
N^A:—Not available. 
Table 15, (continued) 
Size class, number of employees 
Total 
value 100- 250- 500- 1,000-





Fresh or frozen 
packaged fish 
2043 
1963 100.0 5.6 8.1 19.4 16.1 28.2 14.0 8.7 
1958 100.0 5.2 6.9 19.4 20.2 26.6 21.6 Si 
1954 100.0 5.0 7.9 15.6 21.2 28.1 22.1 B. 
Change 1954-63 +. 6 +.2 +3.8 -5.1 +.1 +. 6 Sl 
Frozen fruits 
and vegetables 
1963 100.0 1.6 2.1 6.7 12.2 30.2 19.8 27.4 
1958 100.0 .9 2.3 6.9 11.6 35.4 18.9 24.0 
1954 100.0 1.2 1.4 5.6 16.7 36.2 16.1 22.8 
Change 1954-63 +.4 +.7 +1.1 -4.5 -6.0 +3.7 +4.6 
Flour mills 
1963 100.0 3.0 3.1 10.4 20.4 39.5 15.8 7.7 
1958 100.0 2.9 2.4 10.6 18.6 39.7 17.2 8.4 
1954 100.0 3.0 2.6 8.3 18.1 40.2 11.2 16.6 
Change 1954-63 0 +.5 +2.1 +2.3 -0.7 +4.6 -8.9 
Prepared animal 
feeds 
1963 100.0 7,1 10.8 23.2 21.4 23.3 14.2 
3. 
1958 100.0 6.7 9.1 19.4 20.3 32.Û 12.6 Si 
1954 100.0 5,8 7.2 16.2 16.8 38.3 15.6 ——— 
Change 1954-63 +1.3 +3.6 +7.0 +4.6 -15.0 -1.4 
Cereal preparations 
75.8 1963 100.0 .4 11.4 — —  12.4 
1958 100.0 .4 Si 2.9 1.7 6.5 11.4 77.1 
1954 100.0 .2 .3 2.3 1.7 7.6 23.5 


















Table 15. (continued) 
Size class, number of employees 
Total ~ ' 
value 100- 250- 500- 1,COO-






1963 100.0 1.9 4.7 10.9 21.8 60.8 a 
1958 100.0 1.2 4.2 13.8 34.1 46.7 
1954 100.0 1.1 1.8 24.0 42.0 31.1 â 
Change 1954-63 +. 6 +2.9 -13.1 -20.2 +29.7 â 
Blended and 
prepared flour 
1963 100.0 2.0 1.6 6.7 16.0 26.9 46.9 — 
1958 100.0 2.0 2.7 6.0 6.6 13.8 68.9 3 
1954 100.0 2.4 1.9 5.4 10.0 80.4 â Si 
Change 1954-63 -.4 -.3 +2.3 +6.0 -6.6 St Si 
Wet corn milling 
1963 100.0 .8 .4 .8 13.7 —— —^ 19.5 64.8 
1958 100,0 ,5 1.1 1.3 1.4 3- 10.3 14.5 70.9 
1954 100.0 .6 .7 1.2 1.6 10.1 21.6 64.2 
Change 1954-63 +.2 -.3 -.4 +2.0 â Si -2.1 +. 6 
Bread and related 
products 
1963 100.0 2.2 2,7 7.1 13.2 36.0 24.0 11.1 3.7 
1958 100.0 2.8 3.7 8.7 15.3 34.9 20.1 9.7 4.7 
1954 100.0 3.9 3.6 9.0 17.3 32.7 19.5 10.1 3.9 
Change 1954-63 -1.7 -.9 -1.9 -4.1 +3,3 +4.5 +1.0 -.2 
Biscuit, crackers 
and cookies 
1963 100.0 .6 .7 4.1 4.6 10.5 6.9 39.5 33.2 
1958 100.0 .4 .8 3.5 5.5 10.5 12.7 37.7 28.8 
1954 100.0 .4 .8 2.1 3.5 11.7 10.9 70.6 — 











Table 15. (continued) 
Size class, number of employees 
Total 
value 100- 250- 500- 1,000-
SIC Industry added 1-9 10-19 20-49 50-99 249 499 999 2,499 2,500+ 




1963 100.0 8.4 
a 20.9 50.5 20,2 a 
1958 100.0 .6 19.6 44.3 35.5 a 
1954 100.0 1.2 
a 25.3 48.0 25.5 a 
Change 1954-63 i -18.1 cH -27.1 +35.2 a a 
Cane sugar refining 
1963 100.0 2.4 2.8 17.8 77.1 —— 
1958 100.0 .1 Si 2,3 3 9.0 37.0 51.7 
1954 100.0 12.2 3- a 28.8 59.0 
Change 1954-53 +10.8 Si a -10.7 
Beet sugar 
1963 100.0 2.8 
a a 65.1 32.1 a 
1958 100.0 6.2 
Si 77.1 16,1 a 
1954 100.0 3.0 Si 75,2 21,8 ——— 
Change 1954-63 -.2 
a. â> 
-10.1 +10.3 a 
Confectionary 
products 
1963 100.0 2.5 3.1 7.0 11.4 20,2 19.5 16.0 20.2 
1958 100.0 3.0 3.5 6.7 11.5 17-9 17.6 15.5 24.3 
1954 100.0 2.7 3.1 8.2 11.4 20,4 17.1 9.9 27.1 
Change 1954-63 -.2 0 -1.2 0 -.2 +2.4 +6.1 -6.9 
D^ata has been withheld to avoid disclosure. Data are included in next larger size class. 
Table 15. (continued) 
Size class, number of employees 
Total 
value 100- 250- 500- 1,000-
SIC Industry added 1-9 10-19 20-49 50-99 249 499 999 2,499 2,500+ 





1963 100.0 .6 a a 5.3 11.6 7.9 74.6 
1958 100.0 2.7 
a a 12.8 a 10.0 74.3 
1954 100.0 2.6 B. .9 7.0 13.0 76.5 Si 
Change 1954-63 -2.9 â Si -1.7 -1.4 +5.9 Si 
Chewing gum 
1963 100.0 0.8 — —  0.4 1.4 25.4 ^ 72.0 
1958 100.0 .2 0.8 1.2 3- 9.2 17.7 71.0 
1954 100.0 .5 .8 a 1.3 5.8 13.6 78.0 
Change 1954-63 -.1 Si â +.1 +6.0 ci -6.0 
Bottled and 
canned soft drinks 
1963 100.0 4.1 11.4 27.9 20.2 23.9 9.0 3.3 
1958 100.0 7.1 14.2 29.7 20.7 18.0 7.9 2.4 
1954 100.0 9.6 15.3 28.9 17.3 18.9 10.0 
Change 1954-63 -5.5 -2.9 -1.0 +2.9 +5.0 +2.3 
Flavorings 
1963 100.0 4.8 9.8 16.7 30.4 16.2 22.0 
1958 100.0 5.0 8.6 15.2 29.8 21.3 20.1 
1954 100.0 6.2 6.0 15.0 40.9 13.3 18.5 
Change 1954-63 -1.4 +3.8 +1.7 -10.5 +2.9 +3.5 Si 
Cottonseed 
oil mills 
1963 100.0 .4 5.4 35.7 30.7 27.8 — —  
1958 100.0 .8 3.8 38.3 30.2 26.9 
1954 100.0 .8 3.7 27.4 38.4 29.8 ——•— 















Table 15. (continued) 
Size class, number of employees 
Total 
value 100- 250- 500- 1,000-
SIC Industry added 1-9 10-19 20-49 50-99 249 499 999 2,499 2,500+ 
2092 Soybean oil mills 
1963 100.0 2.1 3.7 13.6 43.0 9.3 28.4 
1958 100.0 .7 1.5 19.4 31.8 16,4 30.1 
1954 100.0 . 6 .6 10.6 34.3 12.3 41.5 — — —  
Change 1954-63 +1.5 +2.1 +3.0 +8.7 -3.0 -13.1 
2093 Vegetable oil 
mills, n.e.C.J 
1963 100.0 2.2 3.1 13.2 30.0 51.5 
1958 100.0 1.5 2.5 4.6 21.6 69,8 
1954 100.0 3.7 3.9 8.9 19.8 63.7 
3. 
Change 1954-63 -1.5 -.8 +4.3 +10.2 -12.2 Si 
2094 Animal and marine 
fats and oils* 
1963 100.0 6.9 14.8 31.3 21.2 25.9 
1958 100.0 7.7 14.2 28.6 24.6 14.2 10.8 
1954 100.0 8.1 13.7 28.5 19.9 17.3 12.5 a 
Change 1954-63 -1.2 +1.1 +2.8 +1.3 -3.9 
D^ata prior to 1958 has been adjusted to include lindseed oil mills and vegetable oil mills, n.e. 
D^ata prior to 1963 has been adjusted to include grease and tallow and animal oils, n.e.c. 
Table 15. (continued) 
Size class, number of employees 
Total 
value 100- 250- 500- 1,000-
SIC Industry added 1-9 10-19 20-49 50-99 249 499 999 2,499 2,500+ 
2096 Shortening and 
cooking oils 
1963 100.0 .6 .6 5.3 12.1 43.8 18.4 19.2 —— 
1958 100.0 .3 1.0 4.0 13.0 38.8 27.4 15.6 
1954 100.0 3.1 2.1 â 11.6 56.8 26.4 & 
Change 1954-63 -2.5 +3.2 â +.5 -13.0 +11.2 â â 
2095 Roasted coffee?* 
1963 100.0 1.4 1.9 8.5 10.2 20.7 19.3 37.9 3. 
1958 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
1954 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
2097 Manufactured ice 
1963 100.0 26.5 28.1 34.1 11.3 3. 
1958 100.0 26.9 25.8 32.3 9.6 5.4 
1954 100.0 27.2 24.7 32.7 10.0 5.9 
Change 1954-63 -.7 +3.4 +2.0 -4.6 ^ 
2098 Macaroni and 
spaghetti 
1963 100.0 3.4 4.1 9.7 15.6 42.7 24.4 
1958 100.0 3.8 3.8 13.4 22.2 41.3 15.6 
1954 100.0 5.3 3.4 15.7 22.2 36,1 17.3 
Change 1954-63 -1.9 +.7 -6.0 -6.6 +6.6 +7.1 
D^ata prior to 1958 has been adjusted to include margarine. 
®Prior to 1963, coffee roasting was not classified as a separate industry, but was classified as 
part of food preparations, n.e.c. 
Table 15. (continued) 
Size class, number of employees 
Total 
value 100- 250- 500- 1,000-
SIC Industry added 1-9 10-19 20-49 50-99 249 499 999 2,499 2,500+ 
2099 Food preparations, 
n.e.c. 
1963 100.0 3.8 4.4 12.6 13.0 24.0 20.8 20.7 
1958 100.0 5.0 5.3 12.8 13.4 27.7 21.9 13.8 
1954 100,0 4.4 5.4 11.4 12.3 30.1 18.3 18.1 





°Data includes coffee roasting. 
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APPENDIX C. DISTRIBUTIONS OF PROFIT RATES, DIVERSIFICATION, AND CONCEN­
TRATION BY SIZE OF FIPJ^  FOR SAMPLE USED IN REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
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Table 16. Distribution of profit to net worth by size of firm 
Profit/net worth 
Assets size Less over 
(millions) than 0 Û-.05 .051-.10 .11-.15 .16-.20 .21-.25 .25 
0-10 8 9 7 10 3 
10-25 1 8 6 3 3 
25-50 1 1 7 5 5 
50-100 3 2 7 4 1 
100-250 1 2 10 4 2 
250-500 1 2 7 2 
500-1,000 2 1 2 2 
228 
Table 17. Distribution of the extent of product 
diversification by size of firm 
Diversification nonprimary sales/total sales 
Assets 
size .01- ,11- .21- .31- .41- .51- .61- Over 
(millions) 0 .10 .20 .30 .40 .50 .60 .70 .70 
0-10 24 1 
10-25 10 2 1 1 
25-50 3 2 1 2 2 1 
50-100 5 3 6 1 2 2 1 
100-250 1 4 3 2 1 2 1 2 
250-500 1 2 2 1 4 2 
500-1,000 2 1 1 1 2 
229 
Table 18. Distribution of diversified power index by size of firm 
Index of diversified power 
Assets 
size 0- .11- .21- .31- .41- .51= .61- .71- Over 
(millions) ,10 .20 .30 .40 .50 .60 .70 .80 .80 
0-10 7 10 4 1 2 
10-25 5 4 4 1 1 
25-50 3 3 5 1 
50-100 5 5 3 1 2 2 
100-250 2 8 2 1 2 1 
250-500 2 4 2 3 1 
500-1,000 1 3 1 1 1 
230 
Table 19. Distribution of primary industry concentration by size of firm 
Primary industry 4-firm concentration ratios 
Assets 
size .0- .11- .20- .31- .41= .51= .61- .71- .81- .91-
(millions) .10 .20 .30 .40 .50 .60 .70 .80 .90 1.00 
0-10 5 11 3 1 3 2 
10-25 3 4 5 1 1 
25-50 2 7 1 2 1 
50-100 6 4 2 2 2 1 
100-250 1 3 6 2 2 1 
250-500 1 5 3 1 
500-1,000 3 2 2 
